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Internal migration in Syria: Findings from a national survey

Fafo

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Preface

"Internal Migration in Syria" presents some major findings of the Syria Internal Migration Survey project, SIMS in short. The report looks at migration flows within and across provinces, and rural and urban areas. Particular efforts have been made to investigate the assumption made by some Syrian researchers that population movement to Damascus and province capitals has halted and that "reverse migration", i.e. movement from cities and to rural areas, and out of province capitals and into smaller cities and towns takes place.

In addition to migration patterns, the report pictures the socio-economic characteristics of migrants, examines the reasons for spatial movement, studies the use of remittances from migrants, and analyses the social integration of migrants at their place of destination. Moreover, it looks at temporary, seasonal migration and intentions to move in the future.

The SIMS is a joint project between the University of Damascus, the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies (Fafo). The CBS collected the data during the second quarter of 2000, and was responsible for data processing. Interviews with more than 20,000 families were successfully completed. Researchers from the University of Damascus and the CBS were responsible for data analysis, with assistance from Fafo. Fafo, in collaboration with the University and the CBS, developed the survey instruments and provided technical feedback during the design and analysis stages.

In addition to this report, the project has, to date, generated a Tabulation report and an Analytical report, both in Arabic, written by the research teams from the University of Damascus and the CBS and published by the University of Damascus. It is further expected that the Syrian government will benefit from the wealth of high-quality statistical data by conducting more in-depth analysis. The University has also published a Methodology Report (in Arabic), which presents the questionnaire, manuals and training materials that were utilized in the study. We hope that the Methodology Report will aid and facilitate future household surveys conducted by the University, and others.

The SIMS project has a two-year history. Nevertheless, the cooperation between the University of Damascus and Fafo goes back five years, to the fall of 1996, when a group of professionals from the University - sponsored by the Norwegian government - visited Fafo in Oslo for a one-week workshop. During that workshop, each institution presented to the other party its fields of interest, and we explored for the first time the possibility of engaging in a joint study.
At the time, we did not know where, exactly, we were heading, as we discussed such diverse topics as the development of marriage patterns; the family and relations

between family members; the status of women in Syria and the Middle East; the Scandinavian welfare state model; privatisation in Syria; the role of civil society in the Arab world; and several questions pertaining to statistics and research methodology.

One of the interesting papers at the workshop, presented by Dr. Kheder Zakaria from the University of Damascus, dealt with the phenomenon of migration in Syria. More precisely the paper discussed the rural-urban dimension of population movement, as this particular aspect of migration has been of considerable concern to decision-makers and central to policy planning in Syria. The paper resulted in a great deal of scholarly debate and it soon became clear that the two groups of researchers found common ground here.

To make a long history short, our next encounter took place in Damascus. Here, Fafo discussed with our Syrian friends the issue of migration more in depth, and started designing a proposal for a migration study. At this point, the Central Bureau of Statistics was invited on board to share with us its expertise and experience in conducting large-scale surveys in Syria.

The three institutions together made a proposal to the Norwegian government to fund the SIMS, which it generously decided to do. We would like to take the opportunity, therefore, to thank Norway for its generosity. We, moreover, extend our greatest appreciation to Vigleik Eide, the Norwegian ambassador to Syria, and his colleagues at the Embassy, for the wonderful support that Fafo as well as our project partners have received over the years.

Turning back to the SIMS project, its principle objective was to provide Syria and Syrian decision-makers and policy planners with high-quality statistics on the nature of population movement in Syria. Through the reports of the project to date, we believe we have come a long way to achieve that. In addition, we sincerely hope that the Syrian Government, with assistance from the University and the CBS, will carry out more detailed analyses in the near future. Thus, professional use of the comprehensive data set would provide the Government with highly relevant input needed for the formulation of population policy, socioeconomic planning and development strategies.

We would like to thank the author of the report, Marwan Khawaja, for his relentless efforts at analysing the complex migration data set and presenting the main findings in this brief and compelling manner. Yet, "Internal Migration in Syria" is the result of significant amount of input and contributions from many people. We should like to express our sincere thanks to Dr. Moussa Darir, Head of the Institute of Economy and Demography at the University, and Dr. Ibrahim Ali, Director General at the CBS, who not only guided their respective research teams throughout the entire project in an outstanding way, but also, together with Mamduh

Mubayed of the CBS and colleagues at the University, contributed significantly to the analysis of the survey data. Furthermore, we are indebted to the support that Khawaja received from Said Safadi and his assistants at the CBS Computer section in producing the accurate statistical output for this report.

Going back one step to the inception, planning and design stages of the Internal Migration Study, we are most grateful to Dr. Sadeq Al-Azem for the invaluable assistance provided. Sumaya Sadel Dine at the CBS was an important factor in the success of our cooperation, as she took care of the much-needed oral and written translations between the Syrian and Norwegian teams. We owe her our sincere thanks. Other persons to whom we are deeply obliged are all the fieldworkers, who we should like to thank for their excellent work. Last but not least, we are profoundly indebted to the vast number of patient and sharing informants and respondents all over Syria without whose co-operation this study would have been impossible. We hope that the report does their contributions justice and that we have painted a picture of migration, which will help the population of Syria through well-informed development policies.

Turning to Fafo: Åge A. Tiltnes directed the project while several Fafo researchers (Marie Arneberg, Marwan Khawaja, Jon Pedersen Åge A. Tiltnes and Guri Tyldum) participated in survey design, sampling, training, data cleaning and preliminary data analysis. Agneta Kolstad prepared the manuscript for printing. We should like to thank them all for their contributions.

Oslo
April 2002
Jon Hanssen-Bauer
Managing Director
Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies

1 Background to the Syrian internal migration survey

The Syrian internal migration survey is a joint project between the Faculty of Economics at the University of Damascus, the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies (Fafo). The Central Bureau of Statistics carried out the survey during the second quarter of 2000, and was responsible for data processing. Local research teams were responsible for data analysis, with assistance from Fafo. The local teams consisted of researchers from the University of Damascus and the CBS. Fafo, in collaboration with the University and CBS, developed the survey instruments for the project and provided technical feedback during the design and analysis stages.

This brief report presents some results pertaining to the incidence (volume) and patterns of internal migration in Syria based on data from the household survey.

Survey design

The survey design called for a relatively large sample of about 20,000 households, owing to the expected rates of internal migration as well as the desire to report on inter-regional migration flows. The sample is based on a multi-stage stratified design, using a sampling frame constructed from the 1994 census of population and household listings updated of all the selected clusters. Interviews with 20,409 households (consisting of 120,247 persons) and 20,330 adults aged 15 years and over were successfully completed, together with about 15,854 ever-married women aged 15-49. (See Appendix 1 for more details about the sample.)

Given our dual purpose of measuring migration flows and explaining the process of migration, we use a specialized migration survey that captures information at the individual, household and to some extent neighbourhood levels. Specialized surveys are the best source of data for investigating the causes and consequences of internal migration in developing countries, at least when compared to conventional censuses and other household surveys (Bilsborrow et al. 1984). Extensive information on migrants and non-migrants are included in the survey, together with data on relevant determinants of migration decisions and behaviour. Although the survey is cross-sectional in design, it includes retrospective data for adult migrants. The survey instrument consists of three main questionnaires: the household questionnaire, a questionnaire for a randomly selected adult aged 15 years and over from each household, and a women's questionnaire.

The household questionnaire includes basic information on the household unit, every household member, and on the neighbourhood in which the household is

located. The main migration questions are included in the household questionnaire, especially the conventional lifetime and period migration questions. This part also includes a special module on the dates and places of destination and origin for up to six moves undertaken during the past five years before the survey. In addition, it includes migration relevant questions at the household levels pertaining to social integration, the household economy, remittances, housing conditions and more importantly, items about close relatives living away from home (migrants).

The second questionnaire is devoted to a randomly selected individual (RSI) adult from each household, and includes a complete migration history for adults who moved at least once in their lifetime. This module is quite detailed with regard to information at the time of move, covering objective demographic, economic and social characteristics as well as subjective assessment of the reasons behind each move. The RSI module covers the following:

1. Complete migration history of all adults aged 15 and older, including dates of all moves undertaken, places of origin and destination, demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of persons at time of move, help received and type of assistance received during migration;

2. Information about the last move, including three main reasons for making the last move, subjective assessment of economic status and social conditions at the place of destination and place of origin;

3. Social integration questions for all respondents, regardless of their migration status; and

4. Demographic items relating to male fertility and maternal mortality.

Finally, the women's questionnaire includes questions about births and deaths of children as well as family planning. For each ever married woman, a complete birth history was collected and included the age, sex and survival status of all children born alive regardless of their current residence. The birth history file includes data on about 79,000 live-born children.

The wealth of data available should be sufficient for detailed analysis of migration at the regional level. While the data contain some missing information and other inconsistencies, they are of good quality for a survey of this size in a developing country.

Space, time, and other definitions

Conceptually, migration involves a fundamental change of one's social community (Goldscheider 1971). Unlike other demographic events, it is difficult to define and measure adequately for several reasons. For one thing, it is a movement across space and time, and the delineation of each is arbitrary and difficult to establish precisely. "For a movement to be considered a migration, it must (1) be across a political or administrative boundary, and (2) involve a change of "usual residence"" (Bilsborrow 1998: 3). Both of these requirements must be satisfied for a movement to be counted as migration. Thus, change of residence within the smallest administrative unit (town, village, etc) is not considered migration as conventionally defined. Yet, political or administrative boundaries are not fixed over time; nor are they uniform from one country to another, or from one census to another within the same country. This has important implication for measuring the volume of migration – more administrative units imply a larger volume of migration, other things being equal. The second requirement referring to the change of usual residence is primarily a question of defining the exact time period for which the person intends to live in the new place of residence. Following the UN recommendation for population censuses, most countries use a cut-off of six or 12 months of residence in the new place to be considered "permanent" migration (Bilsborrow 1998: 3-4), thus excluding those who move for a shorter period of time as non-migrants.

Migration is defined here as a move from one place of residence in order to go and live in another place for a continuous period of at least six months. The six-months time cut off has been drawn in order to allow for international comparisons, but also to distinguish permanent moves from temporary (or seasonal) migration within and across national borders.

Place of residence is defined as the smallest administrative unit in Syria for urban areas, namely, the city; it is the "Nahia" (which consists of several villages) for rural areas. Thus, any move made by an individual from one city or town to another, or from any city or town to another Nahia, or from one Nahia to another Nahia is defined as migration; moves between villages in the same Nahia are not counted as migration in our survey. In the analysis below, we report findings at higher levels of aggregation, e.g., provinces, but this is done only for substantive (or policy) reasons.

The regional boundaries used here are the same ones used by the Syrian statistical classification system. We distinguish between flows between Mohafaza (governorates, or provinces) and three types of residence, namely Mohafaza center (provincial town), other urban places, and rural villages. In designing the sample, our aim was to generate survey data that are representative at these levels of analysis.

There are finer geographic classifications (district, sub-district, etc), but these are not used in the reporting of results.

We draw distinctions between various kinds of permanent migration, all of which are based on the definition above. The main distinctions are between lifetime, period, and migration move. Lifetime migration is used to distinguish individuals who changed their place of residence since birth from others. Period migration also refers to a change of residence at two time points, but with reference to the five years preceding the survey (i.e., since 1995). Migration move refers to any move (of permanent nature) made by a person during his or her lifetime. Here we utilize data on the entire migration history of individuals, but we focus on the last move made by migrants. Another distinction based on the migration moves' data is that between one-time and recurrent (including return) migrants. One-time movers are those who migrated from their place of origin and currently live in another place at the time of the interview, but who have not returned or otherwise made another move. Recurrent migrants are those who made more than one move during their lifetime, but who might have returned to their place of origin at the time of the interview.

The main unit of analysis used is the individual. However, we also report on the migration behaviour of households, using essentially the same definitions as above. Households are, therefore, divided into migrant households and non-migrant households. A migrant household is defined as a household in which at least one household member is a migrant as defined above. A non-migrant household is a household from which no member has ever left the usual place of current residence, or has an intention of staying away, for a period of at least six months.

We also scanned households for information on their migrant members currently living away, if any. Obviously, the data derived from this module are partial and biased; for an unknown number of migrants have no close relatives in their places of origin. This module concerning relatives away is especially important however for assessing financial flows (e.g., remittances) and other links with current migrants, and also shedding additional light on the migrants, their characteristics, their places of residence, and so on.

Previous studies of internal migration in Syria

Empirical studies of internal migration in Syria are quite rare. Most of the available evidence relies on limited migration data from the censuses and small-scale surveys. To date, this is the first nation-wide specialized survey of internal migration in Syria. Below, we provide a brief review of previous empirical studies devot-

ed to this topic. The studies, available in Arabic, are largely descriptive in nature and devoted to rural-urban migration.

There are exceptions, however. The most comprehensive analytic study of internal migration in Syria is the recently completed Strategic National Plan for Internal Migration in the Syrian Arab Republic, sponsored by the State Planning Commission in cooperation with UNFPA and ILO (State Planning Commission 1991). This study primarily reports the results of a large internal migration household survey carried out in 1987. The survey is based on a sample of about 5,000 households in three cities (Damascus, Aleppo and Homs) and a sample of about 3,000 households selected randomly from the rural sector of the country as a whole. The report consists of six chapters dealing with many of the fundamental aspects of internal migration, including causes and consequences of migration, migrants' demographic and socio-economic characteristics, the interrelationship between migration and other demographic factors such as fertility, and elements of a national plan (strategy) of internal migration. Although it would be difficult to summarize the many findings from this study here, a few conclusions pertaining to the determinants of migration are in order.

One of the main conclusions of this study is that access to land plays a critical role in determining rural-urban migration. The landless are more likely to move to the cities, compared to those holding agricultural land. Furthermore, unemployment in the countryside is also an important determinant of citywide migration. The migrants in the city are involved mainly in service jobs, marginal work, and the public sector, and hence migration is a means of transplanting surplus labourers to the cities. Underemployment and unemployment is more common among the migrants of the cities. Furthermore, villagers have a desire to migrate for better income and jobs in the cities, owing to the disparities in wage levels and job opportunities between the city and countryside in Syria. This is re-enforced by the higher educational attainment of the rural population, and education is one of the main determinants of migration. On the other hand, a few migrate for educational purposes. Housing and the availability of services and amenities are considered secondary factors for migration to the cities. If anything, housing is perhaps a cause of reverse migration from the city to the countryside.

There are a few unpublished studies focusing on internal migration in Syria (for further detail see, Zakaria and Sibai 1991: 11-12). Most of these are Master theses prepared by students at Damascus University. They are largely based on small-scale sample surveys, covering rural areas in a region or migrants in a city. Rural-urban migration is the primary focus of these studies. A main conclusion from these studies is that the causes of rural-urban migration differ by period-related changes in the socio-economic sphere in Syria. However, the determinants are mostly pushing

factors in the countryside rather than pulling factors in the cities, as elsewhere in the region (see Winckler 1999: 73). Overall, the findings underscore the importance of economic factors behind citywide migration.

Finally, the Central Bureau of Statistics released some studies and figures pertaining to population distribution and inter-regional migration in Syria at the Mohafaza level (e.g., Ali 1996; Ali and Mubaid 1987; CBS 1998, 2000). These studies are entirely based on lifetime inter-Mohafaza migration data provided by the four censuses of 1960, 1970, 1981 and 1994. The census monographs on the demographic characteristics of the population in Syria include more or less comparable inter-Mohafaza migration data. Data on the last usual place of residence for migrants and duration of stay are also available for the last two censuses. The overriding conclusion from these studies is that internal migration in Syria has become stable over the years, with a possible reversal in the traditional pattern of rural-urban migration (see Batatu 1999: 9).

Some questions

Migration is a complex, multifaceted process. It involves a variety of actors and factors contributing to its occurrence at both places of origin and destination. In addition to, or instead of, the "benefits" of migration for the individual migrants and their families, it has a varying impact on the people and communities of sending and receiving areas. Internal migration, especially, has important bearing on issues related to national and local development (Mollet 1991; Cole and Sanders 1983). The popular and scholarly discourse on internal migration often emphasizes the negative dimensions of internal migration, which range from political instability to "social breakdown", over-urbanization, poverty, death, uneven development, and environmental degradation (Brockerhoff 1995; Chirwa 1997; Lipton 1977; Zakaria ND). Yet, geographic mobility can be viewed in positive terms, yielding benefits to both migrants and non-migrants, sending and receiving areas, and to national development as a whole (Bilsborrow 1998: 23; Papademetriou and Martin 1991; Skeldon 1997).

Policy responses to internal migration have not been widely observed (see Nam et al. 1990; Skeldon 1990). For, unlike international migration, geographic mobility within countries is largely "free" of legal or political constraints. And yet, most people almost everywhere do not move (Hammer et al. 1997). This is quite surprising from an economic perspective given the disparities between different regions of the same country, between rural and urban areas, between centers of the main provincial cities and their hinterland, and between places of the same kind. Indeed, spatial inequalities in wage levels, public health and education services, agricultural

land, cultural "life", and so on abound in Syria as everywhere else. Questions relating to the patterns, causes and consequences of migration cannot therefore be answered adequately without looking to the forces behind immobility (Hammer et al. 1997).

Nor can we understand the present state of internal migration in Syria without some reference to the historical context of both demographic trends and national development there. Some comparisons with the most recent past are important if we are to make sense of our data. For example, are the levels of internal migration or inter-provincial flows too high? It would be difficult, if not outright impossible, to give answers to this question without resorting to the historical record of migration and provincialism within Syria (Winckler 1999: 69). There exist of course relevant data on internal migration for recent times, including four censuses of population, and a complete migration history of adults in the survey. We attempt to draw on these and other sources of information to aid us in providing answers to the issues addressed here. However, there are usually conflicting stories, or otherwise patches of evidence, to choose from, in which case our answers could be judged as preliminary at best. The levels, trends, causes and consequence of internal migration reported here provide at least a baseline for future assessments of Syria's population mobility and development.

We started with a long list of policy-relevant questions relating to both mobility and its compliment, immobility, in Syria. We chose to focus on a number of issues of current relevance, with far-reaching implications for the country's development. These include the following:

1. Does Syria exhibit a high rate of internal mobility by developing countries' standards?
2. What are the reasons for the relatively low (or high) rates of internal mobility in Syria?
3. Do economic factors account for migration flows in Syria? How do these factor compare with geographic and social (e.g., family, social network) factors?
4. What is the shape of inter-regional migration in Syria? Are some regions in decline, other demographic factors being equal? Are people flowing from the countryside to provincial cities? From small to large Mohafazas? Or from remote regions to more central locations?
5. What is the weight of "migration capital" in shaping migration flows in Syria? Does migration breed migration?

6. How do households, kinship and social networks figure in the migration of persons and families in Syria?
7. How large is rural-urban migration in Syria? Has there been a reversal of past trends?
8. Can the cities and the Capital city of Damascus in particular absorb more in-migrants?
9. What is the social and economic profile of today's in-migrants? How does it compare to the past?
10. Is internal migration gender neutral? What is the contribution of higher education among women to migration desires and behaviour?
11. What is the link between internal migration and national (regional) development in Syria? Is migration good or bad for development? What are the uses of remittances?
12. Is internal migration good or bad for in-migrants? Are the migrants economically mobile populations or stagnant groups residing on the margins of the cities' economic and spatial life? How much segregation is there in terms of economic and social location of migrants and "natives"?
13. Are in-migrants, and especially peasants in the cities, suffering from problems of adjustment to city life, with implications for social marginality and "disorder"?
14. What is the economic impact of migration on sending regions and rural places? Does migration contribute to more development, inequality, or stagnation of places of origin? Does it adversely affect agriculture? Is migration good for the development of those places?
15. What is the economic and social "cost" of internal migration on places of destination? Do in-migrants contribute to the local economy of those places? Do in-migrants bring necessary or otherwise needed skills to the places of destination, leading to higher regional economic growth and development?
16. To what extent is there a competition between the new arrivals and residents in terms of jobs, with implication for wage levels and unemployment?
17. To what extent does migration lead to economic polarization in places of destination by the immobility of children of less educated migrants?

18. Is internal migration too skewed in terms of demographic composition, leading to segmented communities in terms of social class and economic prosperity (or decline)?

19. What are the links between internal migration and urbanization in Syria? Is migration leading to the development of the so-called "mega" cities or to a more "equitable" distribution of the population over "areas"?

20. How many Syrians want to move out of their places of residence? Who are those persons and families desiring to migrate? Where do they want to go? What are the reasons given for their intentions to move out?

Of course, we cannot provide complete and comprehensive answers to these questions in a brief report like this one. Some attempts are made however to shed some light on these and other issues of policy concern. The data collected in the survey are quite extensive, providing ample opportunities for future research to address many of the issues at hand more thoroughly.

The results of the survey are for the most part presented in the form of graphs, although some tables are also included. However, for the reader interested in more details than the graphs can provide, the information of the graphs is reproduced as tables in Appendix 2.

2 Low levels of internal migration, overall

The conventional view is that internal migration is primarily associated with market economies, modernization or industrial society in particular. In such societies, people routinely relocate following availability of jobs and thus sentimental attachments to a particular place are rendered weak or non-existent. Of course, there are anomalies both in past times and now, but international comparative data show that internal migration in the developing countries is relatively low as compared to the industrial world. This is indeed the case for Syria.

Population

The basic *lifetime* and *period* migration rates are respectively 15.3 and 5.2 percent. These rates essentially reflect internal migration, as only 1.1 percent are international lifetime migrants and about 0.3 percent are international period migrants. Thus, about 14 percent of the Syrian population had migrated from their birthplace and were living in another administrative unit at the time of the survey. This is not a particularly high rate from a regional or international perspective. Similarly, five percent of the population aged five years and over had migrated from their usual place of residence in 1995 and were living in another locality (or Nahia for rural areas) at the time of the survey. This figure translates into an annual average migration rate of one percent in Syria during the past five years.

