Syrian Foreign Policy and State/Resistance Dynamics in Lebanon
Department of Political Studies and Public Administration
American University of Beirut
New York, New York, USA
By analyzing the behavior of the major actors during Israel's
"Peace for Galilee" and "Grapes of Wrath" operations in Lebanon, this
article explains how Syria foils Israeli policy objectives there. The
research proposition investigated is that Syria's policy owes its
success to Damascus' capacity to manage rather than to resolve serious
conflicts between the Lebanese government and the resistance movement
(Hizballah). This prevents their quarrels from spilling over into the
national arena as a result of Israeli provocation.
It is argued that it is the Lebanese parties' strict adherence to
unwritten rules governing their behavior during Tel Aviv's military
operations that has rendered and will continue to render Israel's use
of force in Lebanon self- defeating. The analysis indicates why, under
the prevailing circumstances, several options presently being explored
by the Israelis are unlikely to resolve their problem in Lebanon, and
suggests that a rapid return to the negotiating table should he
encouraged by the United States.
Israel's "Grapes of Wrath" campaign against Lebanon in April 1996
left over 150 people dead and caused millions of dollars' worth of
damage. Grapes of Wrath was strikingly similar to Israel's Operation
Accountability, against the same target in July 1993. In fact,
statements by Israeli government officials and spokesmen revealed that
the two campaigns pursued the same goals and used the same strategies.
Both operations unleashed massive destruction in South Lebanon in
order to pressure the Syria-backed Lebanese government to halt
Hizballah's attacks on northern Galilee. The broader objective of the
two Israeli actions was to drive a wedge between Syria and Lebanon at
a time when Damascus counted on foreign policy coordination with the
Lebanese government to achieve its regional objectives.
Neither Israeli operation was successful. Despite Syria's inability
to confront its enemy directly with any chance of success, it twice
demonstrated its importance in regional affairs by manipulating
resources at hand in Lebanon from the sidelines. These setbacks have
forced Tel Aviv to begin serious consideration of withdrawing from
Israeli-declared security zone in southern Lebanon that has become a
killing field for its troops.
The critical importance of Syrian-Israeli maneuvers in Lebanon for
peace in the Middle East, and the need to understand how states of
different power capabilities bargain in conflict situations compel a
deeper awareness of the components and dynamics of Syrian foreign
policy in Lebanon. This study explains how changes after 1984 allowed
Syria to develop a two-track resistance policy designed to counter
Israeli strategies in Lebanon. The research proposition is that the
policy devised owes its success to Syria's capacity to manage
successfully rather than to resolve serious conflicts between the
Lebanese government and the resistance so that they do not spill over
into the national arena, as Israeli strategists would like to see
happen. It is argued that it is the Lebanese parties' strict adherence
to unwritten "rules" governing their behavior during Israeli military
operations, rather than any damage inflicted on Israeli forces or
civilians by the resistance, that has rendered and will continue to
render Israeli force in Lebanon self-defeating.
Syrian Interests in Lebanon
As a confrontation state in the Arab-Israeli struggle, Syria
regards Lebanon as both a problem and a strategic asset, and it has
adopted policies to deal with both instances. In the first case,
Damascus wants to prevent Israeli penetration of its soft underbelly
by extending its influence inside the small neighboring state of
Lebanon. That country's internecine conflict made this relatively easy
to accomplish. In fact, Syria and Israel both have tried to exploit
Lebanon's sectarian tensions, which were exacerbated by the unequal
distribution of political power favoring the Maronite Christian
community. Lebanon's domestic conflict was also closely intertwined
with the Arab-Israeli conflict, as the Muslim sector closely
identified with the Palestinian cause, whereas the Christians feared
an erosion of their authority and the suppression of their identify if
the Muslims were able to redress the internal balance of power in
their favor. The rise of a mainly Muslim Palestinian resistance from
the refugee camps in Lebanon in the late 1960s and its catalytic
effect on the Lebanese opposition encouraged Christian military
preparations and the community's swing toward Israel. These growing
confessional tensions made it possible for the regime of Hafiz al-Asad
to add Lebanese Muslim and leftist groups to the roster of
Palestinian organizations that enjoyed its support. Damascus could
thus assert its influence over the loose collection of Palestinian and
leftist groups that began to oppose the Lebanese government and the
Maronite Christian militias and that also cooperated in operations
against Israel from southern Lebanon. The dependency of the militias
operating on Lebanese soil contributed to the development of
indirect confrontation between Israel and Syria. Manipulation of their
respective Lebanese surrogates permitted both parties to contain their
own conflict within tacitly agreed bounds.1
An exception occurred in 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon to crush
the Palestinian resistance that had been launching attacks against the
Galilee from bases in southern Lebanon. As Israeli forces moved north,
it became clear that Tel Aviv also sought to suppress pro-Syria
Lebanese forces and politically outflank Damascus by imposing a
government amenable to a peace treaty with Israel. Although a review
of the Israeli initiative and Syria's reaction to it is beyond the
scope of this paper, it is worth noting that there were far fewer
military engagements between Syrian and Israeli forces than there
might have been had both parties not wished to limit confrontation.
This study concludes that Operation Peace for Galilee failed to
achieve its political objectives mainly because of Syria's firm
rejection and public repudiation of a U.S.-brokered peace treaty
between Israel and Lebanon. Syria also initiated major changes in the
system of indirect confrontation that had hitherto defined
Israeli-Syrian relations in Lebanon. For instance, having lost the
political battle, in the autumn of 1983 Israeli troops began
withdrawing from the areas they had occupied, leaving Syria to cope
with the civil war raging in and around Beirut. In so doing, the
Israelis effectively abandoned the Christian forces they had backed in
the civil war. These Christian groups were later exhausted by military
setbacks at the hands of the Syrians and their allies as well as by
internecine quarrels. Furthermore, a political crisis over
presidential succession in 1988 resulted in opposing governments
seated in the Christian and Muslim sectors of the capital. This
situation offered Syria legal coverage for its growing intervention in
Lebanese affairs when the Selim al-Hoss cabinet in mainly Muslim West
Beirut called on Damascus to send troops to pacify the heavily armed
militias that were causing chaos in that part of the capital. After
tight security had been imposed, Syrian troops stayed to preserve it.
