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quarterly licenses from the Commerce Department's Office of International Trade.

The first three such licenses were issued and Tapline was well in stride. The pipe was being laid at an average speed of a mile a day, an almost fantastic achievement in view of the physical conditions. And then suddenly the OIT said: "No more licenses, at least for now."

It is not difficult to imagine the consternation, the confusion, in the Tapline offices from Ras el Mishaab to Beirut to San Francisco to New York. No reason was given then, or since, just no licenses.* The assumption was that there had been complaints that in a time of shortages at home there should be no such large shipments of critical materials to far parts of the world. And these complaints echoed loud in the ears of political office holders, even though it was demonstrated that less steel was required for Tapline than would be needed for the 65 tankers it would replace.

All this left Tapline with a fleet of 15 Liberty ships contracted for from the Isthmian Line to carry material half way around the world.

Completing the anchor at a 13-degree bend 4½ miles south of Qatil

* The reason was simple. Tapline was so sure of itself that complete ratification of right-of-way agreements had not been obtained from all governments involved. Objecting to the American support of the establishment of the state of Israel, the Syrian parliament refused to ratify, and the western part of the project halted on the excuse that export licenses for building materials were not forthcoming. "In practice, the March 1949 military coup in Damascus solved the problem.", Irene Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield, 1998. [Al Mashriq ed.]

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