These gross rates mask important differences between types of residence (Figure 2.1). Contrary to expectations, the main cities (Mohafaza centers) do not have the highest proportions of in-migrants; other urban towns do. Nearly a fourth of the population in urban localities are lifetime migrants, which is much larger than

Figure 2.1 Levels of migration (internal and external) by type of residence; percent



the national average. Rural areas have the lowest rate of lifetime migration, at nearly 12 percent, but the corresponding rate for Mohafaza centers is close to the national average.

Urban towns also have the highest proportions of period migrants. Nearly nine percent of their populations aged at least five years were living in different localities in 1995. Rural areas have a slightly lower percentage of period migrants (seven percent), but surprisingly only about two percent of the population in Mohafaza centers are period migrants. Needless to say, these proportions do not reflect the relative volume of migration into Syria's main cities.

As expected, migration varies greatly between regions (Figure 2.2). Lifetime migration rates range between 25 percent in the Damascus Mohafaza[1] to a low level of nearly five percent in Der Elzor. Thus, the Damascus Mohafaza has an exceptionally high rate of in-migrants, where one out of every four persons currently living there was born in another place. With about 22 percent in-migrants, Qunitra is not far behind, owing to displacements caused by the Arab-Israeli wars. Seven of the Mohafazas have a disproportionately higher number of lifetime migrants than the national average as clearly shown in the graph.

Figure 2.2 Levels of lifetime migration by governorate



[1] "Damascus Mohafaza" is used synonymously with "Damascus Other" and "Damascus Rural" in this report, and denotes the areas surrounding Damascus City, which makes up a separate province or Mohafaza.

Distinguishing between urban and rural areas in the respective Mohafazas demonstrates more diversity in the incidence of lifetime migration (Figure 2.3). Two trends are clear. First, levels of lifetime migration in urban areas are higher than rural localities in most of the Mohafazas. Only in three Mohafazas, where comparisons are relevant, do we notice higher migration levels in rural areas then urban ones. Second, there are greater variations in the levels of lifetime migration among urban areas than among their rural counterparts. Thus, the rates range from a very high level of 35 percent in urban Sweda to only five percent in urban Hama. The corresponding rates for rural areas range from 22 percent in Qunitra to three percent in Der Elzor. Thus, urban towns show more heterogeneity in terms of migration than rural areas. Sweda is not an anomaly however, and about 30 percent of the population in each of urban Damascus and Tartous are lifetime migrants.

Variation between regions is also evident for migration since 1995, but to a lesser extent as compared with lifetime migration (Figures 2.4 and 2.5). Here, Dara stands out with an exceptionally high rate of period migration, at 14 percent. Otherwise the variance is small, with levels ranging from nine percent in the Damascus Mohafaza to about two percent in Damascus City. More variations in the levels are observed after distinguishing between urban and rural residence within Mohafazas.

Figure 2.3 Levels of lifetime migration by governorate and urban-rural residence



Figure 2.4 Levels of period migration by governorate



Figure 2.5 Levels of period migration by governorate and urban-rural residence



Unlike lifetime migration, there are more variations among rural areas here, with rural Dara having a fourth of its population migrants as compared to rural Hasakeh with merely one percent period-migration rate. For urban areas, Sweda and Damascus Mohafazas have relatively high rates of period migration, 15 and ten percent, respectively; otherwise, similarity rather than difference characterizes the trends reported here.

Are the rates of internal migration reported here too low? We certainly expected higher overall levels of internal migration in Syria. After all, Damascus has grown at a faster rate during the past few decades than the national average. There are various reasons for the relatively low levels of internal migration observed for the Syrian population as a whole.

First, a relatively high proportion of the population lives in rural areas, with reliance on agriculture as a source of livelihood. There is some evidence that Syria's agricultural population has decreased in recent years, despite the government's efforts to improve the living conditions in the countryside (see Batatu 1999: 38-71). We know from various sources, that internal migration intensifies with urbanity. Second, the vast majority of the population own their dwellings, making it more difficult for them to move. For one thing, a housing market is nearly lacking in most of the country's towns and villages, save major urban areas. Third, there is a near parity in social service provision, public facilities, public schooling, welfare and so on, throughout the country (see Drysdale 1987), providing potential migrants little incentives to move. For, improvements in the delivery of services in the countryside have been one of the main public policy issues in Syria since the early 1960s, and especially from 1970 onward (Winckler 1999: 129-135). Fourth, there is also little variations in wage levels for those engaged in paid work, and the public sector is relatively large and visible everywhere. Fifth, while the city of Damascus has clear advantages in terms of wage levels and public services, making it an exceptionally desired place of destination until this day, housing costs in the main cities, particularly Damascus, provide negative incentives for potential migrants. Sixth, Syria is a relatively large country, with low overall levels of population density. And, finally, internal migration figures prominently in the public policy agenda of the Syrian State as judged by the various five-year development plans. However, these factors remain as mere speculation and it is not the purpose of this report to establish the relative importance of each on migration flows.

Households

How are households affected by the migration of one or more of their members? From the survey results, we can safely conclude that internal migration affects a sizeable proportion of households in Syria.

Nearly two in five households have at least one household member who was born elsewhere — a much higher proportion than the one observed at the population level. On the other hand, period migration at the household level is close to that documented for individuals and about seven percent of households have a household member who migrated within the past five years.

Like previously, urban towns have higher proportions of in-migrants than other types of localities (Figure 2.6). In fact, the relative distribution across residence is similar to the one before with regard to both lifetime and period migration. Almost one in two households in urban towns have a lifetime migrant, and at least two in five households in Mohafaza centers have one. Thus, both urban types have a higher rate of lifetime migration than the national average. Rural areas have the lowest proportions of lifetime in-migrants, but the overall level is not that low at nearly 30 percent. On the other hand, conclusions regarding period migration at the household level are similar to those discussed at the population level, with Mohafaza main cities having a disproportionately low number of in-migrants during the past five years.

Figure 2.6 Levels of lifetime and period migration by current residence; percent of households



Similarly, the same regional variations in lifetime and period migrations also hold at the household level (Figure 2.7). In Damascus, Qunitra and Sweda, lifetime migration has affected one in two households. The corresponding proportions in Hasakeh, Tartous and Latakia are also quite high at over 40 percent. In contrast, only Der Elzor has less than 20 percent of its households without a lifetime migrant. The ranking, as well as the variance in the proportions, across Mohafazas is the same as before.

There are some differences however with regard to urban-rural residence (Figure 2.8). The lifetime household migration rates are quite high across Mohafazas, but those found in urban areas are higher than their rural counterparts. About seven out of every ten households in Urban Sweda and Tartous have a migrant member,

Figure 2.7 Levels of lifetime migration by governorate; percent of households



Figure 2.8 Levels of lifetime migration by governorate and urban-rural residence; percent of households



and the urban migration rate exceeds 40 percent in seven Mohafazas. While the city of Damascus does not rank high in terms of lifetime migration rates, over one of every third households there has a migrant member. Again, migration is more widespread in the urban areas of every Mohafaza, and only Hama has a higher rate of migration in its rural households as compared to urban households.

The picture for migration during the five years at the household level of analysis is also similar to that shown for individuals (Figure 2.9). There are clearly more variations in the rate across Mohafazas here, but the sample is too small to detect meaningful or otherwise statistically significant differences, between Mohafazas or among rural-urban localities within Mohafazas.

Figure 2.9 Levels of period migration by governorate; percent of households



The findings reviewed here point to a greater incidence of migration at the household level compared to those pertaining to individuals. One of the main reasons for the discrepancy is probably the expansion of intermarriage across locality or provincial lines. However, households without any internal migrant form a clear majority in all the Mohafazas taken as a whole, and this is true for both lifetime and period migration.

3 Inter-provincial migration flows

Unlike many other countries in the Arab world, Syria is a largely provincial country (Antoun 1991: 2). For one thing, it is not dominated by a "primate" city like Jordan, Egypt or Lebanon. Nor the capital city has increased disproportionately as compared to other Middle Eastern capital cities. Second, it exhibits a significant topographic and socioeconomic heterogeneity. Its large surface area, including a significant portion of agricultural land, as well its historic links (including trade and cross-border travel) with several neighbouring countries contribute in many ways to its diversity in both the economic and cultural "fields". And these factors figure prominently, perhaps indirectly, in shaping inter-regional migration flows in Syria.

More direct determinants include the widely known forces of contiguity, regional "inertia", and distance. Contiguity refers to migration to a region bordering the region of previous residence; regional inertia captures the social habitat, and more specifically cultural attachment to a particular region (Zelinsky 1973) such as the coast or desert; and distance is conventionally used to index the length of travel between "regional" cities. Thus, while these "seemingly" geographic factors are interrelated, they are conceptually different. Moreover, these factors are related to other

Table 3.1 Net lifetime migration across governorates

Governorate	In-migrants	Out-migrants	Net migration	Net migration rate
Damascus city	223841	279325	-55484	-34.89
Damascus governorate	388182	87668	**300514**	157.63
Homs	69959	72860	-2901	-2.05
Hama	36833	89997	-53164	-41.03
Tartos	38424	46000	-7576	-11.75
Latakia	49522	62899	-13377	-15.82
Edleb	20923	90736	-69813	-63.60
Aleppo	90974	90911	**63**	0.02
Rakka	27218	41538	-14320	-21.60
Der Elzor	11694	32212	-20518	-23.70
Hasakeh	64763	38874	**25889**	21.96
Sweda	16961	21111	-4150	-14.48
Dara	43831	49236	-5405	-7.50
Qunitra	6553	86311	-79758	-787.41

Note: only internal migration, excluding persons coming from abroad.

economic and social considerations, including the cost of moving, kin availability, and so on.

As expected, internal migration differs greatly in importance between regions. One way to measure its relative importance at the Mohafaza level is through the net gain or loss of population due to internal migration. It should be noted that comparisons of flows between administrative units are sensitive to the size of the units being used in defining migration. Here, we focus on flows between Mohafazas, thus rendering movements within each Mohafaza as non-migration. Both net migration for lifetime moves (since birth) and period migration (since 1995) are discussed.

Table 3.1 displays the number of in-migrants, out-migrants and net-migration for each Mohafaza, using the lifetime migration matrix. Net migration is simply the difference between the number of in-migrants and out-migrants. The table also reports the net migration rate per thousand persons, with the denominator being the average of population size at origin and destination states. The emerging picture is one of regional diversity overall, but the importance of Damascus (both the city and Mohafaza) cannot be easily dismissed. Over half of the one million in-migrants are in the Damascus metropolitan area and about a third of the out-migrants are in this area, resulting in a significant gross gain of population.

This is clearly reflected in the figures pertaining to net migration. As clearly shown in the table, only three Mohafazas gained population on balance: Damascus rural, Aleppo and Hasakeh. With a net gain of about 0.3 million inhabitants, Damascus clearly stands out as a major "importer" of population. This is somewhat expected, given that Damascus is the capital and those living around the principal city have access to public sector employment, a relatively large private service sector, informal economic activities, an a host of other advantages associated with capital cities in the developing world. The Aleppo Mohafaza also has a relatively large commercial city, and a net gain in population is not surprising. The gain is too small however to be considered meaningful. The initiation of recent agricultural development projects in Hasakeh might be behind the positive gain in population there. On the other hand, the largest net loser of population is Qunitra and this is due to war-related displacements. However, Edlib, Hama, and the city of Damascus are also significant net losers of population, amounting to an estimated 50,000 out-migrants or more each.

These net-migration figures do not take into account the size of the population in each origin or destination region, a significant factor that accounts for the net flows observed. The last column of the table reports the average net migration rate per 1,000 persons. It should be pointed out that the time location of lifetime migration is unknown, for it can occur in any year since birth. This limitation is serious from a practical point of view because it is not possible to derive the annual

net migration rates based on these data. The results of the overall net migration are useful however for comparative purposes, and for examining changes over time.

Here, diversity of inter-regional migration is more evident. Two obvious "outliers" stand out however. The Damascus Mohafaza has a net migration rate of 39 per 1,000, which is exceptionally high. With an average net migration rate of minus 197 per 1,000, Qunitra is also exceptional on the negative side of relative population gains. Between these two extremes, the figures range from 16 per 1,000 loss in Edlib to five per 1,000 gain in Hasakeh.

Do these conclusions hold for period migration? Generally yes, at least with regard to the extreme cases. Yet, the overall situation is more flux here. It should be pointed out however that the data pertaining to inter-regional movement since 1995 are not strictly comparable to those reviewed above. Although we are dealing with a later period, we are not addressing trends in migration flows here because there is some overlap.

The numbers pertaining to net period migration shown in Table 3.2 indicate that Damascus Mohafaza is an exceptionally high net importer of population, gaining about 54,000 persons since 1995. It is followed by Tartous with a net gain of only about 5,000 persons. On the other extreme, the capital city of Damascus is an exceptionally high net exporter of population, and lost nearly 40,000 inhabitants between the years 1995 and 2000. With a net loss of about nine thousand

Table 3.2 Net period migration across governorates

Governorate	In-migrants	Out-migrants	Net migration	Annual net migration rate
Damascus city	17308	56076	-38768	-5.33
Damascus governorate	65409	11347	54062	6.17
Homs	5357	9713	-4357	-0.70
Hama	7431	5275	2156	0.40
Tartos	9095	4001	5094	1.76
Latakia	9735	6472	3264	0.85
Edleb	5645	5877	-233	-0.05
Aleppo	5592	11254	-5663	-0.38
Rakka	734	5333	-4598	-1.68
Der Elzor	1964	2084	-120	-0.03
Hasakeh	1747	10719	-8972	-1.74
Sweda	3495	3805	-310	-0.24
Dara	5615	2900	2715	0.91
Qunitra	122	4392	-4270	-16.70

Note: only internal migration, excluding persons coming from abroad.

inhabitants, Hasakeh is the second largest loser of population in absolute terms. The other Mohafazas are in between with net figures ranging from about 100 persons to 5,000 or so persons. These figures do not however control for the relative size of the population in each Mohafazas. For this, it is important to examine net migration rates.

Unlike the lifetime migration data, the time location of migration can be easily identified here, permitting the calculation of average, annual net migration rates. The assumption here is that the total numbers of net migrants are distributed evenly over the five-year period, from 1995 to 2000. As shown in the last column of the table, the annual rates are quite low in an international perspective. With the exception of Qunitra, they range from a high level of 1.5 per 1,000 persons in the Mohafaza of Damascus to a low level of nearly zero in Der Elzor and Edlib. The capital city of Damascus has a net annual migration rate of about -1.3 per 1,000, which still makes it an exceptionally high net loser of population relative to other areas here. Contrary to conventional views, the poorest regions do not seem to exhibit the highest rate of out-migration in Syria.

Yet, net migration rates hide important mobility flows between places of origin and destination. For one thing, net migration does not capture the volume of migration across region — it simply tells whether a certain region is a net exporter or importer of population. Various exploratory measures can be used to capture mobility patterns across regions, including the so-called inflow and outflow percentages, the mobility ratios, and the odds ratios (Hout 1983). However, the inflow and outflow percentages are perhaps the most commonly used measures of mobility patterns. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report the inflow and outflow percentages of the inter-Mohafaza lifetime migration matrix.

It is obvious that the majority of the cells in these tables are very small, and little will be gained by a detailed discussion of these data. However, the flows to and from the Damascus metropolitan region are relatively large. After all, flows into this region account for about 55 percent of all inter-Mohafaza mobility, and about a third of all inter-Mohafaza moves come from the Greater Damascus area. Put simply, the mobility matrix without the flows into and from (rows and columns pertaining to) this regions, would be strikingly different, with a minimum amount of migration overall. Inspecting the cells along the diagonal of the inflow table reveals that Damascus Mohafaza and the Capital have the lowest proportions of original (by birth) respondents living in these areas: they are respectively, 81 and 86 percent. Thus about one out of every fifth person living in Damascus Mohafaza is from other regions, and one out of every tenth person living there is from the city of Damascus. Qunitra accounts for almost three percent of those living in Damascus Mohafaza, and Homs one percent – and these are the largest contributors to the current make up of this Mohafaza.

Table 3.3 Inflow percentages, lifetime migration

Birthplace	Current governorate														
	Damascus city	Damascus other	Homs	Hama	Tartos	Latakia	Edleb	Aleppo	Rakka	Der Elzor	Hasakeh	Sweda	Dara	Qunitra	Total
Damascus city	85.7	9.9	1.1	0.4	1.3	1.7	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2	2.0	1.7	1.8	10.0
Damascus other	3.6	81.1	0.3	0.1	0.7	0.9	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	1.4	0.5	2.8	10.9
Homs	1.3	1.1	95.0	0.6	1.2	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	2.2	8.8
Hama	1.6	0.6	1.8	97.1	1.0	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.7	1.2	8.2
Tartos	0.9	0.5	0.7	0.2	94.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	4.0
Latakia	1.4	0.8	0.3	0.3	1.0	94.1	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.0	5.3
Edleb	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.8	0.0	0.9	98.0	1.1	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.3	2.1	7.0
Aleppo	0.8	0.7	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.7	97.4	2.3	0.2	2.2	0.1	0.2	0.0	21.8
Rakka	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	95.8	0.3	1.7	0.2	0.0	0.0	4.2
Der Elzor	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.6	98.6	0.9	0.1	0.2	0.0	5.4
Hasakeh	0.6	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.5	94.6	0.1	0.0	0.0	7.2
Sweda	0.7	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	94.0	0.1	0.2	1.8
Dara	1.5	0.9	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	93.9	0.4	4.5
Qunitra	1.0	2.6	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.6	89.3	0.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 3.4 Outflow percentages, lifetime migration

	Current governorate														
Birthplace	Damascus city	Damascus other	Homs	Hama	Tartos	Latakia	Edleb	Aleppo	Rakka	Der Elzor	Hasakeh	Sweda	Dara	Qunitra	Total
Damascus city	82.7	12.6	0.9	0.3	0.5	0.9	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.7	0.1	100.0
Damascus other	3.2	95.0	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1	100.0
Homs	1.4	1.6	94.8	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100.0
Hama	1.9	1.0	1.9	93.2	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.1	100.0
Tartos	2.1	1.6	1.5	0.4	92.9	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	100.0
Latakia	2.6	1.9	0.5	0.4	0.7	92.6	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.0	100.0
Edleb	1.0	0.9	0.2	0.9	0.0	0.7	92.0	3.5	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	100.0
Aleppo	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	97.4	0.4	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Rakka	0.2	0.6	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.6	93.8	0.4	3.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	100.0
Der Elzor	0.5	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.4	96.3	1.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	100.0
Hasakeh	0.8	1.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.8	0.1	0.4	96.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Sweda	3.6	2.2	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	92.7	0.3	0.0	100.0
Dara	3.2	2.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	93.2	0.0	100.0
Qunitra	11.6	37.9	1.1	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.4	8.1	38.9	100.0
Total	9.7	12.8	8.8	7.9	4.0	5.2	6.6	21.8	4.1	5.3	7.4	1.8	4.5	0.4	100.0

The city of Damascus shows more diversity in terms of regional make up of its population as clearly shown in the first column of the inflow table. Nearly four percent of respondents living in the Capital are from nearby areas of the Damascus Mohafaza; Hama and Dara make up almost two percent; and Homs, Tartous, Latakia, and Qunitra account for over one percent. Thus, while the vast majority of the Capital's population are original inhabitants, almost every region contributes to the 14 or so percent of its other residents. This diversity is also apparent in the Mohafazas of Damascus and Qunitra, but to a lesser degree than the capital city of Damascus. However, the Mohafazas of Tartous, Latakia, Sweda and Dara are also relatively more diverse in terms of their population composition than others. Another striking feature in the inflow table is that with the exception of the three most diverse Mohafazas, the inflows in the respective Mohafazas are largely from neighbouring ones. Thus, contiguity is a major factor contributing to the shape of inter-regional inflow proportions.

The destination of respondents also differs from their origin as clearly shown by the outflow percentages (Table 3.4). The force of contiguity is also evident here for the greater Damascus areas, but also for other Mohafazas. Among the other interesting patterns, the following deserve mentioning. The outflow rates from the Qunitra and the Capital are particularly large. In the case of Qunitra, war-related displacement is evident, and less than 40 percent of those originating from Qunitra are living there. The rest are scattered among many Mohafazas, but the largest concentration is in the Damascus Mohafaza, amounting to about 38 percent. In fact, about half of those originating from Qunitra live in the Damascus City and its Mohafaza. For the Capital, about 83 percent of those originating from it are residing there, with most of the rest (13 percent) residing nearby in the Damascus Mohafaza. The interesting contrasts are the Capital and the Mohafaza of Damascus as clearly shown by the relatively larger proportions of the other Mohafazas' populations ending up in these two areas.

The evidence pertaining to inter-regional flows since 1995 provide further evidence concerning the primacy of Damascus, the city and the Mohafaza, as an area of destination for Syrians (Tables 3.5, 3.6). However, inter-regional mobility is very small here as indicated by the proportions of stayers along the diagonals. Given the small number of cases involved in this matrix, any interpretation of the findings should be treated with caution. Despite the low overall proportion of the population that moved across Mohafazas, we can conclude that inter-regional migration has a significant impact on the demographic fortune of some regions, particularly Damascus.