Syria formally consolidated its influence in Lebanon through the
Document of National Accord negotiated under international auspices
and signed by Lebanese deputies meeting in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in
1989. The accord stipulated political reforms that favored Muslim
interests, acknowledged Syria's special relationship with Lebanon, and
provided a timetable for the withdrawal of Syrian troops to the Bekaa
Valley. Negotiations between Beirut and Damascus were to determine the
timing of their ultimate departure from Lebanese territory. The
election of a government amenable to signing a Treaty of Brotherhood,
Cooperation, and Coordination between Lebanon and Syria in May 1991
further strengthened the links between the two countries through joint
councils that would elaborate and oversee implementation of policies
regulating economic, political, and military affairs. Lebanon's
continued pro-Syria drift was evident in the results of the 1992
parliamentary elections, which brought many of Damascus's allies to
power. This made it clear that Syria had achieved major policy goals
in Lebanon, making it very difficult, although not impossible, for
Israel to outflank and isolate Syria by signing a separate peace
treaty with Beirut.
Indirect confrontation between Israel and Syria in southern Lebanon
was reenergized in the wake of Operation Peace for Galilee. By 1985
Israeli troops had completely withdrawn from Lebanon except for a
nine-kilometer wide, Israeli defined security zone on the Lebanese side
of the international frontier. A Christian militia, the South Lebanese
Army (SLA), supported by a minimal number of Israeli soldiers, was
deployed there to ward off any resistance that might replace the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the area. Nevertheless, the
rapid growth of the Islamic resistance, made possible through both
generous support from Iran and Syria's green light, soon outstripped
the SLA's capacity to deal with them effectively. This new situation
modified the system of indirect confrontation that had formerly
prevailed. Because of Hizballah's military capabilities, Syria was
able to distance itself from the hostilities while Israeli soldiers
were drawn into combat with the resistance and wounded and killed in
ever-increasing numbers. The southern arena thus continued to provide
Syria with a staging ground for offensive schemes that carried minimal
risk of a direct confrontation with Israel while causing Tel Aviv
constant damage short of war. In the 1990s Hizballah's resistance
activities were a means of reminding Israel of the importance of
coming to terms with Syria over the Golan Heights while the closely
linked Syrian and Lebanese governments remained on the sidelines.
Considering Beirut the weak point in Syrian policy, the Israelis tried
to exploit its tense relations with Hizballah, the active partner in
the arrangement. The causes of these tensions are discussed below.
Beirut's Priority-Extending Control Over the South
Israel well understands the frictions between a government seeking
to recoup state authority after years of impotence at the hands of
powerful militias and an armed resistance conducting independent
military activities in the country. Besides Lebanon's close
cooperation with Syria, other factors, too, place the government in
this position, the most obvious of which is that the small, recently
reformed Lebanese army is no match for Israel's superior war
machine. Additionally, an Israeli confrontation with Lebanon's
conventional forces would drag Syria into open conflict, a situation
all parties wish to avoid. Thus, if pressure is to be kept on the
occupying force to withdraw from southern Lebanon, the Lebanese
government must abandon normal state prerogatives and assume an openly
supportive position toward the group most capable of doing the job-the
resistance.
But a relatively inactive role in the south is nothing new for the
Lebanese state. It is, in fact, a legacy of the 1967 Cairo Accord,
which sanctioned Fatah's use of Lebanese territory for its battle with
the Israelis. During the 1970s the fedayeen turned the south into a
virtually autonomous battle zone, often facetiously called
"Fatahland." The civil war contributed to the Lebanese state's
inability to play an effective role in the south. At the time of the
PLO evacuation from Lebanon in 1982, the Lebanese army was engaged in
a ferocious battle with pro-Syria forces in the north and was in no
position to recoup governmental authority. As a result, the vacuum
left along Lebanon's southern border was filled by Hizballah fighters,
a development that allowed the game of indirect confrontation between
Syria and Israel to resume.
The postwar Lebanese regime inherited an ongoing resistance that
had eluded control of the central authorities since it had been
established almost a decade earlier. Dealing almost exclusively with
Iran and Syria in tactical and logistical matters and fiercely opposed
to Lebanese governing circles during the civil war years, for most of
its existence Hizballah had had no reason to build a working
relationship with Beirut.
Further complicating any government initiative to influence
resistance activities was the fact that Hizballah's popular support
had grown over the years as a result of its operations in the
south. This was demonstrated by Hizballah's victory in the 1992
parliamentary elections, when the Party of God won all but two of the
seats it contested and achieved the largest party bloc in the Lebanese
parliament. Thus when the Lebanese government is confronted with
massive population dislocation and destruction as a result of
hostilities between Israel and Hizballah, which it can neither predict
nor forestall, it activates the official prerogatives that remain, and
pursues the interest of the state. This entails ending the violence in
the south by bringing diplomatic pressures on Israel to end its
occupation. By campaigning for implementation of UN Security Council
Resolution 425 stipulating withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon,
it hopes to end the freewheeling activities of the last of Lebanon's
operating militias. It also hopes to initiate talks with Damascus
about removal of Syrian troops from Lebanese soil. In other words,
while taking draconian measures to avoid a run-in between the Lebanese
army and Israeli forces in the south and staying out of Hizballah's
way, the government is nevertheless pursuing a goal diametrically
opposed to that of the resistance. The state's basic aim is to end the
violence in the south, whereas the raison d'être of the
resistance is to fight the occupiers and their surrogates. This is why
Israeli strategists believe that officialdom's shaky solidarity with
the Islamic guerrillas can be exploited if the cost of allegiance is
made unacceptable through massive retaliation.
