Appendiks 2
Ad verbum: Strictly Confidential, Port El Kantaoui, Tunisia, 16 July
1993, Memo to Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, from Foreign Minister
Johan Jørgen Holst.
- On July 13th I had a meeting with Chairman Arafat at the PLO Hq. in
Tunis. We spent about 20 minutes with the full delegations for
general discussions and 40 minutes in closed session. During the
closed session, Arafat was alone. I was accompanied by Terje
Rød-Larsen of FAFO and Mona Juul from my secretariat. They have
both played a key role in managing the “Norwegian Channel” and are
my special envoys sent to brief your people directly.
- During the general session, Arafat was somewhat flamboyant and
talking in rather sweeping ultimate terms. He was obviously
talking to the “gallery” of his own people, including Abu Jaffer,
who are not privy to the existence of the Norwegian channel; the
only exception being Abu Alaa. Arafat showed us a copy of the
American proposal made during the 10th round and which was colored
to depict what percentage of the contents which allegedly
originated with Israel (65%), the Palestinians (6%) and the
Americans (the balance). He also gave me a copy of his response to
the Americans. He indicated that the last American draft did not in
his view constitute much of an improvement on the previous American
draft. He emphasized that the time was running out, and that he was
very pessimistic about the prospects of the Washington process
after the submission of the last American draft. With respect to
early empowerment of the Palestinians he referred to a letter of
guarantees from Madrid which envisaged a five year agreement
concerning a transfer of authority. He claimed that Israel was only
willing to give the Palestinians what they already have.
- During the closed session we met another Arafat. My impression is
that he knows that we must close a deal soon. He explicitly
referred several times to the need for a “breakthrough”. He stated
that “good progress” had been made in Oslo and expressed
appreciation for our efforts. He had sent a message to Rabin also in
order to emphasize the authority of the Palestinians delegation to
the talks in Norway. Arafat made the point that more progress had
been made through the “Norwegian Channel” than through any of the
Arab efforts. He trusted us more than the Egyptians because we have
no secret agenda and no interest of our own, with regard to the
material contents of the talks.
- I emphasized the need of realism, and stated explicitly that in my
view substantial progress had been made through the five drafts
from the “Norwegian Channel”, but that the Palestinians proposals
made during the last meeting in Norway seemed to have deviated from
the chain of realistic proposals and constituted a potential threat
to the momentum and prospects of the talks. Arafat did not respond
directly but listened with keen attention. I underline,
furthermore, that I had recently paid an official visit to Israel
and in that connection had an opportunity to discuss the peace
process, including the Norwegian channel, with key Israeli
representative, including you, and that I was persuaded that the
present government in Israel was committed to seeking a negotiated
settlement, but that the government was subject to
constraints. Labour did not have a majority and must avoid Likud
mobilizing a strong opposition. I also told him that I had spoken
with Warren Christopher about the Norwegian Channel under four eyes
only. He had expressed appreciation as well as support. I
emphasized that the United States was Norway’s principal ally and
that we had very good relations with Israel of long standing. It
was important for Norway to maintain those relations.
- On substance I emphasized the need to view the interim arrangements
of a first phase agreement realistically. Several issues could not
be solved now. Both parties had red lights which must be
heeded. Implementation of the first phase would, however, it itself
constitute an important confidence-building exercise which could
change perspectives and alter expectations concerning long term
arrangements. Obviously, any interim arrangement must be shaped so
as not to prejudice the positions of the parties to issues not
regulated by the interim agreements. I challenged him in this
connection to explain his approach of the Jericho-issue and the
question of links and access between Gaza and the Jericho-pocket.
- Arafat responded by bringing out maps and explaining his position
and rationale in great detail. The principal points he made can be
summarized as follows: The PLO needs to include a part of the West
Bank in any interim arrangement. He insisted that he could not
present an interim agreement which only included Gaza. Should he do
so, he would be accused of having “betrayed” the West Bank
Palestinians. He had sought to find arrangements which reflected
the continuity of Middle-East peace negotiations. In this
connection he explicitly referred to the Allon- and Kissinger-plans
for disengagement. Jericho had been chosen because it does not
comprise recent settlements and because it enables them to include
a major Palestinian camp. That way it becomes easier for the PLO to
control the Intifada. When questioned he stated that the city of
Jericho was not enough. He referred to the Jericho province but
indicated a somewhat limited perimeter on the map. He was ready to
compromise in the negotiations. According to Arafat he had paid
attention to proposing an arrangement which took into account Israeli
sensitivities and interests, particular in regards to settlements
and the intifada. He could however, not accept at two-Palestine
solution. With respect to access he stated explicitly, when I
pressed him on the issue, that he was not proposing any corridor
controlled by the PLO or an international authority through
Israel. He was looking towards a designated road or roads and
Israeli guarantees of access. He stated explicitly that Israel
could not be divided into two by a corridor. The road(s) would be
under Israeli control “in the beginning”. When pressed if that
meant through the interim period he was somewhat vague. However, he
stated several times that he was ready to strike a compromise. The
final and permanent arrangements would have to reflect an
international compromise.
- I asked Arafat explicitly if he thought he could control Fatah and
have an arrangement concluded in the Norwegian channel accepted by
the PLO with sufficient majority. He said he had to be honest with
me and say there would be some opposition (he mentioned George
Habash and the Syrians) but expressed confidence that he could deal
with opposition. Arafat sounded determined and confident on this
point. When I asked about the ability of Hamas to torpedo the
agreement, he responded that he had personally split the Hizbollah
in three in the past and that he could deal with opposition. Arafat
sounded determined and confident on this point.
- I stressed the need to maintain secrecy until the first phase
agreement had been concluded. This was not a particular Norwegian
interest, but rather one which was very important for the
Israelis. There were spoilers in Israel who would use leaks to
torpedo any agreements before they had been concluded by
embarrassing the government. I referred explicitly to recent leaks
of direct Israeli-PLO talks reported in the Tunisian La Presse, The
International Herald Tribune, etc. I referred to statements
reportedly made by Nabil Shaath. Arafat said that he had personally
deflected the rumors by referring to previous attempts, which had
failed to establish such contacts in Washington. I observed that
the Norwegian press referred to “anonymous palestinian” sources
when reporting of alleged Norwegian efforts to continue
an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. We had on our side deflected such
rumors by stating that they must refer to the possible contacts in
the margins of the multilateral workshop of refugees during the
Oslo-session. We agreed that secrecy could not be maintained
forever, that we had been successful in that regard with the
Norwegian channel, but that we would probably have to go public in
connection with the possible signing of a first phase accord.
- The Arafat I encountered in the closed session seemed to me as
composed, determined and reflective person. He also seemed
confident about his authority. His vanity is apparent and I suspect
that he is determined to play a major role when breakthrough is
made. He wants to be an actor, not just a spectator.
- We have
maintained contacts with Abu Alaa before and after my meeting with
Yasir Arafat. I am scheduled to meet with Arafat again on July 20th
immediately prior to my departure from Tunisia. Mr. Larsen and
Mrs. Juul have been supplied with speaking notes by me on the
conversations we had in this connection in order to brief your
people. I am ready personally to brief your people in Paris on July
21st/22nd. Furthermore, we stand ready to arrange another round in
the Norwegian channel in Norway or Paris. I am also ready to meet
you any time and place of our mutual convenience.
With warm regards,
Johan Jørgen Holst
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