Table 3.5 Inflow percentages, period migration

		Utdanning i hjemlandet			
		Ingen	Lav	Middels	Høy
Kjønn	Mann	55 (11)	40 (12)	45 (18)	60 (25)
	Kvinne	11 (2)	30 (7)	34 (14)	44 (14)

Table 3.6 Outflow percentages, period migration

Governorate 5 years ago	Current governorate														
	Damascus city	Damascus other	Homs	Hama	Tartos	Latakia	Edleb	Aleppo	Rakka	Der Elzor	Hasakeh	Sweda	Dara	Qunitra	Total
Damascus city	96.2	3.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	100.0
Damascus other+A22	0.3	99.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Homs	0.2	0.2	99.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Hama	0.1	0.1	0.1	99.5	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Tartos	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	99.3	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Latakia	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	99.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	100.0
Edleb	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	99.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	100.0
Aleppo	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	99.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Rakka	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.3	99.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Der Elzor	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	99.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Hasakeh	0.2	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	99.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Sweda	0.7	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	98.5	0.0	0.0	100.0
Dara	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	99.5	0.0	100.0
Qunitra	0.3	5.2	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	2.2	91.8	100.0
Total	10.3	12.7	8.9	7.8	4.2	5.5	6.4	21.4	3.9	5.1	7.3	1.9	4.3	0.4	100.0

4 Rural-urban and rural-rural migration

Rural to urban migration is the overriding issue of the literature on internal migration in developing countries (see Tacoli 1998; Sabot 1982), including the well-known Harris-Todaro model, and Syria is no exception (Oughli 1993; Zakaria ND). This form of migration is perhaps the most important one in terms of volume in some countries, but it is doubtful whether rural to urban migration is the norm in the developing countries as a whole (see Bilsborrow 1998: 7-8; Nelson 1976). In reviewing the evidence for 14 countries using census data from the 1970s and 1980s, Bilsborrow (1992) found only three countries where rural-urban migration flows are greater than other types of flows. In the majority (eight) of countries (including Egypt, Brazil and Peru), urban-urban migration is the largest in terms of volume, and in ten of them the rural-rural migration flows are greater than rural-urban ones. And yet, rural-urban migration dominates the migration policy dialogue in Syria as elsewhere in the developing countries, and it is the one that receives most attention in the empirical literature.

The emphasis on rural-urban migration, and its negative consequences, draws on the European experience of industrialization and the subsequent "uprooting" of the peasantry from rural farms to work as wage-labourers in the cities (see Moch 1992), resulting in rapid urbanization.[2] Recent reviews of historical trends of internal migration in Syria follow this line of reasoning (Zakaria ND; Zakaria and Sibai 1991; Oughli 1993), although the requisite data are lacking to support such perceptions. Movement between rural areas is perhaps equally, if not more, important in Syria. We say "perhaps" because our survey does not fully capture migration moves between rural areas, as the smallest geographic unit at the rural level used in the survey is the Nahia, or sub-district, not the village. Despite this limitation, the data show that rural-rural migration involves a relatively large proportion of migration moves in Syria.

For brevity, we only review the evidence concerning lifetime and period migration patterns by residence. A dis-aggregation of the overall lifetime migration rates indicates that rural-urban migration is the dominant form (Figure 4.1). Several conclusions can be drawn from this graph. First, a disproportionally large number of migrants are of rural origin, regardless of their current place of residence. For example, while 13 percent of the population in the Mohafaza centers are rural migrants, only three percent are urban migrants. Second, rural migrants constitute similar proportions of the population in Mohafaza centers and other urban towns. Third, urban-urban migration is more common in urban areas, and especially in

[2] An urban area is defined here in accordance with the standard classification of the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics as a place of living with more than 20,000 inhabitants.

the urban areas outside of the Mohafaza centers. In other words, urban migrants constitute a slightly larger proportion of the urban population in towns (five percent) as compared to those in Mohafaza centers (three percent). Finally, while rural-rural migration is relatively large, accounting for about nine percent of the rural areas, the dominant form of migration in Syria, with respect to direction, seems to be from rural to urban areas.

Figure 4.1 Percent (lifetime) migrant by origin and current residence, persons



The regional distribution of lifetime migration by origin also demonstrates the overwhelming importance of rural-urban migration. As shown in Figure 4.2, only three Mohafazas (Sweda, Qunitra and Dara), have a lower rate of rural-urban migration than other types of migration. Qunitra is a special case, given the security situation along the borders. But the three Mohafazas are relatively small in terms of population size, with little impact on the overall migration of Syrians. In the other Mohafazas, rural-urban migration exceeds five percent of the total population, and in six of them the rates are higher than the national average (about 11 percent) of rural-urban migration. The rates in Tartous, Homs and Latakia are relatively high, exceeding 14 percent. Moreover, although rural-urban migration is the dominant form in Damascus and Hasakeh Mohafazas as well as in the Capital, other forms of migration are also significant, exceeding about five percent of the total population. Overall, the patterns shown in the Figure demonstrate a remarkable diversity among the Mohafazas.

Figure 4.2 Percent (lifetime) migrant by origin and governorate of current residence, persons



The picture for migration since 1995 looks different, and with a few exceptions uniformity characterizes the situation both overall and across regions. Like before, rural-urban migration is the dominant form of migration regardless of current residence as clearly shown in the graph (Figure 4.3). It is higher in urban towns (six percent) than in either Mohafaza centers (one percent) or rural areas (five percent), but the differences are small. Thus, Mohafaza centers have very low (and almost negligible) rural-urban in migrants as a proportion of the total population living there – a different trend than the one reported earlier. This might be due to the housing situation prevailing in the big cities, especially Damascus, preventing or otherwise discouraging many of villages to migrate there. This is also evident for other migrants, where surprisingly rural areas have a similar proportion – about one percent – of urban-origin migrants as compared to governorate centers and other urban towns. While the differences are small overall, indicating uniformity, Mohafaza centers seem to have a disproportionately less number of recent rural and other kinds of migrants when compared to the rural villages or the rest of the urban sector.

Figure 4.3 Percent (period) migrant by origin and current residence, persons aged 5+



Uniformity is also evident when comparing the rates of migration across Mohafaza (Figure 4.4). The levels of rural-urban migration range from about eight percent in Rakka to less than one percent in Qunitra and Hasakeh. The high rural-urban migration rate for Rakka is due to the Euphrat development project, and the subsequent establishment of a new city in this province (see Hinnebusch 1989). The Rakka province attracted migrants from both the rural sector of Rakka as well as from other provinces to work in this project (Winckler 1999: 128). Interestingly,

Figure 4.4 Percent (period) migrant by origin and governorate of current residence, persons



the Mohafaza of Damascus has a relatively high number of migrants from rural areas as compared to other regions. However, with the exception of the agricultural, and remote, Mohafazas of Dara, Qunitra and, to some extent, Hasakeh, levels of urban-rural migration are higher than for other types of migration. Two additional observations are worth mentioning. First, the Mohafaza of Sweda has almost an equal number of rural-urban and other migrants. Second, the Capital has received very low (and almost equal) number of rural-urban and other migrants since 1995, at about one percent. Caution should be taken however when interpreting these results due to the small number of cases involved.

More differentials are found when considering migration at the household level, especially with regard to rural-urban migration. Migrant households are defined as having at least one migrant member. We distinguish between three kinds of migrant households: those with rural migrant members, urban-migrant members, and mixed (rural and urban) ones. Consistent with the analysis of lifetime migration at the individual level, rural-urban migration is the dominant form of migration here as well, regardless of residence (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5 Percent (lifetime) migrant by origin and current residence, households



About 28 percent of households in Mohafaza centers have at least one person originating from rural villages. The corresponding proportions in other urban areas and villages are, respectively, 20 and 15 percent. Thus, rural-rural migration is significantly lower than rural-urban migration in Syria. The proportions of migrants originating from urban areas are lower, but they differ as well among residence types. As clearly shown in the graph, urban-urban migration rates of seven and ten percent in, respectively, Mohafaza centers and urban towns, are higher than their urban-rural counterpart (three percent). While this points to the presence of urban-rural household migration in Syria, the level is quite low in relative terms. The

proportions of households with mixed, urban-rural, migrants are small in the three types of residence, but especially so in rural areas. They range from a high of two percent in urban towns to less than one percent in the rural sector, which is a negligible difference indeed. The results reported here with regard to patterns of lifetime migration at the household level indicate a diverse situation, with a clear dominance of rural-urban migration.

Migration patterns are rather segmented regionally. The overall rates of rural-urban migration are high across regions, with a range of eight percent in Dara to about 30 percent in Latakia (Figure 4.6). The emerging patterns can be grouped into three segments: (1) those with essentially rural-urban migrant households; (2) those with relatively low rates of rural-urban migrants as compared to other forms; and (3) those with a mix of both rural-urban and other kinds of migration. The first group is the largest one, with about eight Mohafazas, including Aleppo. Three of the Mohafazas fall into the second group, and they include the small Mohafazas of Dara, Qunitra as well as Sweda. Here, the numbers of migrants of urban origin are proportionally greater than their rural counterparts. There are also three

Figure 4.6 Percent (lifetime) migrant by origin and governorate of current residence, households



Mohafazas in the third group, including the Capital. While rural-urban migration predominates here, the proportions of urban-origin migrants are relatively high and range from 15 percent in Hasakeh to about nine percent in the Mohafaza of Damascus. Interestingly, about one out of every ten households in the Capital has a migrant from urban areas. Most likely these migrants come from cities located outside of the Damascus region.

There are not enough cases to examine period household migration at the regional level, so we confine the discussion to the overall rates by types of residence. The findings are quite similar to those reported at the individual level, with very small differentials by residence. As shown in Figure 4.7, the rate of rural-urban period migration (seven percent) is relatively high but it is not significantly different from rural-rural migration (six percent). The proportion of rural migrants in the Mohafaza center is lower at approximately two percent. Other kinds of period migration, including the urban-urban pattern, are relatively rare, and do not exceed two percent with little differentials along types of residence.

Figure 4.7 Percent (period) migrant by origin and current residence, households



Rural-urban migration is often attributed to an urban bias in development planning. Thus, some argue that the equal distribution of development projects across regions as well as the measures implemented to raise the standard of living in rural areas would lead to a decrease in the "flight" of people to the cities (see Ali 1996; Lipton 1977; Winckler 1999). However, the evidence is mixed and there is some evidence pointing to more migration as a result of enterprise development in the countryside (Cole and Sanders 1983; Liang and White 1997; Skeldon 1997). Nor does land scarcity lead to out-migration from the countryside (Connell et al. 1976). While the survey data contain information on these and other related issues, we choose not to report them here mainly because the differentials are rather small.

5 Trends in migration flows

The conventional view is that migration (both internal and international) has undergone an unprecedented increase in scale during the 20th century. The increase in the volume of migration is attributed to the sweeping forces of modernization (for internal migration) and globalization (internationally). However, migration trends are far from secular, lacking the regularity of the fertility and mortality transitions at the international level. There are however proponents of a systematic view of migration trends (and patterns) as societies pass through various stages of development. Zelinsky (1971) proposes "the hypothesis of the mobility transition" according to which countries pass from an early stage of transition where rural-urban migration predominates to an advanced stage where urban-urban migration is the largest form of migration. While such a perspective is somewhat dated, it provides a useful benchmark for viewing trends and patterns of internal migration in Syria.

Trends in migration can easily be established by longitudinal surveys, tracking the movement of persons and families over time, or repeated cross-sectional surveys and censuses. Each source of data has its own problems and weaknesses. Successive censuses suffer from problems relating to boundary changes and other measurement issues (e.g., definitions of migration and reference periods), while retrospective data are hampered by recall errors. Here, we rely on retrospective migration histories to examine the changes in migration patterns and flows. Recall that the migration history data refer to moves made by a sample of adults, and some insight can be gained by examining both the migratory moves as well as the persons making such moves.

The data pertaining to moves indicate an overall rise in internal migration as time elapsed. About eight percent of all moves made by currently living adults aged 15 and over occurred before 1960, increasing to nearly 30 percent in the 1990s. There is evidence that the 1990s witnessed a halt in migration, and the levels across the past two decades are quite similar. Apparently, this is mainly due to a decrease in male migration during the most recent period.

Examining the trends by sex from 1960 onwards shows that migration increased consistently over time, but only for women (Figure 5.1). About 13 percent of all moves made by women occurred in the 1960s, increasing consistently to about 32 percent in 1990s. For males, the moves made in the 1960s account for about 14 percent of all male moves, and those made in the 1980s account for 29 percent. However, there is an apparent decline in the 1990s and this period accounts for about 26 percent of all moves made by men. Thus, the overall high rate of female migration as compared to male migration is due to a recent (in the 1990s) rise in female migration. These sex differentials are still (statistically) small however, so the

results should be treated with caution. Another shortcoming is that while the majority of adults in Syria make only one move during their lifetime, some migrate more than once, resulting in repeatable events. It is, therefore, of some importance to examine trends among adults.

Figure 5.1 Migration moves by period and sex



The timing of the most recent (or first) move of a representative sample of the population is of particular interest, and can also be used to establish trends in migration flows (see Liang and White 1996). Here, we simply report the proportions of moves undertaken in a given year. In order to smooth out random fluctuations and heaping, especially at zero digits, three-year moving averages are actually reported here. Hence, for these averages, a single figure is not important; only trends indexed by periods of several years are. Although these figures are not rates, trends for the later years are of particular interest. Proportions for the earlier periods should be smaller by definition — reflecting the age structure of the population — other things being equal.

The numbers displayed in Figure 5.2 confirm the "secular" trend in internal migration discussed above, with an apparent halt since the early 1980s. There is evidence of a recent decline during the 1990s. Furthermore, there are peaks during the war years, but these are relatively small. The trends by sex shown in Figure 5.3 also confirm the earlier conclusion concerning the similarity of male and female migration, with female migration exceeding that of male's only during the most recent period. This perhaps reflects new trends in intermarriage across localities and regions, or new migration patterns among professional females, or both.

More important from a practical and substantive point of view are trends in the migration propensities across residence and regions. We calculate a simple "migration propensity" index, which is the proportions of all migratory moves in a given

Figure 5.2 Trends in internal migration, last move by year (3 year moving average)



Figure 5.3 Trends in internal migration, last move by year and sex (3 year moving average)



residence type and period to all moves undertaken in a given period. Note that unlike the overall trends reported above, these propensities are not affected by the changing age structure of the population. The origin and destination propensities by residence types since 1960 displayed in Figure 5.4 are striking.

Figure 5.4 Trends in origin and destination propensities by residence, adults



There is a clear trend in the origin propensities, with urban areas slowly but consistently replacing rural places as the dominant originators of migrants. However, the increasing "urbanisation" of places of origin is due primarily to an increase in the importance of Mohafaza centers at the expense of rural areas, with the relative weight of other urban towns remaining relatively stable over the past four decades. An astonishing 69 percent of all adults migrating in the 1960s come from rural areas, with the remaining migrants during this period being almost evenly distributed between Mohafaza centers (about 17 percent) and other urban towns (about 15 percent). In the 1990s, about half of the migrants come from rural areas, and a third from Mohafaza centers. The relative weight of urban areas in "exporting" migrants increased consistently from 15 percent in the 1960s to about 18 percent in the 1990s, but such an increase is minor in statistical terms. Thus, while a reversal of the origin propensities from rural to urban is evident and consistent, rural areas still dominate, accounting for about half the flow in the 1990s.

In contrast, changes in the destination propensities are not so consistent, but the relative decline of the Mohafaza centers as the main places of destination is evident since the 1960s (Figure 5.4). However, migration tends to be more direct-

ed toward urban areas during the entire period of observation. About two thirds of all migrants in the 1960s headed for urban areas, including Mohafaza centers, and still 60 percent of them did so during the 1990s. There is an overall decline in the relative weight of the Mohafaza centers as areas of destination, decreasing from about 45 percent of all migrants in the 1960s to about 34 percent in the 1990s. Yet, such decline is due to changes from the 1960s to 1970s, with the proportions of migrants heading towards Mohafaza centers increasing from the 1970s' level of 22 percent. Other urban towns continued to attract more in-migrants relative to other places, with the propensities increasing consistently from 22 percent to about 26 percent during the entire period. The irregularities in the trends observed here, however, are mainly due to changes in the 1960s. The displacement caused by the 1967 war, resulting in the flight of people form rural Qunitra to Damascus as well as the land reforms (Winckler 1999: 119-127; Richards and Waterbury 1990: 168) might explain the uniqueness of the 1960s pattern. With the exception of the 1960s events and their consequences, there is a clear increasing trend towards Mohafaza centers at the expense of the rural sector, as places of destination in Syria.

It remains that Mohafaza centers are the dominant places of destination in the 1960s, while rural areas are the primary ones in the 1990s. Thus, rural areas are not only the main exporter of population in the 1990s, but they are the main importer of in-migrants as well during the most recent period. The graph also shows that migration has become more evenly distributed across residence types as time has elapsed.

However, migration propensities by residence hide a lot of regional variability. This is true with regard to the regions where migrants come from as well as to the regions where they currently live. There are very few variations over time, however, with respect to regions of origin or destination. We first examine changes in the regional origin propensities (Figure 5.5).

The regional variability of origin propensities is evident in the graph, with the more urban Mohafazas having higher propensities than their more agricultural counterparts. Although the city of Damascus is considered a separate Mohafaza, we have included it here with the Damascus rural in order to facilitate comparisons especially with Aleppo. Damascus and Aleppo seem to be the largest exporter of populations overall, and Damascus stands out as the largest one since 1980. More striking perhaps is that their share has increased over time, with much of the increase due to out-migration from Damascus. Thus, both Mohafazas accounted for about 27 percent of the out-migrants in the 1960s, increasing consistently to about 49 percent in the 1990s. During the 1990s, one out of every two out-migrants comes from these two Mohafazas. A closer look at the data shows that the city of Damascus accounted for much of this increase (see below).

Figure 5.5 Trends in regional origin propensities, adults



Otherwise, another striking feature in this graph is the lack of much variability – stability rather than change seems to characterize trends over time. There are two main exceptions, however, in addition to the recent trend shown for Damascus. First is the 1960s' period when Quinitra accounted for a fifth of all out-migrants, owing to the special circumstances of the war. Second, the 1970s witnessed a disproportionate number of out-migrants from Rakka (eight percent), Dara (eight percent), and to some extent Hasakeh (12 percent). The only consistent, and noticeable, increase in the propensities is found in Damascus. There are of course other "hidden" trends within Mohafazas, and most of the observed trends in origin propensities are really dominated by out-migration from rural areas, save the Capital city.

The decision (or fate, in terms of forced migration) to move is not divorced from the place of destination. Syria's two largest cities, Damascus and Aleppo, with provincial status, have historically been important destinations for inter-regional migrants (see Winckler 1999: 62); and they still are. The graph for the destination

propensities (Figure 5.6) shows that migration is highly concentrated in the two major Mohafazas, and became even more so during the most recent period. With the exception of an unusual surge of in-migrants in Hasakeh during the 1970s, about one out of every two migrants head to Damascus and Aleppo. Damascus receives over one of every three migrants regardless of the period in question, and continues to receive the highest proportion of in-migrants during the 1980s and 1990s. No other region has experienced a net increase in the proportion of migrants over the entire period than the two largest Mohafazas of Damascus and Aleppo combined.

Figure 5.6 Trends in regional destination propensities, adults



Migration to Edlib, Dara, and Homs consistently decreased during the 1960-1990 period, and reached its lowest levels during the 1990s relative to other Mohafazas. Hasakeh also reached its lowest propensities during the 1990s, but the trend is not as consistent due to planned migration to this region during the 1970s. About one

out of every fifth migrant during the 1970s went to Hasakeh. Another observation in this graph is the rather erratic trends over time overall, with an unusual stability of the propensities in Tartous and Latakia. Each of the latter accounted for about seven to eight percent of all the migrants, regardless of the time in question. Finally, the destination propensities in seven of the Mohafazas, including Hama and Sweda never exceeded five percent of all the migrants.

Overall, the regions that received less than four percent of inter-regional migrants were either economically disadvantaged or geographically remote ones. For example, the Mohafaza of Edlib, Rakka, Dara and Der Elzor are remote, rural provinces with little resources. The results reported here show that migration flows are quite segmented as almost everywhere else (see Connell et al. 1976; Roberts 1997), with Damascus and Aleppo attracting most of the migrants.

6 Migration to and from Damascus: what do we know?

The city of Damascus has been the main place of destination for migrants in Syria throughout this century. While there is evidence that its relative importance has recently declined as a place of destination, it is still second only to the Mohafaza of Damascus. A large part of the latter together with the city includes what might be referred to as the greater metropolitan area of Damascus. Migration into and out of this metropolitan area is still the largest in importance with regard to migration flows. It does therefore deserve special attention. Do the flows into and out of the Capital really change over time? What are the characteristics of the migrants in Damascus? What are the differences between those who move to the city, and those who move to its "suburbs"? These and other related questions cannot be adequately answered in this brief report. Here, we only take a closer look at migration trends using the last move to and from the Capital in relation to other areas in the Mohafaza of Damascus.

As shown in Table 6.1, the estimated number of people leaving and coming to Damascus increased substantially over the years, and the Capital is no exception. Note, however, that these numbers are representative of adults making at least one move during this period, and not of the total population. Our purpose in reporting these data is to detect trends rather than to estimate the number of arrivals and those departing from these areas. On the whole, the Capital clearly lost population between 1960 and 1990, while other urban towns and villages gained substantially during the same period — and this is consistent with the findings reviewed earlier using data on lifetime and period migration. Despite this, the figures indicate a consistent increase in the in-migrants and out-migrants in three areas, including the Capital. During the entire period, the Capital experienced about a 23 percent increase in the number of people moving out of it, and about one percent increase in the number arriving. More people have been moving out of the other

Table 6.1 Estimated number of adult movers into and out of Damascus; last move only

Residence	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	Absolute change	Percent change
Origin						
Damascus city	5381	28735	93785	133139	127758	2374
Damascus other urban	6393	13271	27982	33749	27356	428
Damascus rural	12629	11387	16632	34895	22266	177
Destination						
Damascus city	31719	39983	59168	61252	29532	93
Damascus other urban	21778	35580	73855	117735	95957	441
Damascus rural	11203	21388	37575	70145	58942	526

areas, but also substantially more residents have been moving to the rural and urban sectors of Damascus Mohafaza.