Resistance as Islamic Obligation and Road to Power
The Israelis estimate, correctly it appears, that Hizballah would
strongly oppose any governmental restrictions on the resistance and
that this would seriously disturb Syria's security arrangements in
Lebanon. Why have Hizballah operatives, more than any other Lebanese,
embraced military means to oust the Israelis and their surrogates in
southern Lebanon? In an open letter to one of the Beirut daily
newspapers in 1985, the then-clandestine group that called itself the
Party of God announced that its major goal was armed struggle against
the enemies of Islam, a sacred obligation for all Muslims. These
enemies were cited as Israel and its allies, the United States, and
Lebanon's mainstream Maronite Christians.2
Hizballah's religious orthodoxy and willingness to pursue Israel
from within Lebanese territory drew support from Iranian leaders
desiring more influence in shaping the course of regional events.
With Iran's aid, Hizballah trained and equipped recruits in Lebanon's
remote Bekaa Valley who were willing to undertake self-sacrifice in
southern Lebanon for a greater cause.3
The arrangements between Hizballah and Iran to oppose Israeli
occupation in southern Lebanon were facilitated by the Asad regime
because they furthered its strategy of indirect confrontation with the
Israelis with no loss of Syrian influence in Lebanon. Weapons
deliveries to Hizballah from Iran are only possible with Syria's
consent, since shipments must pass through Syrian ports and cross the
Syrian border to reach the Bekaa Valley, where Damascus's troops are
heavily concentrated.
With these logistical problems solved, Hizballah's guerrillas
carried out Islamic obligations by waging a war of attrition against
the Israelis and the SLA, causing them continuous deaths and
casualties. These acts elevated the Party of God on the national
political stage to the point where it was able to rely on its record
of armed struggle in the south to gain votes in the 1992 parliamentary
elections.4
A preelection survey by a Lebanese daily newspaper of some 1,500
individuals of different sects and areas of Lebanon predicted the
success of this strategy. The survey found that 67 percent of the
Sunnis, 79 percent of the Druze, and 75 percent of the Shiites sampled
regarded resistance candidates favorably, while 57 percent of the
Greek Orthodox Christians and 35 percent of the Maronites were also of
this opinion.5 A year later another survey carried out
among Shiites during Israel's Operation Accountability showed that
respondents of all social strata and levels of religiosity were among
Hizballah's adherents and that the Party of God enjoyed more support
among those sampled than did its political rivals. 6 With
their struggle against Israel such a vital factor in the Party of
God's growing political strength, it is clear why the Islamists would
be reluctant to submit their military operations to government control
or to welcome a negotiated peace with Israel that would effectively
bring them to an end.
Incipient Tensions Between the State and the Resistance
Hizballah's military exploits have not, however, mobilized
unqualified support for the Islamists. Apart from raising fears among
government officials that the resistance might draw unbearable
military responses from Israel, the Party of God has been criticized
for capitalizing on the struggle against Israel for its own
aggrandizement. Political rivals such as Nabih Birri, speaker of the
house and leader of the other, more secular, Shiite party, Amal, have
particularly resented the political mileage that Hizballah has gained
from its military achievements. Birri, who regards the south as his
own political domain, disagrees with Hizballah on the basic soundness
of armed resistance in the south and would like to see the Lebanese
army deployed there. In the past, such policy differences precipitated
several violent clashes between Amal and Hizballah, requiring Syrian
mediation. In the chamber where Birri presides and Hizballah's
representatives form part of the opposition, the speaker of the house
takes every opportunity to push the state's position on ending the
Israeli occupation.
Another factor that creates tension between the government and
Hizballah concerns the political ends toward which the party's ascent
may be leading. In a country where power is apportioned according to
the size of the various sects, the growing popularity of Islamic
fundamentalists within the Shiite community - probably Lebanon's largest
confessional group - raises apprehensions that Hizballah's agenda might
include the establishment of an Islamic republic in Lebanon. On the
other hand, those who either accept at face value the assurances of
Hizballah leaders that their organization would never use force to
accomplish Islamic goals in Lebanon7 or trust that the
Syrians would veto any attempt to radically change the Lebanese
system, are still uneasy with the Party of God's conservative social
views and straightlaced approach to aspects of Lebanese life held in
high esteem by Muslims and Christians alike.
It thus appears that Hizballah is not much liked in some circles,
although most Lebanese respect the party for its unshakable pursuit of
the Israelis. The reservoir of public support that the Party of God
enjoys might therefore dissipate if its tactics in the south draw
Israeli responses that jeopardize citizens' security.
The Israelis have twice launched operations designed to agitate the
shaky mariage de convenance between the Lebanese state and the
resistance. The question now is how Syria has countered this strategy
and prevented state/resistance antagonisms from erupting during crisis
periods.
The Imperatives and Rules of Syria's
Two-Track Resistance Policy
A review of the actions of the Lebanese government and the
resistance during Operation Accountability in 1993 will identify
patterns of behavior that can help clarify this question. Operation
Accountability was launched on July 25, 1993, several weeks after
Hizballah guerrillas had begun rocketing northern Israel. Speaking on
Israeli radio, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres described the objective
of the massive attack as follows: "The Lebanese Government has to
decide whether Hizballah represents it or not. If it does, then the
whole of Lebanon is at a state of war with Israel and this also means
that Hizballah seeks the destruction of all of Lebanon. The Lebanese
Government will then have to cooperate with us in silencing Hizballah
and ending its activities."8
Beirut however, did not cooperate. Instead the Lebanese government
pursued diplomatic efforts to end the conflict and limited its actions
on the ground to assisting displaced people fleeing the
south. Throughout the period of conflict the central authorities made
no attempt to discourage Hizballah's incessant shelling of the Galilee
panhandle. The local press did report carping among cabinet members as
to how much resistance Lebanon could tolerate, given the damage that
Israeli gunners, helicopters, and airplanes were perpetrating.
