Appendiks 18
Ad verbum:
Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Minister of Foreign Affairs
SECRET
December 12, 1993
Dear Chris,
- Many thanks for your letter written upon your
departure from the Middle East yesterday.
- I agree with your points concerning rapid and effective
implementation of the DOP.
- Mr. Arafat remains, as I see it, concerned about security and
his ability to provide it following Israeli withdrawal. He has
somewhat inflated view of his security requirements and the
paraphernalia needed to meet them. However, he is probably also
concerned about others (Iran? Syria?) “buying” his “fighters”
from Algeria and/or Yemen.
- Hence, I believe we should be forthcoming in form if not som
much in substance. He should be granted the right as enshrined
in the DOP to form strong police forces. In conversations with
me he has often referred to the Egyptian model (not our ideal,
perhaps, but it may seem appropriate in a Middle East context).
- I share your concern about the Arafat-Rabin meeting in
Cairo. Arafat clearly feels that he is in a corner at it is
certainly useful for Mubarak and/or Moussa [foreign minister
Amr Moussa] to talk to him prior to the meeting, as I now know
they will. I am willing to send a small team of Norwegian
experts on peacekeeping in the Middle East to discuss
practicalities of security arrangements with Arafat and his
people if you think it is a good idea. The purpose would be to
sharpen his view on requirements and to bring some operational
realism into PLO-planning for the post-withdrawal
environment. He seems to trust us and we could probably do
something which others whose motives he might be more suspicious
of would find it hard to achieve. I have in mind a two-phased
approach where the first phase would be one of discussion and
defining security requirement to be dealt with by a strong
Palestinian police force envisaged in the DOP. The next phase
might involve a visit to Jericho and Gaza as well as in depth
discussions with the Israelis and the PLO. The team would report
to me in my capacity as chairman of the AHLC. It could help,
hopefully in defining requirements for internal security
(Article VIII of the DOP) and for an international pressure
(Annex II in the DOP, Article 3 point D.). We would need to have
Israeli concurrence in moving to such a second phase.
- I concur with your view that the important point this close to
the Cairo meeting is to maintain the credibility of the process
and to maintain a degree of momentum even if it falls somewhat
short of what is projected in the DOP. It is my sense that
Arafat is extremely sensitive about the security issue and feels
he is not given a fair judgment by Israel or the US. He put on a
quite show the night I talked to him about it here in Oslo. He
must not been left with the sense of being betrayed or left
behind. He seems to trust the Norwegians and we should consider
seriously how to transform that trust into progress concerning
implementation.
- For Arafat I think not-lethal equipment is not sufficient. He
feels betrayed and not trusted if all parties insists that he
has to give up the armed struggle, be denied any armed capacity
and become a victim of the armed opposition to the DOP. He sees,
of course, also that Fatah arms may play a role in the struggle
for power among the Palestinians. We really cannot have it both
ways, nor can the Israelis. If the PLO is to be a partner it has
to be accorded a minimum of trust. We should insist on the
importance to constitute an ecumenical police force with the
respect to the competing factions of the FATAH and outside, but
the agreement is with the PLO. I know you have som legal
restraints in this field. However, we need to get a feel for
your basic thinking on order to assess the appropriate course of
action.
- We are willing to play a role here but we need to know where
you stand. It is my sense that time is running out.
- I did not, in spite of many attempts, manage to get hold of
Chairman Arafat last night. However, Abu Alaa returned my call
this morning. He seemed pleased about my concern and
initiative. I also conveyed your concern, understanding and
constraints. I expressed my willingness to host an ad hoc
meeting of the AHCL coming Friday/Saturday here in Oslo to which
we could invite the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Greece,
Russia, Japan, South Korea, the EC, USA, Sweden and Norway. They
will call me back at 1500 hrs. Norwegian local time today. I
also offered to send a small team of four Norwegian experts with
experience in peacekeeping in the Middle East to discuss
modalities and requirements in Tunis prior to a meeting which we
would propose to host here in Oslo. The purpose would be to
inject as much professional realism as possible to PLO
deliberations of there issues.
- With respect to the multinational meeting in Tokyo, I want to
send a team to brief the Steering Group but would not presume to
participate on other items than those we would be invited to
report. However, our presence in Tokyo makes it possible for us to
respond effectively to any Steering Group decision to ask Norway
to join as a member.
(Signed Johan Jørgen Holst)
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