Another way to assess the relative importance of the Capital is to examine origin and destination propensities, again using the total number of migrants in a given period as the base. The results for the three areas of Damascus are shown in Figure 6.1. The graph demonstrates the increasing importance of the Damascus areas as places of both origin and destination. The contrast between origin and destination propensities with respect to the capital city is also clear.

Figure 6.1 Trends in origin and destination propensities in Damascus



The declining attractiveness of the city of Damascus as a place of destination is underscored by both the origin and destination propensities over time. Thus, while the city accounted for merely three percent of all the out-migrants in 1960, its share of the total during the 1990s was over 21 percent. The increase is consistent and especially rapid during the most recent period since the 1980s. Urban towns of Damascus changed little here, while rural Damascus accounted for slightly less (from seven to five percent) out-migrants in relative terms during the 1960-1999 period. The city of Damascus remains the dominant area here. However, its attractiveness as a place of destination declined over time from about 17 percent in the 60s to

about nine percent in the 1990s. It is interesting to note that the share of in-migrants for Damascus City remained essentially stable at around ten percent since the 1970s. There is a consistent increase in the proportions heading to the Mohafaza of Damascus, and about ten and 17 percent of all migrants in the 1990s destined to rural and urban Damascus, respectively. It remains that the really surprising finding here is the saliency of migration into the city of Damascus with no apparent major decline of its attractiveness as a place of destination, despite an equally remarkable flight of people out of it.

How does Damascus compare with Syria's other main cities? The destination propensities for the Mohafazas' main cities displayed in Figure 6.2 indicate that Damascus occupies a dominant place, but its relative attractiveness as a place of destination has declined in recent years when compared to the city of Aleppo. (Recall that the propensities reported here are relatively small because they represent the migrants going to a given city in a given period as a proportion of the total during a given period). The share of migrants for the city of Damascus in the 1990s

Figure 6.2 Trends in city destination propensities, adults



declined by almost half its level in the 1960s, from 17 percent to nine percent, as we have already discussed above. The corresponding proportions for Aleppo are ten and 12 percents. While Aleppo's share in the 1990s declined from its 15 percent level in the 1980s, it replaces Damascus as the most attractive city for migrants since the 1980s — at least as judged by the destination propensities of adult migrants in Syria as a whole.

The graph shows that the majority of Syria's main cities account for less than two percent of the total migrants regardless of the period in question. Only Aleppo, Damascus, Homs, and Latakia exceed this level in all periods. Furthermore, although some cities show an apparent rise (or decline) in their share of migrants more recently, the changes are too small and not exceeding two percentage points anywhere.

7 Are migrants different?

Migration, whether internal or international, is selective everywhere much like other demographic events. This is so because migration is linked to crucial life-cycle transitions such as leaving school, entering the labour market, getting married or divorced, and retiring. Selectivity of course differs by type of migration (e.g., labour versus refugee) and by historically specific social and political contexts. The following conclusions seem to hold across space and time: migrants are relatively young; rural labour migrants are usually young adult males; women are more likely to be migrants than men; marital status is more important for women than men in causing migration; women's migration decreases more rapidly with age; migrants tend to be more skilled than the general population; and migrants are not the poorest or the least educated in their places of origin (see Skeldon 1997). Internal migrants in Syria have a number of characteristics in common, regardless of their region of origin.

Although there are differences in the levels of mobility and migration among countries and among regions within a country, the pattern of migration at given ages, by sex, is expected to be fairly systematic across places. The typical age curve of migration is one with high rates of mobility at very young ages, low rates during the teen-age years, rapidly increasing rates during the early 20s reaching its highest peaks, and declining rates at older ages. However, a slight increase in migration should be expected at retirement age.

The migration rates by age and sex displayed in Figure 7.1 confirm the general pattern just outlined. There is a sharp rise in the rate at age 10-19 for females and 20-29 for males until age 40-49 and then a decrease until age 70 with peaks slightly afterwards, especially for females. The curve for males deviates from the typical

Figure 7.1 Percentage (lifetime) migrant by age and sex



pattern where migration peaks at the retirement age of 65, and this may have to do with work patterns in a developing county context like Syria. However, a finer age grouping shows that the curves do indeed change upward around this age. The higher rates shown for women, relative to men, during their reproductive ages are due to the predominance of the patrilocal marriage pattern in Arab society, especially in the rural sector.

The age-sex pattern of migration just described is more relevant to rural migrants than others. As we have already shown, migrants in Syria are largely of rural origin and this is clearly the case regardless of age and sex (Figure 7.2). With the exception of migration at older ages, the rate of migration for rural-origin persons exceeds that of other migrants until after retirement age, and this is true for both men and women. There are very few cases of migrants at very old ages, however, which may account for the pattern shown. The rate of migration at very young ages, 0-4, is typically higher than that of the next age group, but this does not seem to be the case here. One reason of this unusual pattern is measurement error, particularly age shifting, a typical occurrence in developing countries; but it might also have to do with a low level of family migration with very young children in this context. Otherwise, the curve for rural-origin migrants is what would be expected, with a sharp rise in the twenties for males and teenage years for females, up until the late fourties when the curve starts to decline rapidly, especially for males. Like before, female migration dominates until the end of the reproductive years; and male migration dominates during the later years of life.

The pattern shown for urban migrants is different, rising consistently with age for males and females, with female migration exceeding male migration during the working age years. This pattern suggests the lack of labour-induced migration in

Figure 7.2 Percentage (lifetime) migrant by age, sex and origin



the case of urban migrants; but since the rates shown are quite low, and hence similar, one cannot reach meaningful conclusions based on them without reservations.

As expected, female migrants are more likely than male migrants to be married at migration. For, female migration is often related to family reunification and migration of single, unmarried women is rather rare in Muslim societies. Here, gender and gender ideologies play a pivotal role in structuring the migration process (see Chant and Radcliffe 1992). Traditionally, the focus has been on the impact of male migration on families and women left behind (Gulati 1993). Although issues related to gender have been largely neglected in the migration literature, there is a renewed interest in the linkages between gender system and female migration in particular.

Overall, migrants are more likely to be married than stayers are. A fifth of lifetime migrants are single, compared with slightly fewer than half the non-migrants. This pattern holds true after controlling for sex; but clearly, marital status differs by sex, and women migrants are less likely than men to be single (Figure 7.3). While 27 percent of men migrants are single, only 18 percent of women migrants are.

Figure 7.3 Distribution of the population by migration status and marital status



The incidence of migration differs by marital status as would be expected (Figure 7.4). The lifetime migration rate for the ever married is over 20 percent for both sexes; it is only about ten percent for the never married persons. One would expect higher rate of lifetime migration for male singles than female singles, but this is not the case in Syria. The highest rate of migration is observed for the currently married, at 25 and 28 percent for men and women respectively.

Figure 7.4 Lifetime migration rates by marital status



The corresponding patterns for rural and other migrants are essentially the same, with those for rural migrants higher than others as would be expected (Figure 7.5). The rates of migration for rural migrants are highest among the married and widowed at 20 percent. This is also true for other migrants, but the widowed have the highest rate of migration at ten percent. The proportions of widowed and divorced migrants shown for non-rural migration are relatively high, but this might be due to random errors since the sample size is too small for these two groups.

Figure 7.5 Percentage (lifetime) migrant by marital status and origin



An inspection of migration by age and marital status shows that the rate is much higher among the married population up to age 45 for men and 35 for women. This is due to the tendency of married couples to change residence upon, or shortly after, marriage. The higher rates of internal mobility among women aged 15 to 29 as compared to men are undoubtedly due to the normal tendency (in the Arab context) for brides to move to their husbands' locality of residence after marriage. The data reviewed here show that internal migration is related to marriage.

These data, however, mask important changes in the marital profile of migrants over time. The migration history module includes information on the marital status of migrants at time of moving, and this information can be used to examine changes over a relatively short period of time. Although these data are not strictly

comparable to those reviewed above, they are generally consistent at the aggregate level. Changes in the marital profile of migrants by sex are shown in Figure 7.6.

Figure 7.6 Marital characteristics of adult migrants by sex and period



It shows that male migrants are more likely than females to be single at time of moving, while female migrants are more likely to be married, regardless of the period in question. There is a clear trend toward convergence between the sexes, however. About 60 percent of women migrants in the 1960s were married as compared to about 48 percent of men. The proportions married in the 1990s are the same for each sex at 55 percent. The change is more evident recently (in the 1990s) and is largely due to a consistent decline of the proportion of single men migrating, but also to a rise in the migration of single women, at least as compared to married women. There is also a slight tendency for more widowed and divorced women than men to migrate as time elapsed.

The educational level of most of the migrants is rather high, and has risen rapidly over time. Syrian migrants are better educated than non-migrants — this conclusion holds true after controlling for age differences between the non-migrants and migrants interviewed. About 46 percent of the stayers have less than elementary education compared to nearly 40 percent of the lifetime migrants. The relationship is consistent at the upper end of the educational distribution: about 18 percent of the migrants have at least secondary education compared with about ten percent of the stayers.

The relationship also holds for both men and women, but it is particularly strong for men (Figure 7.7). Men are generally more educated than women, and migrant men are more educated than migrant women. About 14 percent of migrant women have secondary education or more compared to about nine percent for non-

migrant women. The difference is larger for men, and about 22 percent of migrant men have at least secondary education as compared with 12 percent of stayers. Overall, the relationship between lifetime migration and education is remarkably consistent for both men and women as clearly shown in the graph.

Figure 7.7 Distribution of the population by migration sex status and education



The migration rate also varies consistently with education, especially for men (Figure 7.8). For men, it ranges from 12 percent among those with less than elementary education to nearly 30 percent among those who completed university education. Although less consistent for women, education increases migration here as well. The lowest rate of 16 percent observed for those with elementary education, and the highest level of nearly 30 percent is found for women with associate college diploma. One reason for some of the inconsistency found here is occupation. Women migrants tend to be involved in domestic services, agriculture and also mobile jobs such as teaching in school or working in health services. With the exception of

Figure 7.8 Lifetime migration rates by sex and education



university education, the graph shows that women are more likely to be migrants than men regardless of education.

The (lifetime) migration rates for rural origin migration are higher than other migration, and this is not surprising (Figure 7.9). Also as expected, the rate increases by education for both groups of migrants. However, the overall educational selectivity of migration observed earlier is largely due to the differentials for rural migrants. Over one out of every five persons originating from rural areas has a university degree, compared to one out of ten persons with less than elementary education. The corresponding proportions for other migrants are six and three percent, implying little, and insignificant, percentage point difference.

Figure 7.9 Percentage (lifetime) migrant by educational level and origin



An examination of changes in the educational profile of movers, reveals that the migrants are much more educated over time as would be expected. And this is true for both men and women (Figure 7.10). Remarkably, the gender gap in education among migrants seems to be narrowing to a minimal level over time, and men and women who migrated in the 1990s seem to have almost similar educational characteristics. Thus, 51 percent of men had less than elementary education at the time of moving in the 1960, as compared to about 86 percent of women. The corresponding proportions in the 1990s are 18 and 26 percent for men and women, respectively. This is a substantial change in the levels as well as in the gap between the two sexes. Trends on the opposite direction of the educational categories are consistent, but they show minimal and (statistically) non-significant differences between the two sexes. For example, 16 percent of males migrating in the 1990s have more than secondary education, while about 13 percent of women do. However, unlike the change for male, the shift in the educational profile of female migrants is very marked during the 1990s.

Figure 7.10 Educational characteristics of adult migrants by sex and period



The differentials in migration rates by age, sex, marital status and education reviewed here are far from surprising and provide few departures from the patterns observed in other contexts. However, this internal migration survey provides the first opportunity to document them in detail for Syria. The overall results based on these data show that there is a sizable segment in the Syrian population who are immobile, including those with little education, the married women in their midlife, and the elderly. And women circulate more often than men do.

8 Stability of migration

Although migration is a repeatable event that can occur several times during a lifetime, we know relatively little about the frequent movers, including return migrants. We know from previous studies elsewhere (McGee 1992) and from anecdotal evidence in Syria that migration is essentially circular in nature, and a sizable proportion of migrants maintain close links with their places of origin. Here, we use data from the migration history of adults (aged 15 years and over) to gain some insights into the characteristics of frequent movers. It should be pointed out that these data cover a wider definition of migratory moves than simply lifetime migration, and hence some departure from the previous section is expected.

About 22 percent of adults are internal migrants, and the vast majority of them (17 percent) are one-time migrants. Of the frequent movers, surprisingly very few migrate more than twice and less than one percent of the total adult population migrate at least four times. Given this low level of frequent migration in Syria, we only distinguish here between one-time movers and recurrent migrants. The latter refers to those who made at least two migratory moves during their entire lives.

Traditionally, women do not figure prominently in the migration literature, especially in developing countries (see Hugo 1993). Yet, there is evidence pointing to the fact than women are more likely to be migrants than men, and this is the case in Syria (Figure 8.1). About 19 percent of adult men are migrants, and 25 percent of women. As clearly shown in the graph, this difference between men and women is due entirely to variations in one-time migration — in other words, women are more likely than men to migrate once in their lifetime.

Figure 8.1 Distribution of the adult population by migration status and sex (persons aged 15+)



There are also some variations by type of residence (Figure 8.2). Generally, levels of migration are higher in urban areas than rural areas, and this is true for both one-time and recurrent migration. Overall, about 16 percent of the adult population in rural areas are migrants; the corresponding levels in Mohafaza centers and

Figure 8.2 Distribution of the adult population by migration status and residence (persons aged 15+)



other urban towns are 25 and 29 percent respectively. Adults in urban towns are more likely to be one-time migrants and frequent migrants than other adults. However, the difference here is largely between urban and rural places rather than between main cities and other urban towns, confirming the conventional view that the urban population is generally more mobile than their rural counterparts. Furthermore, the graph shows that one-time migration is greater than recurrent migration regardless of residence.

Figure 8.3 Percentage migrant by frequency and governorate (persons aged 15+)



Moreover, this holds true across regions (Figure 8.3). The rates of recurrent migration among the adult population are lower than those for first-time migration in every Mohafaza. However, the gap between the two forms of migration is far from uniform. Recurrent migration ranges from 18 percent in Qunitra and Sweda to less than one percent in the agricultural Mohafazas of Edlib, Rakka and Der Elzor. For one time-migration, Hasakeh has the highest rate of nearly 30 percent; and the lowest rate of eight percent is observed in Edlib and Der Elzor. Overall, recurrent migration is not directly related to size of place or urbanity per se (as Aleppo for example has a relatively low rate of frequent migration), but rather to educational characteristics of the population, the size of the public sector, or special circumstances (e.g., Qunitra, Dara).

Recurrent migration is often, but not always, associated with relevant demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The rate of one-time migration is greater than recurrent migration across age. Furthermore, the rate of migration increases consistently with age until retirement among both one-time movers and frequent movers (Figure 8.4). Indeed the similarity between the two trends shown in the graph is quite remarkable. The lowest rate of migration at one and seven percent for recurrent and one-time movers, respectively, is observed for the youngest age group, 10-19 years. The rate increases consistently for both, reaching the highest levels of ten percent for recurrent movers and 25 percent for first-time movers at the retirement age before starting to decline.

Figure 8.4 Percentage migrant by frequency and age (persons aged 15+)



However, the mobility rate by age differs by sex as would be expected (Figure 8.5). Clearly, one-time migration is greater than recurrent migration across ages for both male and females. Also, the rate of female migration is greater than male migration across age, but only for one-time migrants. For the latter group, male migration increases from a low level of five percent at the youngest ages until age 50-59

when it reaches its highest level of 25 percent. For females, the one-time migration rates increases much faster from a low level of eight percent at the youngest age groups to a highest level of 25-26 percent at a much younger age of 30-39. These trends reflect the tendency of women to migrate mainly for marriage or family related reasons.

Figure 8.5 Percentage migrant by frequency, age and sex (persons aged 15+)



The same reason is probably behind the gender difference in recurrent migration. Female migration is slightly higher here at younger ages, but the gender gap is really evident only at the female prime reproductive ages where female migration is lower than that of male migration up until the age of 69. The higher rates of recurrent migration for men during the age groups 40 to 69 are most likely due to work-related reasons.

It was shown above that the currently married persons have the highest rate of lifetime migration relative to other adults. Expanding the definition to include other permanent migratory moves yields a slightly different picture. As shown in Figure 8.6, the highest rate of mobility is observed among the widowed, and this is true for both one-time (28 percent) and recurrent migration (11 percent). On the other hand, the lowest rate of migration is found among the never married — eight percent for one-time migration and only one percent for recurrent migration. It remains that the rate of recurrent migration is lower than one-time migration regardless of marital status.

Controlling for sex yields a slightly different picture, however. Female adults have higher rates of migration than their male counterparts regardless of marital status as has already been documented, but this is only true for one-time migration (Figure 8.7). Even here divorced women are as likely as divorced men to migrate. For recurrent migration, men have higher (or rather similar) rates of mobility than

Figure 8.6 Percentage migrant by frequency and marital status (persons aged 15+)



women regardless of marital status. Furthermore, the widowed have the highest rates of mobility for both one-time and recurrent migration, but this is the case only for females. As clearly shown in the graph, married men have the highest rate of mobility in case of one-time migration (20 percent) and divorced men are more likely to be frequent movers (12 percent) than others.

Figure 8.7 Percentage migrant by frequency, marital status and sex (persons aged 15+)



The findings pertaining to educational background are also slightly different from before, once other forms of migratory moves are included. Figure 8.8 demonstrates that the level of recurrent migration is lower than one-time migration across educational groups. Yet, unlike previously, the mobility rate does not increase consistently with educational level for either one-time or recurrent migration. For one-time migration, those with less than elementary education have a higher level of mobility at 21 percent than others, save those with associate diploma. Otherwise, mobility increases consistently with education here. The least educated also have a higher rate of recurrent mobility, at five percent, than those with at most preparatory education. Remarkably, there are really very little educational differentials in the mobility rate for recurrent migration, except at the university level where mobility reaches the highest level of 14 percent. In other words, the high level of migration for those with university education is mainly due to a higher incidence of frequent migration. In either case, the overall relationship is not uniform, however, as would be expected.

Figure 8.8 Percentage migrant by frequency and education (persons aged 15+)



Such rather erratic relationship between migration and education might be explained by sex. As shown in Figure 8.9, this is not so however. Three trends can be established here. First, for one-time migration the relationship is not uniform for both men and women, but more so for men. For men, education increases the level of mobility consistently from the elementary level; those with less than elementary education have nearly the same level of one-time mobility as those with secondary education. This is also true for women, but the very highly (university) educated women have significantly lower mobility (18 percent) than those with associate diploma (27 percent). Second, the level of recurrent migration is particularly high for those with university education, regardless of sex. Otherwise, there are very little differentials in the rate of recurrent mobility at the lower educational levels. Finally, female migration is higher than male migration at all educational levels

except the highest university levels, and this to some extent holds for either type of migration. True, there are male-female differentials for recurrent migration, but these are statistically non-significant.

Figure 8.9 Percentage migrant by frequency, education and sex (persons aged 15+)



There are significant occupational differentials in the rate of mobility for both men and women, but they are larger in the case of one-time migration (Figure 8.10). With exception of managers, women dominate the occupational groups in terms of one-time and (to a large extent) recurrent migration. For women, the rate of one-time migration ranges from a low level of 13 percent for managers to a high level of 29 percent for professionals. The corresponding rates for men are seven percent in agriculture to 31 percent for managers. Generally, though, high status occupations such as professionals and managers have relatively high levels of migration as compared to low status occupations such as farm work and construction, regardless of sex. This conclusion also holds for recurrent migration, but there are little variations in the rate here. Surprisingly, women managers have higher rates of recurrent migration than first-time migration, but there are very few women managers to make any meaningful inferences here. Women employed in sales and services also have a high rate of recurrent migration at 15 percent, both relative to other women but also to men employed in these occupations (five percent).

Figure 8.10 Percentage migrant by frequency, occupation and sex (persons aged 15+)



More diversity in the rate of migration is found for industrial activities, but women still have higher levels of migration than men do across industries (Figure 8.11). And women have more varying rates of migration across industries than men do. The highest rates of migration are found in service industries, such as public administration, health and education, and hotels and restaurants. One out of every four persons in public administration is a one-time migrant, and one of every ten persons in this industry is a recurrent migrant with no difference between men and women. On the other hand, those involved in agriculture have the lowest levels of both one-time and recurrent migration. About half of the women working in domestic services are one-time migrants, and the rate is relatively high for recurrent migration at ten percent. For recurrent migration, the highest rate observed is among women involved in transport and communications at 15 percent.