During the hostilities the Lebanese public showed somewhat mixed
reactions toward the resistance's performance, and there were no
spontaneous or government-organized demonstrations of solidarity. In
fact, when Hizballah tried to mobilize a rally in Beirut, the
government refused it a license. Furthermore, the United States
persuaded Lebanon not to bring the issue to the Security Council,
arguing that a bitter debate might prejudice Secretary of State Warren
Christopher's forthcoming visit to the Middle East to try to restart
the stalled peace negotiations. Religious leaders met at the seat of
the Maronite Christian patriarchate to express support for the
resistance only after a cease-fire had been achieved. However,
although the media reported an "undisclosed government position
calling for restrictions on the resistance in order to synchronize its
actions with government policy,"9 neither the public nor
members of the government openly demanded restrictions on Hizballah's
resistance activities during the hostilities. Operation Accountability
therefore not only failed to exploit state/ resistance tensions, but
it also gave Damascus a key role in mediating the ceasefire with the
United States. At the same time, Israel and Hizballah verbally agreed
that in the future neither would deliberately target the other's
civilian population.
The actions of the Lebanese government and the resistance during
Operation Accountability indicate that each pursued its own goals,
efficiently using appropriate and distinctive resources. It can thus
be suggested that Syria was able to defeat Israel's strategy of
exploiting tensions between the Lebanese state and the resistance, not
by smoothing them over or resolving them but simply by channeling them
to achieve its policy goals. The Lebanese actors were both fully
backed by Damascus, yet their behavior toward one another was
apparently so closely regulated that any impingement on the other's
sphere of influence, or any misunderstanding was prevented. Implicit
in this scenario are the following "rules" established for Hizballah
and the Lebanese government: (1) Hizballah is to pursue armed
resistance in the security zone while the Lebanese government resists
by taking responsibility for civilians outside the combat areas where
the state enjoys full sovereignty. (2) Furthermore, each party is
given all rights by Damascus to exploit any political, military, or
social means necessary to arrive at its own goals vis-à-vis the
Israeli presence or Israeli actions in Lebanon, and each receives
total Syrian support. (3) Neither party is required to coordinate its
activities concerning the Israelis with the other, because two
separate tracks of resistance are vital to Damascus's plan. (4) The
latent conflict between Hizballah and the Lebanese government is
probably kept within bounds by a strict understanding that neither
party can use force at the expense of the other's goals. (5)
Furthermore, Damascus's "rules" seem to preclude the use of external
actors to promote their cause or derogate the other's with the
Syrians. For instance, knowledgeable sources indicate that Hizballah
cannot use Iran to provide more effective influence with Syria at the
expense of the state's goals, nor can the Lebanese government use an
external actor-France, for instance-to plead its case against
Hizballah. (6) Finally, only if the two parties reach total impasse in
any dispute would Syria, and Syria alone, step in and arbitrate.
These hypothetical guidelines can be applied in our investigation
of the inner workings of the state/resistance dynamics triggered by
Israel's most recent military operation in Lebanon.
The Dynamics of Syria's Two-Track Policy
Hizballah's Sphere of Influence and Actions
Until April 8, 1996, Hizballah stood by its 1993 agreement with the
Israelis to limit attacks to the security zone. Then, claiming that
the Israelis had broken their word, Islamic guerrillas began firing
rockets into northern Israel in retaliation for a roadside blast that
killed a teenager and wounded three outside the agreed combat
area. Several days later, in a replay of Operation Accountability, the
Israelis launched their Grapes of Wrath campaign, warning the Lebanese
government of widespread destruction if Hizballah were not brought to
heel. It was obvious, however, that a far wider game had been set in
motion, one that had been anticipated since that February day when
sixty-four Israeli civilians died in Israel as a result of two Hamas
attacks. Following the twin blasts, a joint Israeli-American
antiterrorism campaign was launched to boost Prime Minister Peres's
security image. Since a victory for Peres in upcoming Israeli
elections was considered essential for continuation of the peace
process, President Bill Clinton reassured the Israeli public of a
strong U.S. commitment to Israel's security. It was therefore widely
believed in Lebanon that sometime before the June elections Peres
would demonstrate his resolve to fight terrorism by military activity
in the south.
Hafiz al-Asad, on the other hand, was reportedly angered by
Israel's abrupt and unilateral suspension of the peace negotiations
with Syria after the Hamas attacks.10 The Syrian leader was
also alert to possible Israeli moves in southern Lebanon and to
opportunities to further embarrass Peres at this critical juncture in
his career. The circumstances were ripe for the type of indirect
confrontation between Syria and Israel that had been going on for
years in southern Lebanon. This time, however, the Labor government's
overarching objective was to prove to the Israeli public that its
candidate "would not sit with arms crossed as Hizballah attacked
innocent civilians," while Syria's intent was again to deliver the
message, in Asad's words, that "there can be no security for Israel
while Arab land is occupied."
From the day of the Braachit blast until the conclusion of a
cease-fire agreement on April 26, the resistance relentlessly fired
Katyusha rockets into northern Israel despite efforts by the Israeli
defense forces to silence the highly mobile guerrilla units. The
machinelike quality of Hizballah's operations and its hard line in
press releases and interviews gave the impression that the
resistance's embrace of the principle of jihad would make it
impossible to stop it, no matter what the consequences for
Lebanon. Comments by Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and by Syria's
deputy foreign minister, Faroukh al-Sharaa, about the Party of God's
determination to take the battle inside Israel reinforced the
impression of Hizballah's unflinching pursuit of its goal. When
Hariri was asked by a member of the foreign press why the Lebanese
government could not stop Hizballah's attacks, he responded, "If the
Israelis with their war machine can't do it, how do you expect us to?"
