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Dura, Appadana, Gazica, Circesium, Phaliga. Some of them we know as exceptionally important fortresses, such as Dura with a garrison of at least 1800 men as reinforced recently by Gallus (below, p. 44, n. 57),30 and probably Circesium. All of them, except Dura, stood on the left bank of the Euphrates, while all the cities taken by Shapuhr and mentioned in his report were on the right bank. But Dura was not on the left bank, and yet it is mentioned by Shapuhr not while he described his march to the north but in the "Appendix." The only explanation of this which I am able to suggest is as follows. Shapuhr wanted to move up the river as fast as possible. He had no time for prolonged sieges and took those Roman strongholds only which were on the road on which his army was marching, that is to say on the right bank of the Euphrates, and which probably offered no strong resistance. He passed by Dura because it was well fortified, had a strong garrison, and required a long siege, and he did not venture to cross the Euphrates because this bank was studded with fortified Roman military posts and the crossing and capture of the fortresses would take too much time. He shows the same haste after the battle of Barbalissus. In his thrust to the South he does not mention Hamath and Hemesa (the first mentioned later in his list) ; he never advanced beyond Raphanaea to the South leaving in the hands of the Romans the Phoenician cities, and he never crossed the mountains to reach the seashore with such opulent cities as Laodicea and Aradus.

In the drive to the West and North we notice the same hurry. Shapuhr took Zeugma and Urima, but not the important crossing of the Euphrates at Europos (Carchemish) while Germanicia and Bathnae31 are mentioned in the Appendix only. Shapuhr's chief aim was apparently to take Seleucia and especially Antioch, for the sake of loot and propaganda.

On his way back he acted in general in the same way, taking the cities which could not defend themselves and were an easy prey. Hemesa was not taken - and we know why (see below) -while Hamath (Hama) was. of the Euphrates' fortresses we find again no mention of Europos-Carchemish and of the minor fortresses of the left bank of the Euphrates. But the chief Roman strongholds of the Middle Euphrates, Circesium and Dura, were captured.

The third section of Shapuhr's narrative concerning his wars with the Romans deals with the third campagn , the battle of Edessa, the capture of Valerian and the consequences of these two spectacular successes. In harmony with the im portance of this decisive success the tone of the narrative becomes more emphatic and the account fuller. The account plunges in medias res: ll. 19 ff., "in the third campaign, when we moved against Carrhae and Edessa and besieged Carrhae and Edessa, Valerian the emperor came to meet us and with him an army of seventy thousand men." Then


30. In the period after Gallus Dura's garrison consisted certainly of the XXth Palmyrene cohort (1,000 men), of one more auxiliary cohort (at least 500), and of a vexillatio of another auxiliary cohort (at least 100). In addition there were at least two legionary vexillationes (about 200 men at least). See

   

J. F. Gilliam, TAPA, LXXII, 1941, p. 170, n. 59.
31. Which Bathnae of the two is meant is uncertain; since Mesopotamia was not attacked in general the Bathnae of the inscription is probably the Syrian Bathnae.


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