Figure 8.11 Percentage migrant by frequency, industry and sex (persons aged 15+)



9 Reasons for moving

There are many reasons why people migrate. Simple and simplistic economic models of internal migration in developing countries going back to the 1950s (e.g., Lewis 1954) are still considered valid in accounting for labour migration in many parts of the world (see Hatton and Williamson 1992; Stark 1991). People do indeed move from their places of origin for higher wages and better opportunities elsewhere, contributing to the uses of surplus labour and hence economic growth (Harris and Todaro 1970; Mincer 1978; Todaro 1969). Yet, time and again this model has been found inadequate to fully explain migration flows even in the case of internal mobility and the absence of political and legal constraints for entry and exit of individuals. Structural factors such as social network (Massey 1990; Wood 1981), migration capital (termed "cumulative causation" by Massey 1990), culturally-bound community or regional attachments (Zelinsky 1973), institutional "designs" (Guilmoto 1998; Faist 1997), "place utility" (Brown et al. 1970), land scarcity (Adams 1991), geographic factors — e.g., distance — (Lee 1966; Ravenstein 1885), "intervening opportunities" (Stouffer 1940) are all considered important causes of, or obstacles for migration (Hammer et al. 1997). Recent formulations are more balanced, emphasising both individual (utilitarian) motives and structural forces in accounting for migration (Chant and Radcliffe 1992).

Below, we only report the "subjective" reasons given by the migrants themselves at the time of each move. For the last move undertaken, we asked respondents to identify the three most important reasons for moving. A detailed list of 26 items were included in the questionnaire, but the list is collapsed here to ten items due to sample size considerations as well as an apparent overlap in some of the items. Of the total 5,440 adult migrants, about 83 percent mentioned only one reason, 12 percent mentioned two reasons, and the remaining five percent of respondents mentioned three. Below, we focus on the first most important reason given for making the last move. The emerging picture is one of diversity: migration is not necessarily a response to lack of job opportunities or rural underdevelopment.

Overall, marriage and family-related reasons figure very highly as reasons for migration (Figure 9.1). Over a third (37 percent) of adults mentioned family-related reasons and another fourth mentioned marriage as the most important reason for moving. However, work is important and about a fifth of adults cited work or better income as the main reason for undertaking the last move. The importance of other factors such as facilities, education, neighbourhood and so on is rather small, ranging from six percent for housing and neighbourhood to less than one percent for reasons related to neighbours/relatives and facilities.

The reasons given for the last move made by adults are related to the time period in which the move was made, to life cycle of individual movers, sex, and a host

Figure 9.1 Most important reason for moving, last move by adults



of other factors. Here, we shed some light on differentials by period and sex — for motivations for moving are dependent on period-related socio-economic changes affecting men and women at the national level. As shown in Figure 9.2, the changes in the reasons given for moving are not great. Three obvious trends can be documented. First, there is a noticeable and consistent increase in housing-related moves, from about three percent in the 1960s to about ten percent in the 1990s. Second, marriage and family-related reasons account for about two-thirds of the last moves regardless of the period in question; work-related reasons account for about a fifth of the moves by adults; and the weight of education is essentially stable at about three percent. Third, the 1960s are distinct, owing to a larger proportion of adults referring to "other" reasons. One possible explanation for the distinctiveness of the 1960s is recall-related measurement errors, and a proportion of respondents cannot recall the precise reason for changing places of residence. However, the 1960s

Figure 9.2 Most important reason for moving by period, last move by adults



also witnessed dramatic events affecting a relatively large segment of the population, namely the 1967 war and internal revolutionary changes, including land reform. These events have undoubtedly resulted in forced political and economic displacements.

As expected, the reasons given differ by the sex of respondent. Figure 9.3 displays changes in the profile of reasons over time for each sex separately. The sex differentials are more striking than variations by period. Since the 1960s, we see no change in reasons given for moving, either for males or females. Marriage and housing/neighbourhood related factors have become slightly more important over time for both men and women. It remains that the single most important factor for migration is family and marriage — nearly 40 percent of men and 80 percent of women migrate primarily for these reasons, with very little changes over time. The difference between the sexes found here is almost entirely due to marriage.

Figure 9.3 Most important reason for moving by period and sex, last move by adults



The largest sex differentials are found for work and marriage. For male migrants work-related motives dominate while for female migrants marriage-related reasons are more important. About a third of male migrants refer to work as the main reason for migration in the 1990s, while only about six percent of women do so. During the same period, about nine percent of men move for marriage as compared to about 45 percent of women. Surprisingly, family-reunion (or accompanying family) is equally important for men and women, accounting for over a third of the migrants regardless of period. The importance of other reasons is rather small. For a small group of migrants (six percent), educational opportunities are the main reasons for migrating, but facilities are not important as the main reason for moving.

10 The uses of migrant labour

Entry into the labour market, job change and employment termination are important reasons for internal migration almost everywhere. While not strictly labour migration, internal mobility involves broader concerns regarding the utilization of in-migrants' labour. Initially, we took a broad view of this issue, encompassing economic activity, unemployment and underemployment, wage levels, and the location of migrants in the economic and occupational structure of the population in places of destination. However, we confine the analysis to the differentials pertaining to the occupational and industrial structure of migrant labour because there are very few distinctions pertaining to the overall labour force activity of in-migrants in Syria. Furthermore, only lifetime migration is considered, owing to the small sample size pertaining to period and circular (from the migration history) migration of adults, especially women.

The economically active population has a slightly higher rate of internal mobility than the non-active population, at least with regard to lifetime migration. There are important differences between men and women however. While women in the labour force are much more likely to be mobile than their inactive counterparts, there are essentially no differentials in the mobility rate between active and non-active men. This reflects the predominant role of marriage (and residential change after marriage in particular) in internal migration.

More substantial are the migration differentials between occupational groups, especially when dis-aggregated by sex. The fluctuations in the mobility rates across occupations are higher for women than men. Generally, skilled persons are more likely to be mobile than the unskilled. Thus, women in service, sales and clerical occupations have the highest mobility rates. On the other hand, persons employed in agriculture have relatively low mobility, but the lifetime mobility rate is similar to the rural population as a whole.

The occupational distribution of lifetime internal migrants and non-migrants shown in Figure 10.1 reveals two noticeable differences between the two groups. For one thing, the migrants are less likely than the stayers to be engaged in farm work — over a third (35 percent) of the stayers are in agricultural occupations compared to less than a fifth (19 percent) of the migrants. Secondly, the migrants are nearly twice as likely to be employed in highly skilled occupations compared to the non-migrants. Thus, about 32 percent of the migrants are in managerial, professional, associate professional and clerical jobs, compared to nearly 17 percent of the stayers. Otherwise, there is essentially no occupational differential between the two groups. The findings concerning farm work are not surprising and most previous research from other places point to the geographic immobility of farm workers as compared to others.

Figure 10.1 Occupation by lifetime migration status



However, the visible occupational advantage of in-migrants in places of destination is quite remarkable, reflecting the high educational selectivity of in-migrants in Syria. The conventional view is that non-migrants at places of destinations tend to be more skilled, or otherwise better "endowed with human capital" than migrants (Bilsborrow 1998: 13); this view is generally supported by evidence from the developed and developing countries. There are undoubtedly migrants, especially in the main cities, who are in marginal jobs in the informal economy. However, impressionistic accounts of the migrant in Syria as an underemployed person, working as a lottery distributor or a street vendor (see e.g. Zakaria and Sibai 1991), do not square with the larger reality.

Occupational sex segregation is a well-known phenomenon almost everywhere, and it would, therefore, be important to examine the occupational profile of migrants by sex. The results displayed in Figure 10.2 are striking — they confirm the

Figure 10.2 Occupation by lifetime migration status and sex



general conclusions above, but more so for women than men. In particular, the migrants are more likely than non-migrants to be in skilled occupations, and there is a marked difference between the two groups with regard to farm work, regardless of sex. Yet, these differentials are clearly larger for women than men.

First, lifetime migrants are more represented than non-migrants in managerial, professional, associate professional, and clerical occupations. About 28 percent of migrant men are in these occupations while only about 15 percent of non-migrants are, implying a significant difference between the two groups. The differentials are even larger for women, and about 44 percent of women migrants are in these occupations as compared to about 26 percent of the stayers. Second, women are generally more involved than men in farm work in many developing countries, including Syria, but migrant women are less likely than non-migrant women to be working in agriculture. Over three out of every five non-migrant women are doing farm work, compared to about two out of every five migrant women. Thus, farm work is the largest occupation of women, despite the large difference between the migrants and the stayers. Migrant men are also less involved in agriculture (14 percent) compared to their non-migrants counterparts (28 percent). Like previously, the occupational distributions between migrants and non-migrants are essentially similar without these two occupational clusters.

Likewise, the migration figures vary widely between industrial sectors (Figure 10.3). Consistent with the occupational distribution, fewer migrants are involved in agriculture as compared to non-migrants. About one fifth of the internal migrants and over a third of the non-migrants are involved in agricultural activities. Clearly, this is the largest industrial differential between the two groups. On the other hand, migrants are much more likely than non-migrants to be employed in "public administration" as well as in education and health services. Thus, about one

Figure 10.3 Industry by lifetime migration status



fifth (20 percent) of the migrants are in public administration; the corresponding proportion for non-migrants is ten percent. The difference is smaller for health and educational services, but still noticeable: about 11 percent of migrants and seven percent of stayers work in these economic services. To a large extent, these findings are congruent with those pertaining to educational and occupational selectivity, reflecting the concentration of public sector employment in large cities, especially Damascus.

This is only true however for men, and sex seems to matter more than migration with respect to the industrial characteristics of respondents (Figure 10.4). In contrast to the differentials of occupational distribution by sex, the distribution here is strikingly distinct for each sex. Almost a third of the female migrants are in health and educational services, while only 17 percent of the stayers are. The corresponding proportions for males are in the same direction; but they are quite small, six and eight percent respectively. The opposite holds true for public administration and police, as this sector is primarily dominated by men, and male migrants are more likely than non-migrants to be working in public administration. Thus, about 23 percent of male migrants are in this sector as compared to 11 percent of non-migrants. More female migrants (11 percent) than non-migrants (six percent) are involved in public administration activities, but the percentage difference is clearly smaller.

Figure 10.4 Industry by lifetime migration status and sex



Involvement in agriculture mirrors the findings pertaining to the occupational distribution by sex. Both female and male migrants are significantly less likely than non-migrants to work in agriculture. About two thirds of female non-migrants work in agriculture, as compared to 40 percent of the migrants. For males, the corresponding proportions are 28 and 14 percent. These findings square with the widely held

view that non-migrants are relatively more likely than migrants to work in agriculture, and this is true for either sex. There are very few noteworthy differentials along the other economic sectors. For example, female migrants are slightly more likely than their non-migrant counterparts to be involved in manufacturing activities, but the difference is rather small. Overall, the findings point to a rather sharp economic duality between the migrants and non-migrants, and the duality is especially apparent for each sex separately.

The economic duality between the sexes is also apparent for the adult migrant, regardless of the type of migration. Figure 10.5 displays the distribution of adult migrants by economic activities using the migration history data. The picture is essentially the same as the one displayed for lifetime migration, but the relative sectoral distribution for each sex is quite different than before. Female migrants are more likely than males to be involved in agriculture as well as in health and educational services. On the other hand, male migrants are more likely than their female counterparts to be involved in public administration, construction and restaurant services. However, almost one in two female migrants are in health and education, and less than a fourth are in agriculture. This finding is different from the previous one, pointing to the large concentration of lifetime migrants in agriculture. One reason for the discrepancy is the change in definition, and migration here is defined to include more recent or other types of migration — not only lifetime ones. A second reason is the small sample size of female migrants in the labour force included here, introducing a possibly large variance in the reported estimates.

Figure 10.5 Industry by sex, adult migrants



Does the economic segmentation between migrants and stayers for each sex have to do with the influx of rural migrants to the cities? The answer is generally yes — and this is consistent with the prevailing view concerning the concerted efforts by

policy makers to improve the educational profile and fortune of villagers (see Winckler 1999). Figure 10.6 displays the distribution of migrants in urban areas by origin and sex. Clearly, the proportions of rural male migrants are particularly high in the public administration, education and health services, as well as in communication and transport. About one out of every three men in public administration (in urban areas) is of rural origin, compared to eight percent of other migrants. The proportions of those in education, health and communication/transport are 25 and 23 percent for rural male migrants — which are much higher than those for other migrants in the cities (eight and three percent, respectively). For women, there is a concentration of rural women migrants in health and education as well as in public administration, as compared with other migrants. Thus, about 27 percent of women in education and health services in the cities are from rural areas, and five percent are migrants from urban areas. The same proportions are found for public administration and agriculture. However, the distribution is less skewed here, owing perhaps to the fact that there are relatively few women migrant workers overall in Syria.

Figure 10.6 Percentage (lifetime) migrant to the cities by sex, place of origin and economic sectors



The majority of migrant men worked prior to migration. This is contrary to previous findings, and the general perception, that it is only the unemployed who move in order to improve their economic situation. The overall proportion of about 28

percent of adults interviewed in the migration history data reporting a job before leaving is not particularly high. Yet, this figure includes a substantial number of migrant children (aged less than 15 years at time of move), and hides important differences between the sexes. When asked whether work was available at the place of origin at the time of moving, over half of the men and about eight percent of women reported having a job.

There are variations by period, especially for women. As shown in Figure 10.7, the proportion of migrants with jobs at their places of origin increased consistently over time for both men and women. For men, about 48 percent of them had jobs when moving during the 1960s, and about 57 percent did so in 1990s, which is a significant increase. The same amount of increase is also evident for women — increasing from a low level of three percent to over 13 percent. The trends documented here imply that the increased volume of adult migration since the 1960s are perhaps due to an expected rise in schooling as well as the increased differentiation of the labour market rather than contractions in the economies of sending areas.

Figure 10.7 Availability of work in place of origin at time of moving by period



Our main concern in this section is with the uses of labour in areas of destination however. The overall proportions with jobs in places of destinations at time of moving are larger than the corresponding proportions for places of origin discussed above. However, the trends are quite similar, with small differences between the two. About 32 percent of those adults who ever moved had a job assured in places of destination at the time of moving. As expected, the proportion of 57 percent for men is much higher than that of ten percent for women.

Unlike the trends for jobs at the places of origin, slightly smaller proportions of men reported job availability at the places of destination as time elapsed. With the exception of the 1960s, a slightly smaller proportion of men moved with employment assured at the places of destination, decreasing from 59 percent in the 1970s

to about 57 percent in the 1990s (Figure 10.8). But the trends for women are on the opposite direction and more of them had jobs available at places of destination as clearly shown in the graph. Less than three percent of women moving in the 1960s had a job available at places of destination; the proportion increased consistently to about 15 percent in the 1990s. This is a relatively large increase since most women migrate for marriage, and family-related reasons. The corresponding decrease in the proportions for men is rather small, leaving the majority of men with employment assured when moving throughout the period since at least 1970. The trends reported here do of course vary by various other characteristics of individuals including age, education and so on, but there are too few observations to control for such factors in examining trends in job availability.

Figure 10.8 Availability of work in place of destination at time of moving by period



11 Migrant adjustment to urban life

There is an old "political" and scholarly debate concerning problems of adjustment of migrants to city life (see Abu-Lughod 1961). Much of this debate hinges on assumptions concerning the characteristics of rural movers to urban places, with implications for the preservation of the social fabric and/or possibilities (or obstacles) for socio-economic advancement. Thus, in one strand of the "adjustment problem" debate the concern is with the growth of a marginal (and marginalized) population in squatter settlements and other "quarters" of the main cities, and the subsequent rise of crime, political extremism and other forms of "pathologies" among this population (see Bienen 1984). Migrants are seen as "atomized" or otherwise "alienated" individuals living in hostile urban environments (Ibrahim 1980).

Moreover, the maladjustment of in-migrants is seen as a hindrance both to the socio-economic achievements of migrants themselves and the intergenerational mobility of their children. Part of the story is "cultural apartheid" and particularly "linguistic" discrimination against other provincial dialects in hiring decisions and "neighbouring". Another example is isolation of migrants and the lack of social contacts with "established" co-residents, preventing the migrants from finding good job opportunities or alternative careers (see Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). While much of this discussion echoes the still relevant "assimilation" debate in the case of immigration to the West, it is of particular concern in the case of internal migration in developing countries as well.

The survey questionnaire includes various items about adjustment or rather the social integration of migrants. The same questions are addressed at both the individual and household levels. A convenient way to summarize the information pertaining to such a multi-dimensional concept of adjustment is to create an overall index of social integration. We choose not to do so here, mainly because of the high degree of homogeneity (or otherwise correlation) among the items. Instead, we report the results for each of the items separately. Only six different indicators are selected to tap different dimensions of adjustment of in-migrants. These include: the exchange of visits, greetings and money; more direct socialisation items such as attending celebrations, allowing children to play with neighbours as well as a general socialization item. Since our main concern here is with the integration of rural migrants in the city, the analysis is done separately for each direction of migration by current residence. In particular, we distinguish between four groups of households living in urban and rural areas: non-migrant households, urban origin, rural origin, and mixed (urban and rural origin) households. A summary of the results pertaining to lifetime migration is shown in Figure 11.1.

Figure 11.1 Adjustment indicators for migrant and non-migrant households by residence and origin



Surprisingly, there is no evidence of an adjustment problem facing in-migrants overall. In fact, the findings show that in-migrants are even better integrated in their communities than the stayers are, but this is true only in urban areas. In the cities, the problem of adjustment is presumably acute for rural migrants. Comparing rural migrants with original urbanites in the cities along the six indicators of integration shows that the former are indeed more integrated than those born in the cities where they currently reside. Rural migrants are less likely than original city dwellers to be integrated only with respect to attending celebrations (19 and 18 percent), but the difference is too small to be significant.

Furthermore, "peasants" in the cities are even better integrated than their urban counterparts. They are slightly more (or as) likely as urbanites to exchange greetings and visits with others, to allow their children to play with others in the neighbourhood, and to socialize with neighbours. However, in-migrants of rural origin are less likely to be involved in lending/borrowing money or to attend celebrations. Thus, about 62 percent of peasants lend or borrow money while about 67 of urbanites in the city do so. The difference is even larger for attending celebrations, and about 28 percent of urbanites participate in celebrations compared to only about 18 percent of peasants. If these two items are indicators of strong

integration, then the peasants are less strongly integrated in their communities than their urban counterparts. We can safely conclude however that the evidence concerning the integration of peasants in community life in the city is somewhat mixed, depending on the indicator used.

Discrepancies based on place of residence are larger than those based on direction of migration. In other words, rural inhabitants are better integrated than their urban counterparts on all of the adjustment indicators. Almost everyone exchanges greetings in Syria and hence the variations are quite small here. For the other items, there are significant differences in the proportions between urban and rural households, ranging from a 16 (exchange visits) to a 26 (exchange money) percentage-point difference. And these differentials also hold across migration types, implying that the social environment plays a crucial role in determining social integration regardless of the social origin of the persons in questions. Thus, if a city person migrates to a village, he or she is likely to behave like other villagers; the same is true for peasants in the city.

However, the analyses reported here are partial at best and should be treated with caution. Little is known, for example, about the effect of residential clustering (in terms of housing) of in-migrants on the results reported here. Certainly, Damascus includes a number of village-like neighbourhoods one of which is called *Hai Al-Muhajereen* (migrants' neighbourhood). Migrants living in such neighbourhoods might be well integrated within the boundaries of the small community, but not necessarily integrated in the urban life of the city as a whole.

12 Migration and remittances

The policy and scholarly debate about levels and uses of remittances is largely focused on international migration. The available evidence concerning internal migration suggests that remittances to relatives in the sending areas are relatively small, and often decline with time — as a consequence of the migrant getting married (Bilsborrow 1998: 18). Remittances are often seen as part of a family strategy to diversify income, whereby the migrant and his/her family enter into a contractual arrangement on purely altruistic considerations (Stark 1991: 25). Maintaining economic links with the family in places of origin can also be a long-term strategy by the migrant to claim inheritance from his/her parents in the future. Unlike in the traditional Todaro-type rational actor models, the focus here is on the family as the unit of analysis (see Wood 1981; Stark 1991). This shift in focus has important implications for the uses of remittances (Skeldon 1997; Rempel and Lobdell 1978), and for poverty and/or inequalities in the receiving areas (de Haan 1997; Richards and Waterbury 1990: 389-394; Lipton 1980).

The findings indicate that nearly one in every ten Syrian households receive some form of remittances (Figure 12.1). In contrast, only three percent of households send remittances to relatives living away. The corresponding figures for households with any out-migrant during the past five years are clearly lower, but equally sizable. They are seven and three percent of households for receiving and sending, respectively.

Figure 12.1 Percentage of household receiving and sending remittances



Rural households are slightly more likely than their urban counterparts to receive remittances; the opposite is true for sending remittances (Figure 12.2). However, households in the Mohafazas' main cities have the largest proportion of receivers (nine percent) and smallest percentage of senders (two percent). One explanation for this pattern is that a disproportionately larger number of out-migrants in the main cities during the past five years are younger dependents, living in large cities

mainly for the purpose of completing their education. This conclusion is confirmed by examining remittances flowing between geographic strata. The flow of remittances among households with inter-strata migrants is more conventional, with those living in rural areas having the largest proportion of receivers as compared to others.

Figure 12.2 Percentage of household receiving and sending remittances by residence



Among households who receive remittances, the majority (58 percent) of those with out-migrants in urban areas receive some of form of remittances. The proportion of households with remittances originating from rural areas is 47 percent, and a similar proportion receives remittances from abroad (49 percent). Not all remittances are monetary, especially those originating in rural areas. Indeed, there is a clear relationship between the form (i.e., cash, in-kind) and source of remittances. Remittances from urban areas are more likely to be in cash compared to those originating in rural areas (Figure 12.3). Furthermore, the majority of recipient households also obtain remittances in both cash and in-kind, and the proportion is significantly higher here for remittances originating from urban than rural places.