Similarly, in response to an appeal from Warren Christopher for
Syria's intercession to persuade Hizballah to consider a truce, Sharaa
reportedly told the American secretary of state that Hizballah flatly
rejected a cease-fire and that at that point Syria was simply unable
to persuade them to accept one.11 The implication was that
the resistance was a force unto itself beyond the control of either
Beirut or Damascus.
Hizballah officials bolstered this impression by issuing strong
policy statements on the cease-fire terms that they would or would
not accept. It was reported that the Party of God was not willing to
respond to mediation on any basis other than the July 1993
understanding, nor would it sign any written agreement with the
"Zionist enemy." A U.S.-French proposal was flatly rejected by the
Islamists because, they claimed, the United States was not qualified
to mediate, given its unambiguous support for the Israeli military
operation.12 When asked in an interview about the
government's position vis-à-vis such uncompromising statements
by an organization that lacked any authority to speak for the state,
Prime Minister Hariri avoided the question, merely commenting, "We
will do our best to arrange a ceasefire."13
Hariri also made it clear that strong public support for the
resistance made it difficult to curb its actions. When asked how he
explained his government's hands-off policy toward the resistance when
their continuous rocketing was causing massive destruction in his
country, Hariri wryly remarked that any Lebanese official who tried to
stop it would be risking political suicide. 14
Presenting the Hizballah fighters as a intrepid, autonomous force
with a mission so important that it would compromise those who
interfered with its operations elevated Syria's value as the player
that could eventually persuade the Party of God to accept a truce. At
the same time, it demonstrated how Damascus could inflict damage on
Israel without direct confrontation.
The State's Field of Operations and Tasks
The crux of Syria's resistance policy was the Lebanese government's
capacity to deal with Israeli punishment without cracking under
pressure to rein in Hizballah and end Tel Aviv's assault. Much of the
Hariri administration's ability to carry out this task rested on the
extent to which it could inspire strong public allegiance to its
noncombative, supportive form of resistance. It could then credibly
portray Hizballah's actions as only one part of the national
resistance that it, the state, was directing. This meant that members
of the administration would have to work as a team, utilizing all of
the state's resources to cope with the emergency.
During this latest Israeli assault the state acted in a way similar
to the way it had during the previous attack except that its efforts
had apparently improved with practice. Government activities were also
covered more extensively by the local press, which had been induced to
hold off all criticism during the crisis. The widest possible coverage
was given to government, diplomatic, and social assistance activities
as well as to the plight of the displaced and to demonstrations of
public and private support for the national resistance. The press was
apparently galvanized into taking this line by a proposal from the
Parliamentary Committee of Defense and National Security that a state
of emergency be declared-which would include the media.
This publicity had an important effect on Lebanese public opinion,
because it drew the ordinary citizen into the heart of the state's
efforts to repulse the Israeli attack, thus helping the government to
shape a supportive national consensus. Detailed press and television
coverage of all of Prime Minister Hariri's almost nonstop shuffles to
regional and European capitals to present Lebanon's case during
Operation Grapes of Wrath repeatedly exposed the Lebanese audience to
their government's version of the events.
During these visits Hariri strictly adhered to the state's line
while treading cautiously with regard to Hizballah. When questioned
about the Party of God's domination of the struggle against Israeli
occupation, the prime minister retorted that the Islamists were not
the only ones resisting--all Lebanon was resisting. The only way to
end the violence in the south and terminate resistance activities
along Lebanon's southern border, he observed, was for Israel to adhere
to UN Security Council Resolution 425 and withdraw from
Lebanon. Hariri assured his press interlocutors that when Israeli
forces did withdraw from the security zone, the Lebanese army, not the
Syrians, would be responsible for security there.15
Hariri also scrupulously avoided questions intended to draw him out
about Hizballah's policies or ultimate intentions. When asked at a
press conference in Paris whether or not Hizballah sought to destroy
Israel, Hariri simply closed that line of questioning by tersely
remarking, I don't want to discuss Hizballah's political agenda."
After watching the replay of this interview an acquaintance of the
author who had often criticized the government in the past remarked
that this was the first time the Lebanese had seen their government
beat the Israelis at the propaganda game.
President Elias Hrawi's decision to deliver personally a complaint
to the UN Security Council about Israel's attacks was another example
of the way state prerogatives were maximized to turn the diplomatic
tables on Tel Aviv. Successful efforts to secure international
reconstruction assistance also improved the government's rating in the
eyes of a national constituency accustomed to Israeli gains and
Arab--especially Lebanese-losses.
The chaotic situation in 1993, with refugees frantically seeking
places to squat in Beirut's mainly Shiite southern suburbs, was
avoided in 1996 thanks to the coordinated activities of several
ministries and state agencies. Government officials helped to install
thousands of displaced families in public schools and centers
throughout Mount Lebanon. Medical care, bedding, and regular food
deliveries were organized. At the same time, the state's Southern
Bureau (Majlis al-Janub), which had been set up earlier to assist the
south's recovery, used Lebanese soldiers to distribute donated goods
to the displaced. The Lebanese army operated as a corps of engineers,
constructing temporary bypass routes and even a bridge, when main
roads linking the south with the rest of the country were cut off
because of Israeli bombardments. Army and civil defense units visited
southern villages under fire to help evacuate the sick and wounded to
regional clinics. Extensive daylong television coverage of these
activities showed the government effectively managing a social crisis
that would have daunted the most functional Western government. This
positive message generated a strong sense of solidarity among citizens
and crystallized a national resistance. People throughout the country
began to pitch into the war effort without regard to the confessional
lines that generally divide Lebanese society.
The Israelis contributed to Lebanon's mobilization when their
airplane bombers struck two electricity transformers in the heart of
the Christian suburb of the capital on April 14 and 15. Speaking on
the second day of the raids, Uri Lubrani, coordinator of Israeli
activities in Lebanon, warned that the Lebanese government's "adoption
of Hizballah" would lead to the destruction of the country's economic
and security accomplishments and that the damage that Hizballah's
shelling caused in Israel would be answered in kind anywhere in
Lebanon.16 The effect of the raids, however, was the
reverse of what Israeli strategists wanted. Instead of using the
attacks to criticize the government's tolerance of the resistance and
pushing for suppression of Hizballah's operations in the south,
Christian leaders expressed outrage at Israeli aggression and rallied
to the national effort. An unprecedented and heavily attended meeting
of "national solidarity with the south" was called in Ashraffiyah, the
center of Beirut's Christian sector.
The Israeli's attack on the UN base at Qana on April 18, which
killed 98 and wounded 101 Lebanese villagers who had sought refuge
there, brought national outrage to a peak. This tragedy, the turning
point of Operation Grapes of Wrath, was taken in hand by the Lebanese
government with the massive participation of the media and used to
drive home the brutal results of the Israeli campaign as well as the
sacrifice of national martyrs who had resisted by refusing to leave
their area. A national day of mourning was declared on April 22, and
after hostilities had ceased, an emotional state funeral was held at
Qana where the dead were buried in rows of simple tombs.
On April 25 Israel was condemned by the UN General Assembly and
asked to cease its operations in Lebanon immediately. A day later a
cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hizballah was announced
simultaneously in Jerusalem by Christopher and Peres, and in Beirut by
Hariri and French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette. The final
toll for Operation Grapes of Wrath was 165 Lebanese killed, 401
wounded, 23,500 shells fired, and 600 air raids in sixteen
days. 17
Policy Payoff for Syria
The fact that Israel's use of force in Lebanon missed its political
mark by a wide margin humiliated the Peres government and gave the
U.S. government the embarrassing task of seeking Syrian assistance to
arrange a cease-fire that would let Tel Aviv off the hook. Grapes of
Wrath also opened the door to a French initiative that disturbed
U.S. hegemony in the region, an outcome that greatly pleased Damascus.
Prime Minister Jacques Chirac's conduct during his visit to Lebanon
during the first week of April apparently convinced Syria that France
was ready to forgo, or at least play down, its historic partiality
toward Lebanon's Christians in favor of a policy that would not upset
Lebanon's political status quo. Chirac was not invited to Syria after
his stay in Beirut, which would have been a logical step considering
the purpose of his tour and France's former mandatory role in that
country. This was construed by political observers as a signal from
Damascus that Paris's regional thrust was opportune, but Syria's
Lebanon policy was not a subject for discussion. Any intervention by
France on behalf of the Lebanese government in that sense was
unwelcome.
In addition to costly setbacks for Israel and the United States,
the centrality of Syrian involvement in international efforts to
manage the Israel/resistance conflict was evident in the mechanics of
the cease-fire negotiations. No fewer than seven foreign ministers
were present in the Syrian capital toward the end of April while Asad
conducted bilateral and trilateral consultations with them at his own
pace and convenience. Although representatives of both the Lebanese
government and Hizballah were available in the Syrian capital, as was
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, they were not brought
into the cycle of high-level meetings but were kept abreast of
developments and consulted by Syrian Foreign Minister Faroukh
al-Sharaa. It was thus made clear once again that Syria was in command
of the situation in Lebanon, and that Asad's plans could be discounted
only at the expense of those concerned.
The negotiations also reaped rewards for both Lebanese actors.
Hizballah achieved the reaffirmation of the 1993 agreement it sought
as well as international recognition as a resistance organization
rather than a terrorist group. The Lebanese state, on the other hand,
acquired equal membership status on a committee to monitor the
cease-fire that included representatives of France, the United States,
Syria, and Israel. This was headlined by the Beirut press as a
breakthrough for Lebanon that gained it international
credibility.18 From the Syrian point of view, Lebanon's
presence on the cease-fire surveillance committee and widespread
affirmation of Hizballah's right to resist Israeli occupation meant
that both actors were well positioned to play their individual
resistance roles again if necessary. In the meantime, Damascus
remained the only committee member with enough influence over
Hizballah to "reason" with the Islamists should their cooperation in
calming Lebanon's southern front be needed in the future.
Strategic gains on the part of Syria and its allies, it should be
remembered, were mainly the result of the containment of intense
competition between the Lebanese actors. It is not surprising,
therefore, that almost immediately after the cease-fire and the
arrangement between Israel and Hizballah came into effect, a
much-publicized quarrel broke out between Prime Minister Hariri and
Hizballah officials. Hariri accused the Party of God of trying to
monopolize and politicize the resistance, while Shaykh Nasrallah,
secretary-general of the Hizballah, retorted that no one was barred
from joining the resistance in its struggle to end Israeli occupation
of the south.19
The state and the resistance also squabbled over who had the right
to assist the displaced and allocate reconstruction funds. This
friction arose because Hizballah contested Damascus's "rule" that the
state has sole responsibility for citizens north of the security
zone. Acting for the state by channeling government assistance to
southerners was the Party of God's rival, Nabih Birri's party,
Amal. Although citizens were requested to reject indemnities from any
agency other than the state's Southern Bureau (which answers to
Birri), by the end of June Hizballah's engineering and contracting
group, Jihad al-Bina'a (Reconstruction Campaign), announced that it
had already rehabilitated more than 2,800 structures damaged by the
Israelis in 106 locations in the south and would be undertaking
reconstruction in the Bekaa and Beirut shortly.20
The controversy over how much and what kind of resistance had won
the day and who should assist the southerners soon settled down to
normally stiff relations between Hizballah and the government as
attacks against the Israelis in the security zone began again. By the
end of June 1996, only two months after the cease-fire had taken
effect, Islamic guerrillas had already killed nine Israelis and
wounded twenty-one. Dire consequences "that would not spare Lebanese
civilians," or "that would surprise the Islamists," were threatened by
spokesmen of the new Israeli government after each attack. Yet, as
resistance attacks inside the security zone continued during July, the
new Israeli administration began exploring the possibility of a
unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in exchange for security
guarantees for northern Israel. This "Lebanon first" policy, if
successful, would make the resistance redundant and isolate
Syria. Predictably, Damascus and Beirut immediately rejected this
initiative, reiterating the need for Israel's unconditional withdrawal
from Lebanon as stipulated by UN Security Council Resolution 425.