Figure 12.3 Source of remittances received by form; households receiving remittances only



The evidence from the region and elsewhere points to the use of remittances largely for consumption purposes, housing, or status symbols, rather than for local in-

vestment (Addleton 1991; Findlay and Samha 1986; Serageldin et al. 1983; but see Adams 1991, 1998). This conclusion seems to hold true as well for internal migration. For households receiving remittances, the vast majority (91 percent) use a portion of them for daily needs, and over a third for purchasing household goods (Figure 12.4). These are followed by health and education needs, at 23 and 13 percent, respectively, and a host of other necessities. On the other hand, only three percent of households reported using some of the remittances they received for investment and saving purposes.

Figure 12.4 Use of remittances received; households receiving remittances only



13 Temporary migration

One of the main alternatives for internal migrants, especially when considering decisions to migrate or to stay is between temporary or permanent moves (Goldstein and Goldstein 1993). This is especially the case in agrarian regions of the developing world where temporary migration is typically seasonal in character (see Rogaly 1997). While temporary migration might be viewed as such also during the prime working age of individual life cycles, it can be considered a transient stage for permanent migration. There is evidence, for example, that adults often start their migration careers by moving temporarily to other places, leaving their families behind, in order to prepare for a long-term migration of their households (De Jong 2000).

Temporary migration is defined in the survey as living away from place of residence for a period of less than six months for the purpose of work or education. The items pertaining to temporary migration are included in the labour force module of the questionnaire, and thus they are asked of persons aged ten years and over. Here, we confine the analysis to those aged 15 years and over in order to allow for international comparisons. Furthermore, school enrolment below this age is fairly high in Syria.

The findings indicate that temporary migration is quite low in Syria, and only about one percent of adults are temporary migrants overall. The temporary migrants are almost equally divided between internal and international (mainly labourers in Lebanon) migrants. Thus, internal temporary migrants constitute only about half percent of the adult population.

Variations across residence are also low. Rural areas have a larger rate (0.6 percent) of internal temporary migrants compared to urban areas (0.3 percent), owing to the large concentration of temporary migrants in low skilled occupations in agriculture and construction activities. The rates are low across regions, but the agricultural Mohafazas of Rakka (2.7 percent) and Hasakeh (1.9) have larger rates than the national average. Similarly, the Mohafazas of Edlib, Tartos, and Sweda also have a relatively higher rate (0.9 percent) of internal temporary migrants, but homogeneity characterizes the spatial distribution of temporary migration overall.

As expected, temporary migrants are overwhelmingly male and in their prime working age. However, there are very few sample cases to examine the demographic characteristics of temporary migrants in more detail.

About two thirds of the migrants are away from home for a period of three months or less (Figure 13.1). The modal period is three months, with over one-fifth of the migrants reporting a three-month absence. Clearly, this rather long period of absence from family is due to temporary migration abroad.

Figure 13.1 Period of absence in months, temporary migrants



14 Potential migration

Migration is difficult to anticipate, mainly because of the complex factors involved in making people move. One way to know about future intentions of individuals to move is to ask them directly. How many have a desire to change their place of residence? When do they plan to move? What are the reasons for wanting to migrate? These are some of the questions that are typically asked of respondents in a migration survey, and we asked them in ours.

Most people everywhere never migrate (Hammer et al. 1997), and this is indeed the case in Syria as revealed by the migration indicators reviewed above. Interestingly, very few plan to move to any other place at any time in the future — only about 1.4 percent of the total population do so. Men are twice as likely as women to want to move away from their current place of residence, and this holds true regardless of type of residence.

Men also have higher rates of potential migration across age (Figure 14.1). The highest rates are observed at the prime working ages for men, reaching the highest level of 3.5 percent at the 30–39 age group. For females, the highest level is reached at the 20–29 age group, but the distribution is rather flat here, deviating significantly from that of men. The gender gap in the rates of potential migration across age is somewhat expected in this context – women migrate largely for family or marriage reasons; men for job related matters.

Figure 14.1 Potential migrants by age and sex



With the exception of the Sweda Mohafaza, there are very few variations in the overall rate of potential migration by region. About 16 percent of Sweda's male population and four percent of its female population are potential migrants. These

rates stand out as exceptionally high. Dara, Rakka, and Qunitra Mohafazas also have higher rates (ranging from three percent for Dara to 1.9 percent for Rakka) of potential migration than the national average. However, the number of cases is too small to make any meaningful inferences at the regional level.

There are various reasons for the lack of intention to move (see, De Jong et al. 1996). One of the reasons is related to the strength of family and community ties that pull people together, but immobility might also be related to economic factors. The immobile are probably satisfied with their economic situation in which case there is no urgent need for improvement or "getting ahead". On the other hand, we know that migration, even internal migration, is an expensive undertaking, and at least a certain threshold of assets is required for migration to occur (Richards and Waterbury 1990: 396).

Among those who plan to move, the majority are not planning internal migration per se — over a half (52 percent) plan to move to another country, and nearly a fifth want to change neighbourhoods within the city limits (Figure 14.2). Otherwise, destination seems to be determined by distance as the majority of the remaining persons want to move within their Mohafaza of residence, and about only about five percent are planning to move to the Capital, Damascus.

Figure 14.2 Place of potential migration, total population



The Capital does not rank high even among those planning to undertake internal migration, with about 16 percent wanting to move to the Capital (Figure 14.3). Over half of the potential internal migrants want to move to another city or village within their region of residence. On the other hand, a move to a village located in another Mohafaza has the lowest priority.

This pattern of destinations is probably a reflection of family unification or marriage rather than job-related factors. Indeed, the majority of potential migrants reported "unification with family" (44 percent) or marriage (nine percent) as the

Figure 14.3 Place of potential migration, internal destinations only



main reason for migration (Figure 14.4). Jobs and higher income are also important reasons for wanting to move, and about 38 percent cited these factors behind their desire to move. The remaining ten or so reasons, including services and facilities, do not figure highly among potential migrants in Syria.

Figure 14.4 Reason for planning to move for potential migrants



Although the overall rate of potential migration is small, a significant proportion of them do not seem to have concrete plans for moving — about a fifth do not know the expected timing of their intended migration (Figure 14.5). The majority do have concrete plans for moving and about a third intend to move within three months.

Figure 14.5 Expected time of planned migration for potential migrants



Likewise, the majority of potential migrants have definite plans regarding the length of stay away from home (Figure 14.6). About a fourth do not know the expected timing of return, but over 42 percent of potential migrants do not want to return to their current place of residence. Only a fraction (nine percent) of the remaining third of potential migrants want to stay away for less than a year.

Figure 14.6 Expected time of return for potential migrants



15 Migration capital — how important?

Migration behaviour in itself can be a cause of subsequent migration, a process referred to by Massey and his associates as "cumulative causation" (Massey 1990; Massey et al. 1993). There are at least two mechanisms that may generate this process. First, migrants are more likely than others to move again, becoming part of what might be termed as a culture of migration. Second, remittances increase the income of the migrants' families relative to others in the community of origin, hence increasing the motivation of other to send migrants. The risk and costs associated with migration decrease by forging kinship, friendship and other ties between the migrants in the destination areas and the potential migrants in the sending communities (see Fawcett 1989; Wood 1982). Here, we refer to this multi-faceted process as migration capital.

As was already documented, the vast majority of Syrian adults migrate only once in their lifetime. But those who migrate are at a greater "risk" of further migration compared to the stayers. The data on migration history are best suited to examine the process of "cumulative" migration over time. Here, we confine our analysis to rather limited data on the links between period migration (since 1995), lifetime (since birth) and temporary migration. We do, however, make use of the migration history data to investigate another aspect of the "migration capital" argument, namely helping behaviour at the place of destination.

Does migration breed migration?

The findings indicate that the majority of those who moved since 1995 were prior migrants. Only one percent of those living in their original place of birth migrated since 1995. On the other hand, about one out of four persons who are lifetime migrants (i.e., residing in a different locality than their place of birth) is a period migrant (i.e., living in a different place since 1995). Prior international migration causes further internal migration as about 12 percent of those born abroad changed residence since 1995. There are essentially no differences between men and women.

Likewise, period migration is also linked with temporary migration. However, the differentials are not as large as those for lifetime migrants. The figures indicate that nearly five percent of those who are not temporary migrants are period migrants; the corresponding proportions for internal and international temporary migrations are eight and ten percent, respectively. These differences hold true in both urban and rural areas.

However, there are clear differentials by type of residence (Figures 15.1 and 15.2). Those living in rural places are more likely to experience cumulative migration than

their urban counterparts. While about 14 percent of lifetime internal migrants in urban areas are period migrants, the corresponding proportion in rural areas is 41 percent. The same trend is shown for those born abroad, but the difference between rural and urban places is smaller.

Figure 15.1 Percentage period migrant by lifetime migration status and residence



Figure 15.2 Percentage period migrant by temporary migration status and residence



The picture for temporary migrants is different. International temporary migrants are more likely than stayers to be period migrants in both urban (nine percent) and rural (ten percent) areas. Internal temporary migrants are also more likely to be period migrants, but only in urban areas. Here, the period migration rate among the urban population is 12 percent compared to three percent among the stayers. The corresponding rate among the rural population is six percent for both stayers and internal temporary migrants. There are very few temporary migrants, however, so caution should be taken in interpreting these differentials.

Helping hands at time of moving?

A second aspect of migration capital investigated here is the help received by migrants at the time of moving. The migrants are presumed to receive help by the increased availability of kinship, friendship, and other social as well as professional associations at places of destination. We focus on the extent and kind of help received at the time of moving, and their change over time, using the data pertaining

to the migration history of adults. Thus, the analysis reported below covers various forms of internal migration.

The evidence summarized in Figure 15.3 is mixed. The majority of moves made by adults do not involve any kind of help, regardless of the period in question. Help by relatives is relatively extensive, and about a third of moves involve some help by a relative. Friends come in second, with about six percent of moves during the 1990s involving a helping hand from friends. On the other hand, very few moves (two or three percent) involve any help from an employer or other associates. Thus, kinties matter the most, overall. Another interesting observation in this graph is the absence of increase in helping behaviour as time elapsed. Again, the trends are dependent on the helper. For, the only noticeable change in the strength of helping behaviour is evident in the 1990s, for help received by relatives and friends — but the change is too small to be significant.

Figure 15.3 Help received at time of moving by provider and period



However, a secular trend is not so evident when control is made for sex, as clearly shown in Figure 15.4. There is no overall tendency for help to increase with migration over time, and the extent of help received by relatives is greater during the 1980s for women. On the other hand, help received by friends increased slightly for both sexes. Evidently, the use of kinship and other ties during migration is sex-specific however. Help by relatives is much more common for females, while help by friends and employers is more prevalent for males. Thus, over a third of moves by women involved some help by relatives during the 1980s and 1990s, while only a quarter of moves by men involved the same kind of help at that time. Friends and employers seem more important for men, but sex differentials concerning these help providers are too small to be considered meaningful.

What kind of help is provided to migrants who receive it? A total of nine items were included in the questionnaires, but we group them into seven distinct items here on practical and substantive grounds. These include housing, finding employment, help with bureaucratic red tape, schooling and so on. The most important

Figure 15.4 Help received at time of moving by provider, period and sex



areas of help are housing and bureaucracy overall, with about nine and seven percent of in-migrants using help here. On the other hand, schooling and employment are the least important areas, and less than one percent of migrants receive help in finding employment or children's schooling. There are some significant differences between women and men, however.

Figure 15.5 Kind of help received at time of moving by sex



As shown in Figure 15.5, women are more likely than men to receive help in finding residential dwellings as well as assistance with the bureaucracy. For the latter, about nine percent of women are using help and about four percent of men are. Men are much more likely than women to seek help in finding work and other job information, but the percentage differences here (as well as the remaining items) are too small to be considered significant.

16 Conclusions

We have described the volume and general patterns of internal migration in Syria using detailed data from the 1999 Syria Internal Migration Survey. We then considered the main demographic features of these population flows and went on to examine the characteristics and trends of the more specific destinations of out-migration, focusing on population movements to the Capital and other provincial cities. A brief descriptive analysis of the migrants at places of destination has also been provided. This includes migrants' characteristics, their economic activities, the reasons given for "choosing" to move, adaptation to city life, incidence and uses of remittances. We concluded with a discussion of temporary and potential migration, as well as of the so-called "migration capital" (uses of one's social network) during the migration process. We have not attempted in this rather descriptive account to provide explanations for the observed patterns. Uncovering the causes of population migration is a complex and controversial undertaking, requiring a careful and lengthy treatment in separate studies.

Analysis of the Syrian internal population movements, especially rural-urban migration, generally confirms findings from previous studies. These include the stability of inter-provincial migration, rural-urban migration turnaround, the significance of economic factors and education, the declining importance of housing and availability of services as determinants of internal population movements, and the overwhelming use of migrant labour in service, mainly public sector, jobs. However, there are some surprising results.

Chief among these is the low level of internal migration found in Syria relative to other countries in the region as well as internationally. According to the conventional measure of lifetime migration, about 14 percent of the total Syrian population had migrated from their birthplace and were living in another administrative unit at the time of the survey. On the other hand, period migration data show an estimated annual migration rate (of those aged five years or more) of about one percent. Clearly, these rates are not particularly high either in regional or international perspectives. These rates fall below their corresponding international averages as reported by the UN. We suggested various factors that may explain the low incidence of internal migration, including Syria's large surface area, the relatively large share of population living in rural communities, expansions of social services to rural or otherwise remote areas, high cost of housing in urban areas, low variations in wage levels, and more importantly policy interventions in the "field" of migration. Despite the generally low levels of migration, there are significant variations in the migration rates among regions, and types of residence within regions.

The general trends indicate that migration has been increasing in volume, and becoming more urban-oriented. However, there is evidence of an apparent halt in the volume of migration since the early 1980s, and perhaps a recent decline during the 1990s. As revealed by the net migration rates and inter-provincial flows, the Capital city of Damascus and its surrounding areas, remains the primary place of destination for Syrians. However, there is a relative decline of the Mohafaza centers as the main places of destination since the 1980s. There are significant movements within provinces, especially towards the provincial centers, but movements across provinces are generally uncommon. On the other hand, rural-urban migration is the dominant form of population movement in Syria, but we also find high rates of urban-urban, especially in the urban towns, and rural-rural migration in the countryside.

The trend of population movement towards the urban areas is also one of the main characteristics of population movement at the household level in Syria. The findings indicate that over a fourth of households in provincial cities have at least one person originating from rural areas. Here, migration seems segmented in its regional character. The majority of provinces have rural-urban migrant households, but other provinces, including the Capital, house households with urban-urban or mixed-origin migrants.

Despite the tremendous demographic impact of migration on places of origin and destination, migration has had relatively little effect on the general patterns of population distribution among the provinces since the early 1960s. The proportions of population in the two major regions of the country, Damascus and Allepo, underwent little change throughout the period, and this can be partly attributed to population policies and their implementations. However, this does not imply that the impact of migration is negligible. As clearly shown in the report, internal migration has caused profound shifts in the demographic makeup of urban areas, especially provincial centres, with implications for housing and social services.

Contrary to common impressions there are little gender differences in migration propensities. The levels of female migration are higher than male overall, but the trends over time indicate that this is essentially due to a recent rise (1990s) in female migration in Syria. Adult migrants tend to be married rather than single, and they are more educated as compared to non-migrants. There are some gender differentials here but they are smaller than would be expected. Evidently, the gender differences in the volume as well as the character of migration are essentially due to the type of migration in question. Furthermore, recurrent migration is Syria is rather rare, and even less common among women. It is more common in urban areas, but varies little by region.

Judging from evidence regarding the reasons for migration, marriage and family related ones figure highly for both women and men with little variations in the profiles of reasons given over time. Some sex differentials are found for work and marriage. For male migrants work-related motives dominate while for female migrants marriage-related reasons are more important. The majority of migrants tend to be employed prior to migration, and once in urban destinations, migrants are better off than non-migrants in terms of occupational and industrial locations. The findings pertaining to the uses of migrant labour in the cities indicate significant positive returns to migration overall.

There is no evidence of migrants' maladjustment to city life; findings from various dimensions of "coping" and social "integration" indicate that migrants are in fact more socially "connected" or otherwise integrated than stayers. This holds true for migrants in the cities with rural roots as compared to stayers or urban migrants. One explanation for this is the "clustering" of rural migrants in the cities with possible segmentation between migrant and non-migrant communities. Rural migrants in the cities appear connected to their places of origin, and a majority of households with urban migrants receive some form of remittances. Remittances also flow from rural households to migrant relatives in the cities. In either case, remittances are largely used for consumption purposes.

Very few Syrian adults have intentions, or otherwise, plans to move, and Syria has a small proportion of temporary internal migrants. On the other hand, migration is "cumulative" – migration tends to "breed" more moves and this is particularly true for those living in rural areas. There is evidence of a significant use of help upon migration, especially from relatives, but the majority of adult migrants did not receive any kind of help during migration. Once present, help is sought and used upon arrival more in housing matters, dealing with the bureaucracy, than finding employment or schooling. Women are more likely to receive help than men, especially in non-work related areas. It remains, however, that while common, helping behaviour does not involve the majority of migrants and differs little across groups or over time.

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Appendix 1 The Survey Sample

Jon Pedersen

The Sample

The design of the SIMS sample was – like any other sample – subject to a number of constraints. The main design characteristics for the Syria sample were the following:

1. The population selected for this study was all households resident in Syria.
2. The budget allowed for a sample of 20,000 households.
3. The sample was chosen to be of sufficient size to allow estimation of migration rates from migration history data and allow description of the households living and working conditions.
4. The questionnaire calls for a respondent that answers for the household, all ever married women in the household, and a random selection of a person aged 15 or above.

The sample frame

The sample frame is the list of enumeration areas (EA) that were used for the 1994 Census of Syria. The frame was generated from the census data files. The structure of the sample frame is given in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Organization of the sample frame

Enumeration areas have (1994) sizes spanning from about 20 households to 400 households. Most enumeration areas have between 100 and 200 households. Small EAs are most common in rural areas.

From the census listings one obtained counts of households and counts of families. A household is a dwelling unit; there may thus be several families within one household. It appeared most practical to select dwelling units (households).

The main problem associated with the sample frame was quarters with either large, newly completed apartment buildings or apartment buildings that were vacant in 1994. Such buildings or areas did appear in the enumeration area listing.

Sample design

The key elements of the sampling were the following:

1. PSUs (EAs) were explicitly stratified by province (*mohafazat*, governorate) and urban rural status resulting in 26 strata.
2. Each stratum received a sample allocation proportional to the number of households in the stratum.
3. Within each stratum PSUs were selected with simple linear systematic sampling. This was not the intention, which rather was to select with proportionate to size (PPS).
4. A sketch map was made for each selected PSU and all dwelling units within the PSU were to be listed.
5. From the updated list the selection of households was to be made with linear systematic sampling.
6. An individual aged 15 or above should be selected randomly for being the respondent on the "individual" questionnaire, by simple random sampling.

Sample selection procedures

PSUs were selected with simple random sampling. In total (across all strata) 1002 PSUs were selected. The selected PSUs were mapped and listed. All households within a selected PSU should be listed, regardless of the size of the PSU. The PSUs were supposed to be identified from the 1994 census books, which provide details of boundaries and households. Thus, all households within the area covered between by the original household locations should be listed. In addition, it was the intention to list households that were immediately adjacent to the old PSU, when they naturally belong to the PSU. (For example, if a village was selected as a PSU, houses that had been built after 1994 just outside the village borders, but obviously belonging to the village should have been listed.)

In practice it appears that the mapping and listing was not complete, and that the degree of completeness varied between provinces. In two provinces (Aleppo and Hasakeh), the listed size of the enumeration areas are generally smaller than the 1994 count, suggesting that several households were not listed, even in dwelling units that existed at the time of the 1994 census. The other provinces show an increase in size, although less than the recent projected numbers.

Unfortunately, it is possible that these listing problems introduce a bias with respect to the main purpose of the survey, namely migration. Since migrants often move into new houses, it is possible that they are under-represented in the sample.

Selection of households

The households to be interviewed were selected by linear systematic sampling in the central office.

The target allocation for each PSU was 20 households. The design of the sample called for a variation in the number of households to be selected in order to keep the sample self weighted within each stratum. The exact allocation procedure used depended on the fact that the first stage was intended to be drawn with probability proportional to size. Since this was not the case, the allocation procedure did not work as planned, and the selection probabilities for households were different for each cluster.

Random selection of one person aged 15 or above

The interviewer was responsible for selection of the RSI. The interviewer should first determine household membership using the household roster part of the questionnaire. She should then use a specially constructed sampling sheet to make a list of the adults that was ordered so that first men were listed by descending age, and secondly women by descending age. The roster number should also have been noted adjacent to the name. For each line on this list, there could be a pre-printed X. The interviewer started at the bottom of the list, and selected the first line with an X. This should be the randomly selected person. The Xs were put on each line with a probability that was 1/(line number). The method is described in Deming 1960: 240-241.

Substitution

No substitution of selected units was to take place. If for any reason a household or person could not be interviewed, another person or household should not take its place. However, it should be noted that the listing and selection was considered as consisting of dwelling units. That means that if, between the listing and interview, a family had moved from a dwelling unit and another family had moved into the dwelling unit, the new family should be interviewed.

In practice it appears that interviewers must have substituted the Randomly Selected Individuals. A very low number of RSIs were not interviewed – only 79 persons. In most surveys there are a number of reasons why a RSI cannot be interviewed, the most common being that some are often not at home, so that repeated visits are needed. SIMS has comparatively few visits, leading to the suspicion that (some) interviewers tended to choose RSIs who were present at the time of the first visit. A second indication of RSI substitution is that employed men are extremely underrepresented in the RSI file, suggesting that women were picked instead.

Because of the low number of household visits, and the insignificant non-response, it is possible that households also were substituted. This is more difficult to determine, however, since there are no particular indication of it in the data.

Over sampling

Over sampling was used in order to make up for the reduction of effective sample size due to various sources of non-response. Based on the experiences of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), a 5 percent over sample was deemed to be sufficient, bringing up the selected sample to 21,000. In practice, this appeared to be more than necessary, as the total sample size arrived at 20,409 completed interviews. However, as noted some substitution of households may have taken place, and a 5 percent over sample may be a reasonable figure in future surveys.

Inclusion probabilities and weights

It follows from the above that the sample is in general a two-stage sample, but with a third stage for the RSI.

Notation

In order to describe the sample precisely and calculate inclusion probabilities we need to introduce some notation. This is done in Table 1.

Table 1: Notation used

Symbol	Meaning
N	Dwelling unit (household) count (initial estimate)
N^l	Dwelling unit count as listed
n	Sample count (as per the sample allocation)
m	Sample number of PSUs
M	Total number of PSUs
p	Inclusion probability
s	Index of stratum
c	Index of PSU
h and i	Index of household (h used to indicate household in the sampling stage, i for the list of all households from 1 to n in the sample)
d	Index of person within the household

Selection of PSUs

The inclusion probabilities for a PSU c in stratum s is the following:

Equation 1

$$p_{s,c} = \frac{m_{s,c}}{M_s}$$

Within each PSU a fixed number of households is to be selected (but see above). The inclusion probability for a household h within a PSU c in stratum s is then the following:

Equation 2

$$p_{c,h} = \frac{n_{s,c}}{N^l_{s,c}}$$

Note that the listed number of households is used, rather than the initial estimate of households from the census. The overall inclusion probability for a household then becomes:

Equation 3

$$p_i = p_{s,c,h} = \frac{m_s \cdot n_{s,c}}{M_s \cdot N^l_{s,c}}$$

Probabilities for individuals

The inclusion probability for RSI d within the N adults of household h is:

Equation 4

$$p_d = \frac{1}{N_{h,d}}$$

since only one RSI is selected.

Sampling weights

There are two types of sampling weights. The expansion weights create estimates equivalent to real numbers in the population, while the relative weights retain the sample size and only adjust the relative contribution of each unit of analysis (household or individual). The expansion weights are calculated as the inverse of the sampling probability, while the relative weights are calculated as the expansion weight divided by the mean of all the expansion weights.

Thus, the expansion sampling weight for household *i* is:

Equation 5

$$W_i^e = \frac{1}{p_i}$$

The relative sampling weight is then:

Equation 6

$$W_i^r = \frac{W_i}{\frac{\sum W_i^e}{n}}$$

The sampling weights as such will not be used in estimation of survey results, because the sampling weights are adjusted for non-response as will be discussed below.

Sampling weights were created for both households and RSIs.

Non-response and non response corrections

The response rate achieved during the fieldwork of a survey is crucial for the quality of the survey results. When response rates are low, one may justifiably suspect biases in the results.

In general one may distinguish between two types of non-response: unit non-response and item non-response. Unit non-response pertains to the non-response of a whole unit, such as a household. In that case almost nothing is known about that household.

Item non-response pertains to the lack of information on a specific item for a unit, for instance that a person does not answer questions about income. Here we will only consider unit non-response.

Unit non-response: the household

The results of the interviews or attempted interviews can be studied using a fairly detailed classification of non-response in the questionnaire, derived from Hidiroglou, Drew and Gray (1993). The response categories in the framework are given in Table 2.

The framework is built around the observation that an interview can be missing for two reasons. First, it may be that the selected household does not belong to the sampling frame. This is the case for instance for diplomats. Second, a selected household, which actually exists and is eligible, may refuse, or not be found at home. Also, the classification has to take into account that there will be some situations where the interviewer cannot determine if a household exists or not. Moreover, interviewers sometimes encounter the situation that the household is available for interview, but that no useful information can be obtained because the respondent is sick or otherwise incapable of answering.

Table 2: Response categories

Category	Response type
1 Interview completed	Interview is possible (response)
2 Refusal converted by supervisor (The respondent initially refused, but co-operated after a visit by the supervisor)	Interview is possible (response)
3 Partly completed	Interview is possible (response)
4 Status not determined (The field work team could not find out if a household was living at the address)	Not clear, usually distributed over possible interview and not possible
5 No usable information (For instance because the respondent was sick, mentally ill, not really co-operating)	Interview is possible, non-response
6 Dwelling unit did not exist	No interview possible
7 Dwelling unit is vacant	No interview possible
8 Dwelling unit is under construction	No interview possible
9 Not eligible	No interview possible
10 No contact (the household exists, but could not be found at home)	Interview is possible, non-response
11 Refusal	Interview is possible, non-response

Non-response correction

Non-response always occurs. Nevertheless, since the extent and seriousness of non-response vary the plan of non-response correction must be reconsidered after the fieldwork.

Weight adjustment and estimation weights

When there is unit non-response, direct use of the sampling weights will result in biased estimation. The biases generally take two forms. One is that when totals are estimated with sampling expansion weights, the total will be too small because non-response implies that units that should be added into the total are missing. The other form is that estimation may be biased because non-responding units may have particular characteristics.

One way to reduce the biases produced by unit non-response is to adjust the sampling weights. The method of correction of the weights for non-response that is used here, is the so-called "adjustment cell method" (see for instance Lehtonen and Pahkinen 1995; Little and Rubin 1987). In this approach, households that are considered to be fairly similar are identified and the non-response rate calculated for each group of households, called adjustment cells. In line with the description above, when non-response rates are calculated, only the non-response of those that could have responded but for some reason did not do so is considered.

The inverse of the non-response rate in each adjustment cell was then used to adjust the sampling weights (both expansion and relative) for each household. The result is the so-called estimation weights, both expansion and relative. The weighted sample size is now, as it would have been if all households had responded. The effect is also to increase the relative contribution to the estimates of units that are similar to those missing.

In the present study the adjustment cells used are likely to consist of a number of geographically adjacent PSUs.

Using the notation in Table 3, the correction factor to the weights for non-response is given in Equation 7.

Table 3: Notation for non-response adjustment

Symbol	Explanation
C	Adjustment (Correction) factor
a	Index of adjustment cell
h^r	Responding households
h^f	Non responding households

The number of possible interviews (i.e. the denominator in the non-response rate) is the sum of categories 1,2,5,10 and 11 in Table 2. The number of non-respondent units is the sum of the categories 5, 10 and 11. The "status not determined" category may be distributed over the other categories.

Equation 7

$$C_a = \frac{1}{\frac{h_a^r}{h_a^r + h_a^f}}$$

The weights are then adjusted according to the following equations:

Equation 8

$$W_i^{estimation} = C_i W_i^e$$

Equation 9

$$W_i^{r,estimation} = \frac{W_i^{e,estimation}}{\frac{\sum W_i^{e,estimation}}{n}}$$

The effect of the corrections is that the expansion weights are increased so that the sum of the estimation expansion weights corresponds to the sum of units in the sample frame (less non-existent or non-eligible units). The relative estimation weights are normalised. This means that the sum of the weights is the sum of the household records in the data file.

This type of non-response correction was carried out for the household and the RSI responses. For each, adjustment cells were formed by using the concatenation of the stratum identifier and result of the integer portion of the division cluster_number/10. This leads to adjustment cells that in general are geographically adjacent.

Correction for errors in the listing

Since the uncorrected expansion weights resulted in a population estimate of 13.292 Million persons for Syria it was decided to post-stratify the sample using the estimated population sizes for the urban and rural parts of each province as recently established by the CBS. This post stratification follows exactly the same logic as the correction for non-response. Thus, for each stratum a correction factor of:

$C_s = \frac{P_s^e}{P_s^s}$, where P refers to population, the subscript s to strata, and the superscript e to estimated from population models, and the superscript s to estimated from the survey.

The result is that the population size is forced to the total estimated for Syria in mid-year 2000.

It is not particularly good practice to post stratify by estimates of population size that are so uncertain as the population sizes for the provinces in Syria. The main merit is to bring the reporting for the survey in line with official statistics and also undoubtedly to make estimates of totals more realistic.

Corrections for substitution of RSIs

The problem of RSI substitution is a serious one, because it creates larger biases than if the RSIs that could not be contacted were simply registered as no contacts. This has two reasons: first, the missing RSIs are substituted with persons that are surely different from them, and second, it is impossible afterwards to find out who were substitutions and who were not, thus severely reducing our ability to model the non–response mechanism.

Therefore, a simple adjustment to the roster distribution of persons by residence (in groups of provinces divided into urban and rural), sex, age groups and labour force status (in labour force or out of it) was carried out using the same adjustment cell as described for non-response above.

Appendix 2 Tables to Figures

Table for Figure 2.2 Levels of lifetime migration by governorate
Table for Figure 2.3 Levels of lifetime migration by governorate and urban-rural residence
Table for Figure 2.4 Levels of period migration by governorate
Table for Figure 2.5 Levels of period migration by governorate and urban-rural residence
Table for Figure 2.6 Levels of lifetime and period migration by current residence; percent of households
Table for Figure 2.7 Levels of lifetime migration by governorate; percent of households
Table for Figure 2.8 Levels of lifetime migration by governorate and urban-rural residence; percent of households
Table for Figure 2.9 Levels of period migration by governorate; percent of households
Table for Figure 4.1 Percent (lifetime) migrant by origin and current residence, persons
Table for Figure 4.2 Percent (lifetime) migrant by origin and current residence, persons
Table for Figure 4.3 Percent (period) migrant by origin and current residence, persons aged 5+
Figure 4.4 Percent (period) migrant by origin and current residence, persons
Table for Figure 4.5 Percent (lifetime) migrant by origin and current residence, households
Table for Figure 4.6 Percent (lifetime) migrant by origin and current residence, households
Table for Figure 4.7 Percent (period) migrant by origin and current residence, households
Table for Figure 5.1 Migration moves by period and sex
Table for Figure 5.2 Trends in internal migration, last move by year (moving average)
Table for Figure 5.3 Trends in internal migration, last move by year and sex (moving average)
Table for Figure 5.4 Trends in origin and destination propensities by residence, adults
Table for Figure 5.5 Regional origin propensities, adults
Table for Figure 5.6 Regional destination propensities, adults
Table for Figure 6.1 Trends in origin and destination propensities in Damascus
Table for Figure 6.2 City destination propensities, adults
Table for Figure 7.1 Percentage (lifetime) migrant by age and sex
Table for Figure 7.2 Percentage (lifetime) migrant by age, sex and origin
Table for Figure 7.3 Distribution of the population by migration status and marital status
Table for Figure 7.4 Lifetime migration rates by marital status
Table for Figure 7.5 Percentage (lifetime) migrant by marital status and origin
Table for Figure 7.6 Marital characteristics of adult migrants by sex and period
Table for Figure 7.7 Distribution of the population by migration status and education
Table for Figure 7.8 Lifetime migration rates by education
Table for Figure 7.9 Percentage (lifetime) migrant by educational level and origin
Table for Figure 7.10 Educational characteristics of adult migrants by sex and period
Table for Figure 8.1 Distribution of the adult population by migration status and sex (persons aged 15+)
Table for Figure 8.2 Distribution of the adult population by migration status and residence (persons aged 15+)
Table for Figure 8.3 Percentage migrant by frequency and governorate (persons aged 15+)
Table for Figure 8.4 Percentage migrant by frequency and age (persons aged 15+)
Table for Figure 8.5 Percentage migrant by frequency, age and sex (persons aged 15+)
Table for Figure 8.6 Percentage migrant by frequency and marital status (persons aged 15+)
Table for Figure 8.7 Percentage migrant by frequency, marital status and sex (persons aged 15+)
Table for Figure 8.8 Percentage migrant by frequency and education (persons aged 15+)
Table for Figure 8.9 Percentage migrant by frequency, education and sex (persons aged 15+)

Table for Figure 2.1 Levels of internal migration by type and residence; percent

	Governorate center	Urban, other	Rural	Total
Life-time	16.4	23.2	11.9	15.3
Period	1.6	8.6	6.8	5.2

Table for Figure 2.2 Levels of lifetime migration by governorate; percent

Der Elzor	4.6
Hama	7.8
Edleb	9.4
Rakka	10.5
Aleppo	11.5
Damascus city	13.9
Dara	15.4
Hasakeh	15.6
Homs	16.0
Latakia	16.1
Tartos	17.8
Sweda	19.1
Qunitra	21.9
Damascus other	24.8
Total	14.2

Table for Figure 2.3 Levels of lifetime migration by governorate and urban-rural residence; percent

	Urban	Rural
Qunitra	-	21.9
Hama	4.8	9.3
Edleb	7.0	10.4
Der Elzor	9.2	2.9
Dara	11.5	18.8
Aleppo	12.4	10.1
Damascus city	13.9	
Rakka	16.2	6.5
Homs	20.2	10.7
Latakia	20.4	11.4
Hasakeh	24.9	10.8
Tartos	29.9	13.0
Damascus other	30.3	18.4
Sweda	34.7	12.7

Table for Figure 2.4 Levels of period migration by governorate; percent

Damascus city	1.2
Der Elzor	1.9
Hasakeh	2.3
Latakia	3.1
Aleppo	3.1
Hama	4.7
Homs	5.6
Tartos	6.4
Edleb	6.4
Sweda	6.7
Qunitra	8.0
Rakka	8.3
Damascus other	8.5
Dara	14.4
Total	4.9

Table for Figure 2.5 Levels of period migration by governorate and urban-rural residence; percent

	Urban	Rural
Damascus city	1.2	-
Hasakeh	4.4	1.1
Der Elzor	1.2	2.2
Sweda	15.2	3.3
Latakia	2.1	4.1
Homs	6.1	5.0
Hama	1.6	6.3
Tartos	6.4	6.4
Damascus other	10.3	6.4
Aleppo	0.6	7.3
Qunitra	-	8.0
Edleb	1.0	8.6
Rakka	5.5	10.2
Dara	2.2	24.8

Table for Figure 2.6 Levels of lifetime and period migration by current residence; percent of households

	Governorate center	Urban, other	Rural	Total
Life-time	42.8	47.1	29.5	37.6
Period	3.4	12.3	9.2	7.4

Table for Figure 2.7 Levels of lifetime migration by governorate; percent of households

Der Elzor	16.7
Edleb	21.3
Hama	23.0
Rakka	27.3
Aleppo	28.0
Dara	33.3
Damascus city	36.6
Homs	36.9
Latakia	41.1
Tartos	44.7
Hasakeh	45.9
Sweda	48.3
Damascus other	49.5
Qunitra	50.7

Table for Figure 2.8 Levels of lifetime migration by governorate and urban-rural residence; percent of households

	Urban	Rural
Qunitra	-	50.7
Hama	17.3	26.3
Edleb	21.4	21.3
Aleppo	30.9	22.5
Der Elzor	33.0	8.7
Dara	33.8	32.9
Damascus city	36.6	-
Homs	43.2	28.1
Rakka	48.3	12.6
Latakia	49.5	31.3
Damascus other	57.9	39.0
Hasakeh	63.1	36.2
Tartos	67.5	34.4
Sweda	71.1	36.7

Table for Figure 2.9 Levels of period migration by governorate; percent of households

Damascus city	2.7
Hasakeh	3.6
Der Elzor	3.9
Aleppo	3.9
Homs	6.4
Latakia	6.6
Hama	7.0
Qunitra	7.6
Edleb	7.6
Rakka	9.1
Tartos	9.7
Sweda	11.0
Damascus other	12.8
Dara	17.2

Table for Figure 4.1 Percent (lifetime) migrant by origin and current residence, persons

		Rural origin	Urban origin
Current place of residence:	Governorate center	12.7	3.2
	Other urban	12.9	5.1
	Rural	8.6	1.9

Table for Figure 4.2 Percent (lifetime) migrant by origin and current residence, persons

	Rural origin	Urban origin
Der Elzor	4.5	1.1
Dara	5.8	9.7
Hama	7.4	0.6
Sweda	7.9	13.5
Qunitra	8.6	11.7
Edleb	9.1	0.3
Hasakeh	9.2	7.4
Rakka	10.5	0.2
Aleppo	11.2	0.6
Damascus city	11.6	5.3
Damascus other	11.9	4.8
Latakia	14.3	0.9
Homs	14.9	0.9
Tartos	16.6	2.0
All	10.7	2.9

Table for Figure 4.3 Percent (period) migrant by origin and current residence, persons aged 5+

		Rural origin	Urban origin
Current place of residence:	Governorate center	1.0	0.5
	Other urban	6.3	1.1
	Rural	5.1	1.4

Table for Figure 4.4 Percent (period) migrant by origin and current residence, persons

	Rural origin	Urban origin
Qunitra	0.3	7.8
Hasakeh	0.9	1.4
Damascus city	1.0	0.7
Der Elzor	1.7	0.3
Latakia	2.5	0.1
Dara	2.9	11.7
Aleppo	3.1	0.1
Sweda	4.2	3.9
Hama	4.5	0.3
Homs	5.5	0.5
Damascus other	5.6	0.8
Tartos	6.2	0.4
Edleb	6.3	0.1
Rakka	8.3	0.0
All	3.8	1.0

Table for Figure 4.5 Percent (lifetime) migrant by origin and current residence, households

		Rural origin	Urban origin	Mixed, rural urban
Current	Governorate center	27.8	6.7	1.7
place of	Other urban	20.2	9.5	2.3
residence:	Rural	15.1	3.0	0.7

Table for Figure 4.6 Percent (lifetime) migrant by origin and current residence, households

	Rural origin	Urban origin	Mixed, rural urban
Dara	8.9	15.5	1.1
Qunitra	10.6	15.2	0.0
Sweda	11.4	26.7	4.9
Edleb	12.8	0.3	0.1
Der Elzor	12.9	1.6	0.6
Hama	16.2	1.4	0.1
Damascus other	19.0	9.3	2.8
Aleppo	21.6	1.1	0.3
Rakka	22.7	0.1	0.3
Damascus city	23.4	10.3	2.1
Hasakeh	23.6	15.5	3.3
Homs	27.8	2.1	0.6
Tartos	29.0	2.5	2.4
Latakia	29.9	1.5	1.1
All	20.9	5.5	1.3

Table for Figure 4.7 Percent (period) migrant by origin and current residence, households

		Rural origin	Urban origin	Mixed, rural urban
Current	Governorate center	1.7	0.9	0.0
place of	Other urban	7.4	1.3	0.2
residence:	Rural	5.7	1.5	0.0

Table for Figure 5.1 Migration moves by period and sex; percent

	Male	Female	Total
Up to 1960	8.6	7.8	8.2
1960s	13.9	12.9	13.4
1970s	22.2	19.8	21.0
1980s	29.0	27.7	28.3
1990s	26.2	31.8	29.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 5.4 Trends in origin and destination propensities by residence, adults; percent

Residence of origin	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Governorate center	16.8	17.4	29.6	33.9
Urban, other	14.7	16.7	16.9	17.9
Rural	68.6	65.9	53.4	48.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Residence of destination	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Governorate center	45.2	22.4	25.9	33.8
Urban, other	22.3	19.4	23.0	25.7
Rural	32.5	42.3	34.9	38.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 5.5 Regional origin propensities, adults; percent

Region of origin	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Qunitra	21.1	1.8	0.7	0.8
Rakka	0.8	8.4	3.3	2.2
Sweda	2.2	1.7	2.6	2.5
Dara	3.7	8.0	3.8	2.9
Der Elzor	2.1	2.3	2.8	3.0
Edleb	5.0	5.9	5.5	4.9
Hama	5.7	6.7	6.7	6.2
Tartos	7.1	6.1	5.9	6.6
Hasakeh	9.0	12.0	10.5	7.3
Homs	8.3	8.6	6.8	7.4
Latakia	7.8	7.1	6.5	7.5
Aleppo	13.8	16.4	17.7	16.3
Damascus	13.5	14.9	27.1	32.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 5.6 Regional destination propensities, adults; percent

Region of destination	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Qunitra	0.0	1.0	0.6	0.6
Rakka	1.1	3.2	2.3	1.9
Edleb	4.0	2.9	2.9	2.3
Der Elzor	2.5	1.2	1.4	3.2
Sweda	2.3	2.4	3.9	3.3
Dara	5.0	3.5	4.0	3.3
Hama	3.3	4.6	3.7	4.4
Homs	9.9	7.0	7.8	6.4
Hasakeh	8.6	20.4	9.7	6.4
Tartos	7.3	7.4	6.6	7.1
Latakia	7.5	8.2	7.3	7.9
Aleppo	13.3	12.3	18.8	16.9
Damascus	35.0	26.0	30.9	36.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 6.1 Trends in origin and destination propensities in Damascus; percent

	Damascus city	Damascus other urban	Damascus rural
Origin propensities			
1990s	21.4	5.4	5.6
1980s	18.3	5.5	3.3
1970s	8.0	3.7	3.2
1960s	3.0	3.5	7.0
Destination propensities			
1990s	8.9	17.1	10.2
1980s	10.7	13.4	6.8
1970s	10.7	9.5	5.7
1960s	17.2	11.8	6.1

Table for Figure 6.2 City destination propensities, adults; percent

City of destination	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Aleppo center	9.8	9.5	14.6	12.2
Damascus city	17.2	10.7	10.7	8.9
Homs center	5.9	3.5	4.6	3.8
Latakia center	4.6	4.5	2.2	3.2
Hasakeh center	1.3	3.7	4.7	1.8
Tartos center	0.8	1.7	1.2	1.3
Rakka center	0.2	1.4	1.4	1.0
Der Elzor center	2.1	0.9	0.5	0.9
Sweda center	0.7	0.5	1.1	0.8
Hama center	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.7
Dara center	1.8	0.5	0.0	0.6
Edleb center	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.1