Conclusions and Implications
This study shows how a state incapable of directly confronting a
more powerful adversary can demonstrate damage capability by
marshaling external resources in unconventional ways. A combination of
factors permitted Syria to advance its own interests against those of
Israel by manipulating complex circumstances in Lebanon from the
sidelines. On the Syrian side, these factors included its capacity
quickly to fill the resistance gap left by the PLO in southern Lebanon
using Iranian assistance, and its gradual extension of military and
political hegemony over Lebanon. For Israel, on the other hand, faulty
projections of the unfolding situation in Lebanon produced strategic
errors that Damascus was able to exploit at little cost. In light of
the hostility that Syria and Iran had demonstrated toward it, Israel
made another grave miscalculation when it established its highly
vulnerable security zone, which strategists believed could be
effectively held by a surrogate force and a handful of Israeli
soldiers. As things turned out, the Israelis could not rely on the SLA
to neutralize Hizballah for them, and Tel Aviv's soldiers were again
drawn into the Lebanese quagmire while Syrian troops watched from the
sidelines.
Nevertheless, a potentially exploitable breech in Syria's strategy
appeared in 1990 as Beirut's interest in defending its own national
borders and ending violent confrontations within Lebanese territory
put the postwar administration on a collision course with the
freewheeling resistance in the south. This study has shown how
Damascus was able to channel this conflict to meet its policy goals
through the elaboration of a two-track resistance strategy. This
strategy succeeded because each of the Lebanese parties played its
mutually exclusive role to the hilt, mobilized all, resources
available, and found a means of distinguishing itself in the eyes of
the Lebanese public. At the same time, observing red lines laid down
by Damascus, each avoided attempts to draw it into the other actor's
sphere of influence, while rebuffing efforts to incite dissension
between it and the other prong of the resistance. The smooth operation
of this strategy, together with an effective media campaign, allowed a
new resistance dynamic to emerge in Lebanon, one that could not be
shaken by Tel Aviv's military provocations.
The question arises as to whether the policy Syria used to exploit
Israel's weaknesses will serve Damascus as well in the recently
established surveillance committee as it has in the field. Since
Lebanon and Syria have equal weight in committee activities, could
Israel drive a wedge between the partners here? Since the authority of
Lebanon's postwar regime still rests firmly on Syrian foundations,
there seems little possibility of this happening. Coordination to
date of foreign policy between Beirut and Damascus is as tight as ever
when the surveillance committee meets. More germane are questions on
how Syria will use the new group to advance its interests in the
contest with Israel over the Golan Heights.
It is clear that while the watch group's presence in southern
Lebanon may expose Israel's targeting of Lebanese civilians and impede
Hizballah targeting of northern Israel settlements, it cannot do so
without enhancing Syria's role as key power broker. In other words,
the committee is a plus for Syria's foreign policy. Furthermore, the
presence of Syrian, Lebanese, and Western observers on the committee
exposes Israel's "hot pursuit" or targeting of Hizballah fighters
(whose homes and points of organization are usually in towns and
villages outside the security zone) to international
pressure. According to the April 26 understanding, civilians on both
sides of the border must be spared retaliatory attacks. Soon after the
surveillance committee began operations, members were seized with
complaints that the Israelis broke the agreement on three separate
occasions, causing the death of five and injury of twenty-three
Lebanese civilians. Hizballah, on the other hand, has limited its
attacks to military personnel within the security zone. In all three
incidents the committee found for the plaintiff, Lebanon, but took no
action against Israel. The difficulty of verification as well as the
fact that future clashes might give France opportunities to broaden
its role in Arab-Israeli affairs through its participation in the
surveillance group, it is likely that the surveillance committee will
eventually be allowed to fade away.21
The situation in southern Lebanon therefore is back at square
one. Beirut and Damascus rest on their position that negotiations with
Israel over the protection of its Lebanese allies and the Galilee
settlers after withdrawal can only be tackled as part of a
comprehensive peace settlement. On the other hand, the Benyamin
Netanyahu government has underlined its tough stand on the Golan
Heights by authorizing construction of new housing units there. It
has also warned that besides the resistance, "other military units on
Lebanese soil" will not be spared if Israeli settlements are again
attacked from southern Lebanon. This convinces Lebanese officials as
well as ordinary citizens that further violence is on the way-violence
that may engulf the Syrian army.
As Israel's new prime minister weighs the costs of his country's
traditional approach to its problems with Lebanon and Syria against
the benefits of ceding territory for security, it would be well to
heed the advice of Gideon Rafael, a founding member of the Israeli
foreign ministry. Rafael recently observed that the negative results
of Israel's use of force in Lebanon, the complexity of the situation
in Lebanon, and "the way the recent conflict ended there," made it
imperative to get direct negotiations between Tel Aviv and Damascus
over their broader differences back on track. These negotiations, he
added, should take into account Syria's special interest in Lebanon
and also include the temporary situation in southern
Lebanon.22
This study has provided evidence that amply supports the soundness
of Rafael's recommendation. Using force against the Lebanese
government has failed. A unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon
in exchange for security guarantees for northern Israel satisfies the
Lebanese state's goals but neglects the fact that it is presently in
no position to enter such negotiations without Syria's
cooperation. Punishing Syria-inside or outside Lebanon-is not likely
to soften Asad's stance, nor to shake his reliance on Beirut and the
resistance to secure Syrian interests. Whatever leverage the United
States possesses should therefore be used to get Syrians and Israelis
back to the negotiating table as quickly as possible.
Notes
1. Itamar Rabinovich, in "Controlled Conflict in the Middle East:
The SyrianIsraeli Rivalry in Lebanon," in Gabriel Ben-Dor and David
B. Dewitt, eds., Conflict Management in the Middle East (Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 97-111, discusses the arrangements
worked out by Syria and Israel to control their conflict in Lebanon
and their transformation. See also Yair Evron, War and Intervention in
Lebanon: The Israeli- Syrian Deterrence Dialogue (London: Croom Helm,
1987), pp. 45-56. Back
2. Hizballah, "Nass al-Risala al-Maftuha allati wajahaha Hizballah
il-l-Mustad'afin fi Lubnan wa-l-Alam" (Open letter concerning
Hizballah's program in Lebanon and the world), Al-Safir, February 16,
1985, p. 1. See also Shimon Shapira, "The Origins of Hizballah,"
Jerusalem Quarterly 46 (1988):115-130. Back
3. For background on Hizballah's motivations and behavior, see R.
Ramazani, "The Islamization of Lebanon?" in Revolutionary Iran:
Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986), pp. 175-178, and M. Kramer, "Hizballah the
Calculus of Jihad," in M. Marty and R. S. Appleby, eds.,
Fundamentalisms and The State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1993). Back
4. A. N. Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizballah: From Islamic Revolution to
Parliamentary Accommodation," Third World Quarterly 14, 2
(1993):329-332. Back
5. Judith P. Harik and Hilal Khashan, "Lebanon's Divisive
Democracy: The Parliamentary Elections of 1992," Arab Studies
Quarterly 15, 1 (Winter 1993):51. Back
6. Judith P. Harik, "Between Islam and the System: Sources and
Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hizballah," Journal of
Conflict Resolution 40, 1 (March 1996):68-97. Back
7. See Sayyid M. Fadlallah, Hizballah's spiritual guide, "An
Islamic Perspective on the Lebanese Experience," Middle East Insight
18 (1988):18-26. Back
8. Middle East Weekly Reporter, no. 3664, July 27, 1993, p. 8. Back
9. See, for instance, An-Nahar, July 28, 1993, p. 2. As-Safir, on
p. 1, quoted Hizballah politburo chief Hussayn Khalil as saying,
"There is great coordination between us and the government. Israel
will not be able to drive a wedge into our domestic front." Back
10. For an analysis of Syria's bargaining strategy in these
negotiations, see Muhammad
Muslihm, "Dateline Damascus: Asad Is Ready," Foreign Policy 96
(Fall 1994):155-160. Back
11. An-Nahar, April 22, 1996, p. 2. Back
12. As-Safir, April 17, p. 9, April 22, 1996, p. 1. Back
13. Middle East Daily Reporter, vol. 132, no. 4349, April 19,
1996, p. 7. Back
14. Interview, CNN, April 22, 1996. Despite this public position
there is evidence that the government seriously discussed curbing the
resistance during the fighting. AnNahar reported on April 22 that
this question was raised at a cabinet meeting chaired by President
Elias Hrawi in the prime minister's absence. Hrawi reportedly
remarked, "How can Hizballah's actions be contained with all of Iran's
power behind them?" Another indication of the government's
exasperation over its lack of control occurred when the prime minister
and the minister of foreign affairs cold-shouldered Iran's deputy
foreign minister, Mohammad Kazem al-Khonsari, when he attempted to
meet with them. This gesture was intended to show Beirut's annoyance
with Iran's policy of dealing directly with Hizballah and treating the
Lebanese government as if it did not exist. Back
15. Middle East Daily Reporter, vol. 132, no. 4350, April 22,
1996, p. 8. Back
16. as-Safir, April 16, 1996, p. 1. Back
17. Rosemary Hollis and Nadim Shehadeh, eds., Lebanon on Hold:
Implications for Middle East Peace (London: Royal Institute for
International Affairs, 1996), p. xii. Back
18. See, for instance, L'Orient-Le Jour, April 27, 1996, p. 1. Back
19. L'Orient-Le Jour, May 29, 1996, p. 5, and May 30, 1996, p. 3. Back
20. L'Orient-Le Jour, June 13, 1996, p. 2. Interview with Zuhayr
Mansur, project engineer, Jihad al-Binaa. Back
21. Israeli behavior in south Lebanon came under further scrutiny
on November 5, 1996, when the surveillance committee decided that
Lebanese citizens could no longer be expelled from the security zone
by Tel Aviv's forces there. Twenty-three civilians have been expelled
and France, which upheld an appeal by Syria and Lebanon that two
families be allowed to return, was charged with following up these
cases. Back
22. L'Orient-Le Jour, June 13, 1996, p. 2. Back
23. "Israel at 48, Has Historic Business to Talk Over with Syria,"
International Herald Tribune, May 14, 1996, p. 7. Back
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 20:249-265, 1997
Received 10 December 1996; accepted 16 January 1997 Address
correspondence to Judith Harik, Department of
Political Science and Public Administration, American University
of Beirut-N.Y., 850 Third Avenue, New York,
NY 10022, USA
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