Table for Figure 7.1 Percentage (lifetime) migrant by age and sex

Age	Male	Female
0-9	5.5	5.3
10-19	8.3	8.9
20-29	12.7	19.5
30-39	22.4	28.2
40-49	28.4	29.7
50-59	26.7	27.6
60-69	24.1	24.2
70-79	22.4	20.8
80-89	18.4	21.4
90+	19.5	27.0

Table for Figure 7.2 Percentage (lifetime) migrant by age, sex and origin

Age	Male rural	Female rural	Male urban	Female urban
0-4	2.7	3.1	0.8	0.5
5-9	4.3	3.6	1.0	0.8
10-14	5.4	5.6	1.6	1.3
15-19	7.5	7.8	2.6	2.3
20-24	9.1	14.1	3.2	3.5
25-29	12.6	19.6	2.8	3.9
30-34	18.8	23.5	4.1	4.8
35-39	23.8	25.7	4.9	7.0
40-44	25.5	27.2	7.0	8.7
45-49	30.4	26.5	7.6	8.6
50-54	28.8	28.5	8.4	9.4
55-59	28.4	26.1	11.2	11.8
60-64	26.2	23.8	10.7	12.1
65-69	27.2	19.9	11.5	16.0
70-74	23.0	17.1	11.7	12.0
75-79	26.3	16.3	11.3	19.2
80+	17.9	18.5	17.4	17.2

Table for Figure 7.3 Distribution of the population by migration status and marital status; percent

	Male stayer	Male migrant	Female stayer	Female migrant
Never married	50.4	27.0	41.6	1.6
Married	48.8	71.9	52.9	75.3
Widowed	0.6	0.8	4.8	6.4
Divorced	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 7.4 Lifetime migration rates by marital status; percent

	Male	Female
Divorced	23.9	20.5
Widowed	21.7	26.2
Married	24.5	28.3
Never married	10.6	10.6

Table for Figure 7.5 Percentage (lifetime) migrant by marital status and origin

	Urban	Rural
Divorced	6,8	12,6
Widowed	9,5	20,5
Married	5,3	20,5
Never married	2,2	7,4

Table for Figure 7.6 Marital characteristics of adult migrants by sex and period; percent

	1960s			1970s		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Never married	52.0	39.8	45.8	50.0	33.7	41.9
Married	48.0	60.0	54.1	49.7	64.6	57.0
Widowed/ divorced	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.3	1.7	1.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	1980s			1990s		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Never married	46.3	39.1	42.6	44.8	42.8	43.7
Married	53.6	60.0	56.8	54.7	55.1	54.9
Widowed/ divorced	0.1	0.9	0.5	0.5	2.1	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 7.7 Distribution of the population by migration status and education; percent

	Female		Male	
	Stayer	Migrant	Stayer	Migrant
Less than elementary	51.6	47.5	40.9	30.8
Elementary	31.1	26.8	36.9	32.7
Preperatory	8.8	11.5	10.8	14.1
Secondary	4.6	6.9	5.8	10.3
Diploma	2.5	5.0	2.7	4.9
University	1.5	2.4	3.0	7.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 7.8 Lifetime migration rates by education; percent

	Male	Female
Less than elementary	11.6	16.3
Elementary	13.4	15.4
Preperatory	18.5	21.4
Secondary	23.4	23.6
Diploma	24.2	29.4
University	28.9	24.5

Table for Figure 7.9 Percentage (lifetime) migrant by educational level and origin

	Rural	Urban
Less than elementary	11.2	3.1
Elementary	10.6	2.7
Preperatory	14.0	3.9
Secondary	17.3	4.3
Diploma	19.5	5.0
University	20.6	6.2

Table for Figure 7.10 Educational characteristics of adult migrants by sex and period; percent

	1960s		1970s	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Less than elementary	50.9	85.5	41.6	69.3
Elementary	21.6	9.4	24.8	16.5
Preparatory	14.9	3.1	12.0	5.4
Secondary	8.5	0.7	12.7	2.7
Higher than secondary	4.2	1.3	8.8	6.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	1980s		1990s	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Less than elementary	27.9	49.4	17.5	25.8
Elementary	25.0	24.0	35.0	32.2
Preparatory	14.1	12.0	15.3	16.4
Secondary	17.9	6.6	16.6	12.7
Higher than secondary	15.0	8.0	15.6	12.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 8.1 Distribution of the adult population by migration status and sex (persons aged 15+); percent

	Male	Female
Stayer	81.0	74.7
One-time migrant	14.4	20.6
Recurrent migrant	4.6	4.7
Total	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 8.2 Distribution of the adult population by migration status and residence (persons aged 15+); percent

	Stayer	One-time migrant	Recurrent migrant	Total
Governorate center	74.8	20.1	5.0	100.0
Other urban	70.6	21.9	7.5	100.0
Rural	84.2	13.0	2.8	100.0

Table for Figure 8.3 Percentage migrant by frequency and governorate (persons aged 15+)

	Stayer	One-time migrant	Recurrent migrant	Total
Rakka	86.8	12.5	0.7	100.0
Edleb	91.2	8.0	0.8	100.0
Der Elzor	90.7	8.2	1.1	100.0
Hama	87.1	11.1	1.8	100.0
Aleppo	82.2	15.7	2.1	100.0
Hasakeh	68.4	29.4	2.1	100.0
Homs	81.4	14.2	4.3	100.0
Damascus city	76.0	18.7	5.3	100.0
Tartos	68.2	25.1	6.7	100.0
Latakia	73.3	19.6	7.0	100.0
Dara	75.6	15.4	9.0	100.0
Damascus other	65.2	24.5	10.3	100.0
Sweda	63.4	19.3	17.3	100.0
Qunitra	58.4	23.2	18.4	100.0
All	77.9	17.4	4.7	100.0

Table for Figure 8.4 Percentage migrant by frequency and age (persons aged 15+)

Age groups	Stayer	One-time migrant	Recurrent migrant	Total
10-19	91,8	7,1	1,1	100,0
20-29	83,4	14,4	2,2	100,0
30-39	72,9	21,8	5,4	100,0
40-49	66,8	24,4	8,8	100,0
50-59	64,9	25,3	9,8	100,0
60-69	64,7	24,9	10,4	100,0
70+	70,0	24,0	6,0	100,0

Table for Figure 8.5 Percentage migrant by frequency, age and sex (persons aged 15+)

Age groups	Stayer		One-time migrant		Recurrent migrant	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
10-19	93.5	90.0	5.4	8.9	1.0	1.1
20-29	88.6	78.3	9.7	19.1	1.7	2.6
30-39	7.3	68.3	17.6	26.0	5.1	5.7
40-49	68.7	64.9	22.2	26.7	9.2	8.5
50-59	64.9	64.9	24.6	26.0	10.6	9.0
60-69	65.6	63.7	22.7	27.4	11.7	8.9
70+	72.3	66.1	22.4	26.8	5.3	7.1

Table for Figure 8.6 Percentage migrant by frequency and marital status (persons aged 15+)

	One-time migrant	Recurrent migrant
Never married	7.9	1.3
Married	24.1	6.8
Widowed	27.5	10.7
Divorced	19.5	9.1

Table for Figure 8.7 Percentage migrant by frequency, marital status and sex (persons aged 15+)

	One-time migrant		Recurrent migrant	
Marriage status	Male	Female	Male	Female
Never married	7.3	8.8	1.3	1.2
Married	20.7	27.4	7.4	6.3
Widowed	17.0	29.0	10.8	10.7
Divorced	19.6	19.4	11.7	7.9

Table for Figure 8.8 Percentage migrant by frequency and education (persons aged 15+)

	One-time migrant	Recurrent migrant
Less than elementary	21.4	4.7
Elementary	13.3	3.2
Preparatory	16.3	4.6
Secondary	19.0	6.2
Diploma	22.4	6.2
University	20.2	14.1

Table for Figure 8.9 Percentage migrant by frequency, education and sex (persons aged 15+)

	Stayer		One-time migrant		Recurrent migrant	
Completed education	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Less than elementary	79.4	70.6	16.7	24.3	3.9	5.1
Elementary	85.9	80.4	11.1	16.2	3.0	3.4
Preparatory	80.5	77.3	14.7	18.4	4.8	4.3
Secondary	75.9	73.4	17.3	21.1	6.7	5.5
Diploma	75.6	66.5	18.6	26.7	5.7	6.8
University	63.8	69.9	20.9	18.8	15.3	11.3

Table for Figure 8.10 Percentage migrant by frequency, occupation and sex (persons aged 15+)

Occupation	Stayer		One-time migrant		Recurrent migrant	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Managers	49.3	69.0	30.7	12.5	20.0	18.5
Professionals	68.7	63.4	21.3	28.7	10.0	7.8
Clerks	67.0	64.3	24.5	27.2	8.5	8.5
Sales and service	79.8	61.2	15.2	23.5	4.9	15.3
Agricultural	90.6	82.3	7.1	15.9	2.3	1.9
Manufacturing/technical	80.1	76.7	15.9	18.6	4.0	4.7
Construction	80.8	77.8	15.0	17.8	4.1	4.4

Table for Figure 8.11 Percentage migrant by frequency, industry and sex (persons aged 15+)

Industry	Stayer		One-time migrant		Recurrent migrant	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Agriculture	90.5	82.3	7.1	15.8	2.4	1.9
Manufacturing	82.2	75.2	15.1	19.9	2.7	4.8
Construction	79.1	82.7	16.2	12.0	4.6	5.3
Trade/hotel/restaurant	81.3	58.9	13.7	29.2	5.0	11.9
Transport and communications	75.1	76.7	19.4	8.4	5.5	14.9
Public administration/ police/military	65.4	65.1	25.5	25.8	9.1	9.1
Health and education	71.6	61.5	20.8	29.3	7.6	9.1
Other services	79.5	71.5	13.5	19.5	7.1	9.0
Domestic/household work	-	39.5	-	49.9	-	10.6

Table for Figure 9.1 Most important reason for moving, last move by adults; percent

Facilities	0.2
Neighbours/relatives	0.6
Economic, other	0.9
Education	2.9
Other reasons	3.1
Forced migration	4.2
Housing/neighbourhood	6.0
Work	20.4
Marriage	24.8
Family	36.8
Total	100.0

Table for Figure 9.2 Most important reason for moving by period, last move by adults; percent

	Up to 1960	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	All
Work related	21.0	17.6	25.0	23.0	18.0	21.0
Education	2.5	2.8	2.5	3.1	3.2	2.9
Family	35.1	32.0	41.4	39.9	33.3	36.8
To get married	23.9	22.0	22.5	23.5	29.5	24.9
Housing/neighbourhood	1.4	3.0	4.2	6.4	9.6	6.0
Neighbours/relatives	0.1	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.6
Other	16.6	21.3	3.8	3.0	4.9	7.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.5

Table for Figure 9.3 Most important reason for moving by period and sex, last move by adults; percent

	1960s		1970s		1980s		1990s	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Work related	30.0	5.3	39.5	8.4	36.9	7.7	31.9	6.4
Other economic	0.9	0.0	1.2	0.3	1.3	0.8	1.3	0.8
Education	5.6	0.0	4.3	0.5	4.4	1.7	4.3	2.4
Family	31.4	32.6	40.5	42.3	37.1	42.6	32.0	34.2
To get married	6.8	37.2	4.8	41.0	6.7	39.6	9.3	45.0
Housing/ neighbourhood	3.6	2.4	3.5	4.9	7.5	5.2	13.2	6.8
Neighbours/ relatives	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.1	0.6	1.0	0.5
Facilities	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.1
Other	20.9	21.8	5.3	2.0	4.4	1.6	6.6	3.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 10.1 Occupation by lifetime migration status; percent

	Stayer	Migrant	Total
Managers	0.9	2.5	1.2
Professionals	4.5	6.9	5.0
Technician	4.3	7.9	5.0
Clerks	7.2	14.3	8.6
Sales	9.2	0.0	9.2
Services	3.2	3.6	3.3
Agriculture	35.1	19.3	31.8
Industrial operators	8.1	7.8	8.0
Crafts	10.2	9.6	10.1
Construction	15.1	15.5	15.2
Other	2.3	3.7	2.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 10.2 Occupation by lifetime migration status and sex; percent

	Male		Female	
	Stayer	Migrant	Stayer	Migrant
Managers	1.0	2.9	0.5	1.3
Professionals	3.8	6.0	7.4	10.1
Technician	2.6	3.8	11.6	22.8
Clerks	7.2	15.5	6.9	10.2
Sales	10.9	10.6	1.7	2.8
Services	3.6	3.7	1.4	3.1
Agriculture	28.3	13.7	64.3	39.8
Industrial operators	8.9	8.2	4.4	6.6
Crafts	12.5	12.1	0.4	0.4
Construction	18.5	19.5	0.5	0.7
Other	2.7	4.1	0.9	2.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 10.3 Industry by lifetime migration status; percent

	Stayer	Migrant
Agriculture	35.2	19.6
Manufacturing	13.2	12.7
Construction	12.4	12.4
Trade/hotel/restaurants	14.6	13.6
Transport/communications	5.0	6.5
Public administration/ police/military	10.3	20.3
Health/education	6.5	11.4
Other services	2.8	3.2
Domestic work	0.1	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 10.4 Industry by lifetime migration status and sex; percent

	Male		Female	
	Stayer	Migrant	Stayer	Migrant
Agriculture	28.5	14.2	64.4	39.6
Manufacturing	15.0	14.1	5.2	7.7
Construction	14.9	15.3	1.3	1.5
Trade/hotel/restaurants	17.3	16.2	2.7	4.0
Transport/communications	6.0	8.1	0.7	0.8
Public administration	11.1	22.9	6.4	10.8
Health/education	4.2	5.8	16.8	31.8
Other services	3.0	3.3	2.3	2.7
Domestic work	0.0	0.1	0.1	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 10.5 Industry by sex, adult migrants; percent

	Male	Female	Total
Agriculture	7.9	22.5	10.2
Manufacturing	9.4	6.1	8.9
Construction	12.1	1.5	10.4
Trade/hotel/restaurants	10.9	3.2	9.6
Transport and communications	6.1	2.1	5.5
Public administration/police/military	44.2	16.9	39.9
Health and education services	6.6	45.9	12.8
Other services	2.9	1.7	2.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 10.6 Percentage (lifetime) migrant to the cities by economic sectors

	Female		Male	
	Rural origin	Urban origin	Rural origin	Urban origin
Agriculture/forestry/fishing	21.8	4.5	15.1	5.1
Mining and manufacturing	23.7	9.4	13.0	3.2
Construction and infrastructure	15.6	4.7	17.7	5.9
Trade/hotel/restaurants	22.3	8.6	12.7	3.7
Transport and communications	19.8	7.7	23.2	3.6
Public administration/ police/military	24.7	5.2	33.5	6.7
Health and education services	27.4	4.7	25.2	8.6
Other services	16.7	8.4	15.9	6.1
Domestic/household work	34.1	25.8	47.0	0.0

Table for Figure 10.7 Availability of work in place of origin at time of moving by period; percent

	Male	Female	All
1960s	48.7	3.0	25.5
1970s	49.5	4.5	27.3
1980s	51.3	7.5	29.0
1990s	56.5	13.0	31.8

Table for Figure 10.8 Availability of work in place of destination at time of moving by period; percent

	Male	Female	All
1960s	49.2	2.5	25.7
1970s	59.0	5.2	32.6
1980s	58.4	10.5	34.2
1990s	55.7	15.1	32.6

Table for Figure 11.1 Adjustment indicators for migrant and non-migrant households by residence and origin; percent

	Non migrant	Rural origin	Urban origin	Mixed	Total
Exchange greetings urban	97.2	98.2	98.0	97.9	97.5
Exchange greetings rural	99.4	99.6	98.9	98.1	99.4
Exchange visits urban	78.2	83.9	83.2	84.7	80.1
Exchange visits rural	95.8	95.6	92.0	94.3	95.7
Allowed to play urban	72.3	80.6	80.1	79.1	75.1
Allowed to play rural	93.8	91.5	92.7	93.5	93.5
Lend/borrow urban	54.8	61.8	67.0	61.4	57.5
Lend/borrow rural	84.0	81.1	85.5	79.2	83.6
Socialise urban	33.5	37.7	35.3	38.6	34.7
Socialise rural	55.1	54.0	50.2	47.2	54.8
Attend celebrations urban	19.1	17.5	28.1	23.8	19.4
Attend celebrations rural	41.2	39.6	47.3	32.1	41.1

Table for Figure 12.1 Percentage of household receiving and sending remittances

	Any outmigrant past 5 years	All households
Sent	2.6	2.9
Received	6.7	9.0
Sent and received	0.3	0.4
None	90.4	87.7
Total	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure Figure 12.2 Percentage of household receiving and sending remittances by residence

	Mohafaza center	Other urban	Rural
Sent	1.9	4.1	3.1
Received	8.7	4.1	4.7
Sent and received	0.1	0.0	0.6
None	89.3	91.8	91.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 12.3 Source of remittances received by form; households receiving remittances only; percent

	Received cash	Received in-kind	Received both
From urban	59.9	36.2	61.6
From rural	36.3	86.3	50.3

Table for Figure 12.4 Use of remittances received; households receiving remittances only; percent

Investment	0.8
Saving	2.4
House repair/ buying	3.7
Social functions	5.2
Pay off debts	9.6
Education	12.8
Health treatment	23.2
Household goods	36.4
Daily needs	91.3

Table for Figure 13.1 Period of absence in months, temporary migrants; percent

< 1 month	10.7
1 month	14.5
2 months	14.7
3 months	22.4
4 months	16.7
5 months	15.5
6 months	5.6
Total	100.0

Table for Figure 14.1 Potential migrants by age and sex; percent

Age	Male	Female
0-9	0.6	0.7
10-19	0.8	0.7
20-29	3.0	1.1
30-39	3.5	0.8
40-49	1.9	0.7
50-59	1.1	0.2
60-69	0.5	0.4
70-79	0.3	0.1
80+	0.0	0.0

Table for Figure 14.2 Place of potential migration, total population; percent

Village in another governorate	3.0
The capital	4.6
City in another governorate	6.3
City in same governorate	6.5
Village in same governorate	8.1
Another block in the city	19.4
Another country	52.0
Total	100.0

Table for Figure 14.3 Place of potential migration, internal destinations only; percent

Village in another governorate	10.6
The capital	16.2
City in another governorate	22.0
City in same governorate	22.9
Village in same governorate	28.4
Total	100.0

Table for Figure 14.4 Reason for planning to move, potential migrants; percent

Move with family	44.3
Job-related	24.2
Improve income	14.2
Get married	9.4
Other	7.9
Total	100.0

Table for Figure 14.5 Expected time of planned migration, potential migrants; percent

Within 3 months	35.0
In 4-6 months	13.2
In 6-12 months	10.4
In 1-2 years	11.9
In more than 2 years	6.0
Don't know	23.4
Total	100.0

Table for Figure 14.6 Expected time of return for potential migrants; percent

No return	42.2
Don't know	24.1
After less than 1 year	8.8
After 1-2 years	12.9
After 3-5 years	8.0
After more than 5 years	3.9
Total	100.0

Table for Figure 15.1 Percentage period migrant by lifetime migration status and residence

	Male	Female	Total
Up to 1960	8.6	7.8	8.2
1960s	13.9	12.9	13.4
1970s	22.2	19.8	21.0
1980s	29.0	27.7	28.3
1990s	26.2	31.8	29.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table for Figure 15.2 Percentage period migrant by temporary migration status and residence

	Current place of residence	
Temporary migration status	Rural	Urban
Internal temporary	6.4	11.9
International temporary	10.0	9.3
Non migrant	6.4	3.4

Table for Figure 15.3 Help received at time of moving by provider and period; percent

Helper	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Others	2.0	2.3	2.0	2.6
Employer	1.4	3.3	3.0	2.8
Friends	3.4	3.4	4.5	5.9
Relatives	31.9	30.5	30.2	35.3

Table for Figure 15.4 Help received at time of moving by provider, period and sex; percent

Helper	1960s		1970s		1980s		1990s	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Others	1.7	2.2	2.9	1.8	2.2	1.8	2.4	2.8
Employer	2.8	0.0	5.5	1.1	5.8	0.3	4.3	1.7
Friends	5.5	1.4	5.2	1.5	5.7	3.2	6.9	5.1
Relatives	28.4	35.3	22.4	38.9	25.2	35.0	26.4	42.1

Table for Figure 15.5 Kind of help received at time of moving by sex; percent

	Male	Female	All
Housing	9.1	9.4	9.3
Bureaucracy	4.3	9.7	7.1
Find work	4.0	1.0	2.4
Other	2.3	2.1	2.2
Job info	3.2	1.2	2.2
Other employment related	0.3	0.5	0.4
Schooling	0.3	0.4	0.4

Internal migration in Syria: Findings from a national survey

"Internal Migration in Syria" presents the main findings of the Syria Internal Migration Survey (SIMS). The report looks at migration flows within and across provinces, and between rural and urban areas. Particular efforts have been made to investigate the claim that population movement from rural areas to Damascus and other provincial cities has diminished and that "reverse migration", i.e. movement from cities to rural areas, and from provincial cities to other cities and towns has been taking place.

In addition to examining the volume and patterns of internal migration, the report describes the socio-economic characteristics of migrants, examines the reasons for spatial movement, studies the use of remittances from migrants, and analyses the social integration of migrants at their places of destination. Furthermore, it looks at temporary, seasonal migration and peoples' intentions to move in the future.

The SIMS is a joint project between the University of Damascus, the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies (Fafo). Data were collected during the second quarter of 2000. Interviews with more than 20,000 families were successfully completed.

In addition to this report, two publications (a Tabulation report and an Analytical report), written in Arabic by the SIMS research teams from the University of Damascus and the CBS, have been published by the University of Damascus.

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